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7Preface
In November 2010, a conference on ›The New Politics of International Mobil-
ity‹ was organized at the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural
Studies (IMIS) at the University of Osnabrück, followed by a workshop on
›Disciplining Global Movements – Migration Management and its Discon-
tents‹.
Supported by the German Robert Bosch Foundation and IMIS, these
events brought together more than 200 leading experts, scholars, researchers
and practitioners for academic and practice-oriented debates on emerging
trends in migration politics. Since the mid-1990s, ›migration management‹
has become a catchword to refer to a range of new initiatives pertaining to
international migration and human mobility. One of the core beliefs behind
these new approaches is that migration, if ›managed‹ in a properly and or-
derly manner, can be turned from a ›problem‹ to a beneficial process that will
serve the interests of all: sending and receiving countries as well as migrants
themselves. Yet, despite the popularity of such assumptions and the increas-
ing references to the notion of migration management, very little is known on
its political implications, ideological foundations and practical consequences.
This volume brings together a selected number of key contributions
from the conference and the workshop. They reflect their truly international
and comprehensive nature, which saw participants from some 20 countries
gather and engage in critical discussions on the issues raised by migration
management. We hope that this book, along with the debates that took place
in Osnabrück in November 2010, will contribute to shed light on the crucial
questions that surround the ways in which the cross-border movements of
people are addressed by states and the international community.
As guest editors we would like to thank the Robert Bosch Foundation
for its generous financial support. We also cordially thank all authors to this
volume as well as Sigrid Pusch and Jutta Tiemeyer, who prepared the manu-
script for publication, and Maren Mikulla for her proofreading.
Osnabrück and Paris, 1 December 2011
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1 The New Politics of International
Mobility. Migration Management
and its Discontents
Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud
›Migration management‹ has, since the mid-1990s, become a catchword for a
range of new initiatives pertaining to international migration and human
mobility. A core feature of this political agenda is the recognition of migra-
tion as a normal process, and hence the calls to go beyond the mere control of
human mobility and proactively seek to organize and steer migration for the
benefit of all. This approach has proved to be highly influential in current
political thinking about migration. Migration management indeed provides a
potential compromise between the often conflicting objectives of states, both
within and between governments; it seeks to achieve a balance between the
multiple concerns associated with migration, including in particular the need
to recruit or export labor, the focus on (under-)development, the rights of mi-
grants, and security. This perspective, often presented as ›holistic‹, challenges
the long-standing repressive and control-centered agenda, while also con-
veying the idea that governments are not alone in managing migration:
States would no longer be the sole actors in migration politics and should co-
operate with each other, as well as with other actors (such as intergovern-
mental agencies, international and non-governmental organizations, think
tanks and experts), to build the foundations for a truly international govern-
ance of migration.
Yet, despite the burgeoning popularity of the concept, very little is
known on what migration management is about. Most of the available litera-
ture is still concerned with what could or should be done to properly manage
migration, rather than with what is actually taking place.1 Knowledge re-
mains scarce regarding the ›grass-root‹ level materializations of migration
management practices, or the more concrete ›real-life‹ implications and con-
sequences of such approaches. This also has to do with the massive knowl-
edge-production strategies pursued by international governmental organiza-
tions (IGOs), which lead to a high number of (sometimes influential) publica-
                                                
1 Alexander Betts (ed.), Global Migration Governance, Oxford 2011; Philip Martin et
al. (eds.), Managing Labor Migration in the Twenty-First Century, New Haven 2006;
idem et al. (eds.), Managing Migration: The Promise of Cooperation, Lanham 2006.
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tions by institutions as such as the International Organization for Migration
(IOM), the World Bank or the United Nations Development Program. Such
›policy relevant‹ knowledge leaves only little room for critical and independ-
ent research. The narratives developed by old and new ›migration managers‹
within and beyond the state are therefore hardly questioned, even though
many of the supposedly new concepts actually resemble old-standing policy
tools in the field of migration politics (as the ›rediscovery‹ of temporary mi-
gration programs make particularly clear).2 Another consequence of such in-
stitutional knowledge is to discourage research on the (new) key actors in
migration management, precisely those that produce knowledge and that in-
clude IGOs, (international) non-governmental organizations (INGOs/NGOs),
supranational actors such as the European Commission, new specialized
agencies (such as Frontex), think tanks, and individual experts (both local
and foreign-based). Yet, the increasing criticism voiced by human rights,
refugee and migrant advocacy groups concerning the practices of such actors
calls for independent research.
In sum, migration management raises mixed feelings: To some, it con-
stitutes a welcome new approach that breaks with states’ claimed zero-
immigration policies and with the extreme political sensitivity that has de-
veloped around the cross-border movements of people. International migra-
tion, it is argued, would be a normal feature of a globalizing world; it should
not inspire fears or panic, but be pragmatically approached so as to become
beneficial for societies. Moreover, if adequately managed, migration would
have the potential of serving the interests of both sending and receiving
states, which would call for genuine international cooperation and the neces-
sity to really embark in this direction. To others by contrast, migration man-
agement is a technocratic invention that disguises, often under the label of
more humanitarian and rights-based approaches to migration, the perpetua-
tion of restrictionist migration control; it would look like an apparently
sound and balanced policy orientation, but with the sole purpose of enabling
powerful receiving states to steer migration flows according to their political
and economic interests. In addition, it would embody a managerial approach
that negates the fundamental political issues raised by migration, which
could ultimately threaten core principles such as the right to seek protection
under the Geneva Convention and undermine the attempt to create consen-
sus on new principles regulating migration.3 Migration management would
                                                
2 Stephen Castles, Guestworkers in Europe: A Resurrection?, in: International Migra-
tion Review, 40. 2006, no. 4, pp. 741–766; see the contributions of Victor Piché and
Hideki Tarumoto in this volume.
3 Antoine Pécoud, The UN Convention on Migrant Workers’ Rights and International
Migration Management, in: Global Society. Journal of Interdisciplinary International
Relations, 23. 2009, no. 3, pp. 333–350.
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then amount to a tool meant to regulate the needed circulation of workforce
at the global level.
The polarized reactions to the idea of managing migration, and the
often polemical debates that surround this issue, should, in our view, not
however prevent researchers from studying what is exactly at stake with this
approach, and with the different actors that promote it. This is what the con-
tributions to this volume do, by looking at the different implications of
migration management and, more broadly, of recent trends in the politics of
international mobility. This introductory chapter provides an overview of the
core issues that emerge throughout the chapters.
A Third Way Between Open and Closed Borders?
According to many of its supporters, migration management would consti-
tute the best compromise between open and closed borders. On the one
hand, it would challenge the narrow security concerns behind closed borders
objectives, which would negate the central role of mobility (and especially of
labor mobility/migration) in the world economy, while contributing to rep-
resent migration as a threat for receiving states. On the other hand, (more)
open borders would be impossible for obvious political reasons, hence the
need for an in-between scenario and the pragmatic calls to avoid the fruitless
opposition between open and closed borders.4
In chapter 2, Bimal Ghosh recalls his personal experience and the reac-
tions he encountered when first talking about migration management, as he
was criticized by both those who were keen on maintaining states’ sover-
eignty over migration flows and by the advocates of freedom of movement.
He further reminds us how migration management has long been (and, to
some extent, still is) a ›dirty‹ word: the introduction of a managerial logic in a
field that is dominantly thought of as a matter of state sovereignty is indeed
an uneasy process; the idea that migration should be steered so as to serve
economic interests also runs against widely-shared assumptions according to
which jobs should go to national workers as well as mainstream economic
wisdom that sees (free) trade as the right way to ensure the proper allocation
of labor at the world level.
In other words, and while migration management may now appear as
belonging to the dominant orthodoxy, one should keep in mind that it re-
mains a somewhat fragile policy option, caught between powerful and con-
tradictory trends and interests, including the sovereignty of rich receiving
states over flows from poor sending regions, the deep aspiration to control,
                                                
4 Savitri Taylor, From Border Control to Migration Management: The Case for a Para-
digmatic Change in the Western Response to Transborder Population Movement, in:
Social Policy & Administration, 39. 2005, no. 6, pp. 563–586.
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and the equally deep factors that create emigration pressures in large parts of
the world. Moreover, as Bimal Ghosh further argues, migration management
implies a degree of genuine cooperation between states, as well as a real coher-
ence between their political objectives: in the face of the diverging interests
between countries, these objectives are clearly not easy to achieve.
This third-way, in-between scenario is well-known, but the implications
of this approach have perhaps not been fully examined. Indeed, if closed
borders scenarios are rejected for their inherent flaws, this is less clear with
open borders, which may be rejected either for reasons that have to do with
political feasibility or for the fundamental undesirability of this option. Bimal
Ghosh has thus elsewhere argued that managed migration is inherently bet-
ter than open borders:
»If […] restrictive and unilateral migration policies have not been working well,
should we opt for a policy shift to the other extreme of full freedom of movement?
We had rather not. [I] would argue that a regime of unfettered migration, however
attractive at first sight, is not likely to do much better than the current policies, and
that its political viability, at least from a short-to-medium-term perspective, is
highly problematic. Instead, we should strive for a regime of managed migration
that is based on the concept of regulated openness and sustained by close inter-state
cooperation.«5
This echoes an argument often made against free movement: open borders,
while ethically defendable or intellectually stimulating, would have terrible
practical consequences (such as the impossibility to maintain social cohesion
and welfare systems, the destruction of common values or national identity,
or the exacerbation of tensions between groups). In this view, freedom of
movement is a wrong political orientation and state regulation remains a key
aspect of any migration policy. This is a quite different position than the one
that sees freedom of movement as a desirable, but politically unfeasible, ob-
jective. Open borders then appear as an ideal that, however valid, is impossi-
ble to achieve due to a lack of political support. The appropriate attitude
would then be to call for managed migration as a second-best option, while
waiting for more favorable times during which freedom of movement could
perhaps be placed on the political agenda. In practice, both positions con-
verge to support managed migration; yet, their ideological and intellectual
premises differ.
                                                
5 Bimal Ghosh, Managing Migration: Towards the Missing Regime?, in: Antoine Pé-
coud/Paul de Guchteneire (eds.), Migration without Borders. Essays on the Free
Movement of People, Oxford 2007, pp. 97–118, here p. 99.
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Ideas and Institutions
Advocacy for managed migration implies at least two different processes.
First, there is a need to develop a discursive framework that explains what
migration management is all about, why it is an appropriate approach, and
how it should be implemented. Second, institutional settings need to be built,
or modified, to make migration management possible. Ideas and institutions
naturally go hand-in-hand but, as some of the contributions to this volume
show, they may not always be perfectly connected.
As argued by Bimal Ghosh (chapter 2), migration is a truly global phe-
nomenon that calls for international cooperation; one of the assumptions be-
hind his call for migration management is precisely to have governments ad-
dress jointly this issue and bring their respective positions and practices
closer to each other. This internationalization of migration issues is not new:
the ILO was already involved in such efforts before World War II.6 Yet, it
does nevertheless challenge states’ old-standing uni- or bilateral ways of
regulating migration. It follows that this is not a straightforward process.
In chapter 3, Juan M. Amaya-Castro makes this clear when he investi-
gates how recent reports by the ILO struggle to make migration global. His
analysis reminds us that reality is never immediately legible; it is always con-
strued discursively and migration is therefore neither inherently local nor
global. It is precisely the function of IGOs like ILO to transform a social proc-
ess into a global reality, for example through the collection of (supposedly)
comparable data from all countries, or through what he calls totalizing ten-
dencies, i.e. different patterns of argumentation that all view migration as a
global phenomenon and that produce a coherent story out of the multiple
manifestations of cross-border mobility.
Sara Kalm, in chapter 4, continues this discussion by analyzing the core
arguments that lie at the heart of migration management discourses, namely:
the recognition of migration as a normal and potentially beneficial process;
the so-called triple-win ambition according to which it should benefit send-
ing and receiving states, and migrants themselves; the emphasis on the rela-
tionship between migration and development, as well as on the necessary
cooperation between states to increase the efficiency of migration policies.
Sara Kalm also provides a short historical overview of migration governance,
and of how the topic emerged on the international agenda.
Catherine Wihtol de Wenden also looks at this process from a more in-
stitutional angle. In chapter 5, she sees the beginning of this process with the
1994 Conference on Population and Development in Cairo. Her contribution
                                                
6 Paul-André Rosental, Géopolitique et Etat-providence. Le BIT et la Politique Mon-
diale des Migrations dans l’Entre-Deux-Guerres, in: Annales HSS, 61. 2006, no. 1, pp.
99–134.
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follows up with the policy developments until the establishment of the
Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), which first took
place in Belgium in 2007. Catherine Wihtol de Wenden points out the diffi-
culty of incorporating a wide range of actors in these consultations, including
governments, IOs/IGOs and NGOs, as well as the birth of a consensus on a
number of topics. For example, the connection between migration and devel-
opment, once marginal among experts and policy-makers, now belongs to
the international orthodoxy. She notes that, even though multilateralism is
viewed by many as the future of migration policymaking, the GFMD shows
how challenging the implementation of this principle into reality remains.
From Rhetoric to Practice
Initiatives taken at the international level are often criticized for having no
(or only very limited) impact on the ground, or for being disconnected from
reality. This is indeed a challenge for the discourses and discussions men-
tioned above: they display a quite surrealist optimism that stands in sharp
contrast to the negative image of international migration portrayed in much
of the media, public opinion surveys, and policy circles, especially in Euro-
pean receiving states. This may be a matter of time, as new ideas would de-
velop in small international policy milieus and then be progressively diffused
to the national level, in a largely top-down process. But we may also envisage
a situation in which different assumptions and discourses would durably co-
exist, thus seriously questioning the implementation of migration manage-
ment in actual policymaking.
This is precisely the question examined by Doris Hilber and Tatjana
Baraulina in chapter 6. They provide a detailed analysis of the way in which
the relationship between migration and development is addressed in German
politics. They show that, while this is a core argument at the international
level, it remains quite marginal at the national level. This is due to the fact
that the German government is still predominantly concerned with the con-
trol of irregular migration and the integration of migrants. Moreover, the dis-
course surrounding the so-called ›migration and development nexus‹ can be
very diversely interpreted: for instance, development might be viewed as a
›remedy‹ against migration pressures, which is quite different from the view
that more migration would better serve development purposes; these differ-
ent interpretations can be found among national actors, which fuels confu-
sion on the practical initiatives that could be taken. Interestingly, Doris Hil-
ber and Tatjana Baraulina point to the fact that, because of the international
enthusiasm surrounding the relationship between migration and develop-
ment, some already-existing practices, such as return programs, are relabeled
as ›migration and development‹ initiatives.
The New Politics of International Mobility
17
In the following chapter 7, Victor Piché provides another illustration of
the way migration management rhetoric is put into practice, by analyzing
Canada’s temporary labor migration programs. While this country is well
known for its immigration policy and its famous ›point system‹ to select
permanent immigrants, he shows that increasingly high numbers of migrants
are accepted on a temporary basis to meet labor market needs for unskilled
labor. As he notes, such agreements are widely perceived as an appropriate
policy to meet the interests of all parties, and Canadian policies in this field
are even regularly cited as ›best practices‹ that should inspire other govern-
ments. Yet, the implementation of such policies is nevertheless problematic:
they lead both to the violations of fundamental human and labor rights, and
to the institutionalization of a dual migration regime, in which unskilled mi-
grants have only access to less attractive migration channels, whereas their
skilled counterparts enjoy many more rights.
This shows what could be called the cosmetic nature of discourses, i.e.
the way certain practices can be presented in different ways depending upon
the discursive regime that is selected. In chapter 8, Clotilde Caillault goes
one step further and argues that the sole purpose of the ›migration & devel-
opment‹-inspired projects run by IOM in Morocco is to raise funds while
showing that the organization cares for the underdevelopment that charac-
terizes the country; but even IOM staff seems skeptical regarding the success
of these projects.
Governance, Management and Power
In her analysis of IOM’s presence and activities in Morocco, Clotilde Caillault
(chapter 8) further shows the tension between IOM’s formal mandate as an
intergovernmental organization and its role as a service-provider in the con-
text of the EU’s externalization and exterritorialization of migration control.7
On the one hand, IOM claims to have its own agenda centered on the promo-
tion of managed migration ›for the benefit of all‹; but on the other, it does
what it gets asked and paid to do, and hence what fits into the interests of
developed, mostly Western donor countries. This is by now a well-known
feature of IOM8, which raises the issue of the relationship between the ideals
of cooperation in managed migration and ›real world‹ relations between
states, characterized by imbalances in power, wealth and influence.
                                                
7 Martin Geiger, Europäische Migrationspolitik und Raumproduktion. Internationale
Regierungsorganisationen im Management von Migration in Albanien, Bosnien-
Herzegowina und der Ukraine, Baden-Baden 2011.
8 Fabian Georgi, For the Benefit of Some: The International Organization for Migration
and its Global Migration Management, in: Martin Geiger/Antoine Pécoud (eds.),
The Politics of International Migration Management, Basingstoke 2010, pp. 45–72.
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In this respect, Juan M. Amaya-Castro (chapter 3) writes that the ILO
relies on what he calls a ›flat world‹, one could also say an (intentionally)
simplified ›imagined migration world‹.9 The world would indeed be merely
composed of states juxtaposed to each other, with no consideration of history
or of their unequal capacity to shape the world order in their interests. Yet, in
a context marked by massive inequalities between states, asymmetric ›coop-
eration‹ may amount to the unilateral imposition of powerful states’ concerns
upon less powerful countries. This is for example clear in the agreements be-
tween hegemonic European states and politically and discursively subordinated
sending countries/countries of origin, which – under the cover of ›coopera-
tion‹, ›partnership‹, ›development‹ or ›good governance‹ purposes – pursue
mainly security- and control-oriented objectives.10 Other actors, such as
(I)NGOs, are regularly invited to take part in debates, but probably have
even less influence.
Two other chapters illustrate this complex relation between manage-
ment and power. In chapter 9, Hideki Tarumoto analyses Japan’s recent ini-
tiatives to recruit (temporary) labor migrants in the so-called care-sector,
mainly from Indonesia and the Philippines. He highlights the dilemmas at
both ends of the process: Japan is reluctant to accept and admit its need for
migrant workers and is still keen on maintaining a very low immigration
level. Yet Japan is increasingly in need to import labor migrants from other
countries due to its rapidly aging society, and particularly in the area of care
migration. Countries of origin like Indonesia and the Philippines then face
the risk of a pronounced ›care drain‹ while being heavily depending upon
the export of workers’ and migrants’ remittances. Hideki Tarumoto scruti-
nizes how the bilateral labor agreements between Japan and these two
Southeast Asian source countries, while meant to respect the interests of mi-
grants and these two sending countries, are actually increasing and repro-
ducing fundamentally imbalanced relations. The agreements pursued by the
Japanese government indeed fortify the role of poorer source countries as
›care-producing‹, while Japan as a far richer nation is reinstated as the more
powerful, hence ›care receiving‹ country at the other end of the ›care chain‹.
The same could certainly be said of most of today’s existing migration
›agreements‹ and ›partnerships‹, which aim at developing less-developed
sending regions while relying precisely on the development differentials be-
tween the countries involved.
                                                
  9 William Walters, Imagined Migration World: The European Union’s Anti-Illegal
Immigration Discourse, in: Geiger/Pécoud (eds.), The Politics of International Mi-
gration Management, pp. 73–95.
10 Aderanti Adepoju et al., Europe’s Migration Agreements with Migrant-Sending
Countries in the Global South: A Critical Review, in: International Migration, 48.
2010, no. 3, pp. 42–75.
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In chapter 10, Bernd Kasparek and Fabian Wagner analyze the func-
tioning of Frontex, the European agency in charge of the control of the EU’s
borders. They highlight the contradiction between its mission, which is to
develop a harmonized and coherent approach to the external borders of the
continent, and its actual initiatives, which are heavily dependent upon the
states concerned, and especially upon the power of non-EU partners. Thus,
projects that involve ›weak‹ (and therefore subordinated) states such as Mo-
rocco are much easier to implement than those that target countries with
greater bargaining power, such as Turkey or Libya. It follows that Frontex
actually oversees very different border regimes, which are recreated on the
basis of local power relations.
This tension between technocratic initiatives and power relations is not
new; nor is the disguise of politics under an apparently neutral approach in
terms of management or governance. Yet, it makes for a paradox, as migra-
tion management struggles to avoid the (over-)politicization of migration is-
sues, while nevertheless proposing a whole set of normative guidelines on
what constitutes ›good‹ or ›well balanced‹ policymaking in the field. In this
sense, migration management may be depoliticised (as it avoids the explicit
political issues raised by migration), but is nevertheless fully political – as it
entails, and promotes implicit but nevertheless hegemonic power strategies
and normative assumptions. For example, Sara Kalm notes that migration
management takes for granted the current economic/capitalist world order
(chapter 4).
Researchers and the Critique of Migration Management
Such implicit assumptions point to the need of critically deconstructing the
narratives and practices associated with migration management. This is not
always an easy task. First, migration researchers are often themselves in-
volved as ›actors‹, especially as consultants or experts in the rhetoric produc-
tion of IGOs and IOs. Moreover, organizations like IOM regularly present
their arguments as already being a critique of ›traditional‹ political ap-
proaches, which would be too restrictive, security-oriented, unilateral, ideo-
logical, ineffective etc. This is a logical prerequisite for their action: if current
policies were perfectly efficient and satisfactory, IOM and other IOs would
have little to bring – hence the need to emphasize the ›failure‹ of existing ap-
proaches. In this sense, criticizing migration management amounts to a cri-
tique of the critique – a position that is sometimes difficult to hold.
In recent years, academics have nevertheless started to pursue critical
investigations of migration management. This is particularly visible in the
growing number of studies on IOM, which – despite its leading role in the
field – has long received very little attention (compared to the much older
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literature on the UNHCR, for example).11 Other key institutions, such as the
ICMPD or Frontex, are also becoming the object of study for researchers.12 As
far as discourses are concerned, by contrast, much less has been produced;
yet, research on policy discourses (and, for example, on international dis-
courses on development) have highlighted their potentially powerful impact
on the representations of reality13, which would call for the same kind of ex-
ercise with migration management narratives.
Most fundamentally however, the critique of migration management is
difficult because it implies entering truly political discussions that scholars
often prefer keeping at a safe distance of their academic research. Fabian
Georgi and Susanne Schatral make this very clear in chapter 11; they dem-
onstrate that the critique of migration management necessitates in particular
a renewed discussion of the open border scenario. As argued above, migra-
tion management is regularly presented as a ›third way‹ between closed and
open borders, but without specifying whether it is a second-best option (fol-
lowing the impossibility of opening borders) or an inherently better option
than open borders. This ambiguity is important: if freedom of movement is
structurally associated with undesirable consequences, then there are no al-
ternatives to migration management and the only question that remains re-
gards the degree to which states should open themselves and the criteria
upon which to let people in. But if, on the contrary, managed migration is
only a second-best scenario, then the question is whether attempts to regulate
migration and establish ›half-open‹ (or, for that matter, ›half-closed‹) borders
                                                
11 Rutvica Andrijasevic/William Walters, The International Organization for Migration
and the International Government of Borders, in: Environment and Planning D: So-
ciety and Space, 28. 2010, no. 6, pp. 977–999; Ishan Ashutosh/Alison Mountz, Migra-
tion Management for the Benefit of Whom? Interrogating the Work of the Interna-
tional Organization for Migration, in: Citizenship Studies, 15. 2011, no. 1, pp. 21–38;
Céline Nieuwenhuys/Antoine Pécoud, Human Trafficking, Information Campaigns
and Strategies of Migration Control, in: American Behavioral Scientist, 50. 2007, no.
12, pp. 1674–1695.
12 Fabian Georgi, Migrationsmanagement in Europa. Eine kritische Studie am Beispiel
des International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), Saarbrücken
2007; Sabine Hess, We are Facilitating States! An Ethnographic Analysis of the
ICMPD, in: Geiger/Pécoud (eds.), The Politics of International Migration Manage-
ment, pp. 96–118; Bernd Kasparek, Borders and Populations in Flux: Frontex’s Place
in the European Union’s Migration Management, in: ibid., pp. 119–140.
13 Andrea Cornwall, Buzzwords and Fuzzwords: Deconstructing Development Dis-
course, in: Development in Practice, 17. 2007, no. 4, pp. 471–484; Chris Shore/Susan
Wright, Policy: A New Field of Anthropology, in: idem (eds.), Anthropology of
Policy. Critical Perspectives on Governance and Power, London 2007, pp. 3–39;
Antonina Levatino/Antoine Pécoud, Overcoming the Ethical Dilemmas of Skilled
Migration? An Analysis of International Narratives on the »Brain Drain« (Universi-
tat Pompeu Fabra GRITIM Working Paper no. 11), Barcelone 2012.
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can really be ›fair‹. Indeed, as Henk Overbeek notes, in the current world or-
der and in the face of the deep inequalities between states, managing migra-
tion will inevitably imply the persistence of strong control measures14, and
the question then concerns the extent to which this can be conciliated with
the objectives of balanced fairness associated with migration management.
As Beth Humphries asks, »fair immigration control – or none at all?«.15
Yet, as Fabian Georgi and Susanne Schatral show, the debate on open
borders is marginal and unpopular among most researchers. The result is
that critics of migration management stop halfway: for example, they criticize
the abuses and human rights violations stemming from IOM’s activities (such
as ›voluntary‹ return, detention or counter-trafficking efforts); but if migra-
tion management cannot be fair, then such critical statements make little
sense as they amount to identifying undesirable realities without questioning
the underlying approach that leads to such realities. This is why Fabian
Georgi and Susanne Schatral call for a ›radical‹ critique that would address
the core political issues raised by migration management, and not only its
consequences.
They further argue that many researchers struggle silently with this
debate. On the one hand, researchers are exposed to the extremely unpleas-
ant reality of current migration dynamics and to the abuses that stem from
states’ restrictive measures; they are also aware that all international stake-
holders, while lobbying for innovative migration management and claiming
to improve the situation, are unlikely to fundamentally change this reality.
On the other hand, most researchers seem to dissociate this reality from their
work; they may be sensitive to the moral darkness of migration patterns, and
to the ethical arguments in favor of open borders, but they avoid discussing
directly these issues. This may have to do with a tactical positioning, meant
to avoid ideological confrontation and achieve soft progress toward less un-
acceptable approaches. Or this may stem out of a reluctance to enter into
›ideological‹ debates, which would not be ›scientific‹ enough. By contrast,
Fabian Georgi and Susanne Schatral call for a critique of migration manage-
ment that would address the core issue of the justifications of migration con-
trol, while also building upon the increasing discontents against the current
world order in which the political regulation of migration takes place.
                                                
14 Henk Overbeek, Neoliberalism and the Regulation of Global Labor Mobility, in: An-
nals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 581. 2002, no. 1, pp.
74–90.
15 Beth Humphries, Fair Immigration Controls – Or None at All?, in: Steve Cohen et al.
(eds.), From Immigration Controls to Welfare Controls, London 2002, pp. 203–219.
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Conclusions
Over the last two decades, migration has become a major issue for a wide
range of governments. Accordingly, it has been the object of (purportedly)
new approaches, among which migration management is one the most influ-
ential. One core argument of this book is that there is a need to critically
investigate the often implicit assumptions behind this notion, as well as the
nature and impact of the actors and practices that fall under its umbrella.
The success of migration management is uncertain. As Sara Kalm
(chapter 4) recalls, all the efforts done so far have not resulted in any binding
commitments or agreements for states, which therefore remain largely free to
address migration in the way they want. Moreover, any attempt to improve
the governance of migration will likely face the numerous contradictions that
characterize the relationship between states: it is for example frequently ob-
served that states’ attitudes in other policy fields (agriculture, arms trade, or
trade for example) run directly against the objectives of migration manage-
ment.
It remains that, through the reliance on a migration management
framework, international organizations and other actors have introduced
new elements in migration debates. These may have the sole purpose of dis-
guising the perpetuation of migration control, and of the inequalities be-
tween states. But even if they are purely cosmetic, ideas have the power to
influence the way reality is constructed and represented. In this sense, migra-
tion management is an object worth studying.




2 A Snapshot of Reflections on Migration
Management. Is Migration Management
a Dirty Word?
Bimal Ghosh
Attempts to make international migration more orderly are not new. They go
at least as far back as 1927 when the League of Nations sought to adopt a
convention to »facilitate and regulate international exchange of labour.«1 But
soon the Great Depression gripped the world, and there was no follow up. In
the aftermath of World War II several international and regional organiza-
tions, including the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Organiza-
tion for European Economic Cooperation (now the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development, OECD) and the European Community
(EC; now the European Union, EU) adopted resolutions calling for freer
movement of workers to help economic reconstruction. They did not how-
ever spell out the details about how this was to be promoted and sustained.
In any case by the mid-1970s following a sharp increase in oil prices
and rising tides of unemployment the calls were abandoned. Instead, in the
ensuing years new slogans of trade in place of migration and workers to work
through a new division of labor between rich and poor countries were raised
and gained ground. Years later, in 1980 the Willy Brandt Commission2 urged
nations to build in the common interests of all nations a framework that
would be »more just and equitable than the present one.«3 All these initia-
tives sought to make, one way or another, movements of people more re-
sponsive to the prevailing economic social and economic needs and realities.
The perspectives differed, but they all underlined the need for closer inter-
state cooperation. But somehow the narratives hardly used the expression
managing migration. Indeed, up until the late 1980s, the migration literature
                                                
1 Cited in: Bimal Ghosh, Foreword, in: Joel P. Trachtman, The International Law of
Economic Migration. Toward the Fourth Freedom, Michigan 2009, pp. xv–xvii.
2 Also known as the Independent Commission for International Development Issues,
first chaired by Willy Brandt (the former German Chancellor) in 1980, to review in-
ternational development issues. For the final report of this commission, the so-called
Brandt Report, released in 1980, see www.stwr.org/special-features/the-brandt-
report.html (11 Nov 2011).
3 Independent Commission on International Development Issues (Willy Brandt
Commission), North-South, Cambridge, MA 1980, p. 112.
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made little use of it; and when the term began to be used, the reactions were
not always very positive. For some at least it was a somewhat ›dirty‹ word!
In the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and in the early 1990s,
when I started using the term migration management, it came under attack
from two extremes. Libertarians, including liberal economists, disliked the
term management, as they believed in free flow of people, without any restric-
tion for individuals to move and sell their labor or skills in the world market.
At the opposite end, the enthusiasts on state sovereignty and other restric-
tionists were equally anxious to dump the word management as they cher-
ished their unflinching faith in unilateral control. Management was too soft a
word to convey this sense.
I recall my experience during a ministerial level conference on migra-
tion held in Dakar in 2000. As the scientific coordinator of the conference, I
must have used in my presentation the term management, and that terribly
upset the team leader of a major European country: »Why do you use the
term management and not control? When you speak of managing migration, it
dilutes the sense of control we would like to have on immigration«, he ar-
gued. I tried to explain the concept of migration management by saying that
the term as used in this very context had a wider connotation than control,
although it did not completely eschew the latter. It signified a process by
which two or more conflicting forces were brought into a state of dynamic
harmony. »In the field of migration«, I added,
»what we are witnessing today is a conflict between two powerful forces: rising
emigration pressure on the one hand and dwindling opportunities for legal entry
especially for low skilled workers. Effective management of migration seeks to bring
this mismatch into some kind of a dynamic equilibrium or harmony. To achieve this
we need more comprehensive and proactive actions at both ends of the flow, not
just unilateral and reactive control.«
Why should we seek to remove or at least reduce this asymmetry? I also ex-
plained that unlike unilateral control, the concept of cooperative manage-
ment is also related to a set of precise objectives: making movement of people
more orderly and predictable as well as productive and humane, based on a
commonalty and reciprocity of interests of all the actors involved – sending
and receiving and transit countries and the migrants themselves. I do not
know if I really convinced him but at least he did not make any further fuss
at the conference, as we had feared he might be doing.
Cooperative Management: What does it stand for?
Elsewhere, I have indicated in some detail the design and main features of
the multilateral arrangement needed for cooperative management of interna-
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tional migration.4 Guided by the principle of regulated openness and sus-
tained by cooperation among nations, the arrangement will be built on three
main pillars: (1) shared policy objectives as I have just outlined above; (2)
harmonized norms and practices and (3) improved institutional arrange-
ments for better coordination of action, including assistance and monitoring.
The main tenets underpinning the whole approach include the following:
(A) Labor-abundant origin countries shall take all necessary steps to re-
duce pressures for disorderly and unwanted or irregular migration. Migrant
receiving countries, for their part, shall take appropriate measures to support
the origin countries’ efforts to reduce pressures for disorderly migration. In
addition, they shall provide new opportunities for legal entry to meet their
labor market and demographic needs, both current and projected. Both
groups will meet their humanitarian and human rights obligations under the
major international instruments.
(B) Both groups of countries shall adhere to a set of specific guidelines
or norms to ensure coherence of policies and action to attain the above objec-
tives. All countries will retain their basic right to determine the level of im-
migration in a flexible manner, but be guided by the agreed set of principles.
To avoid policy contradictions at home or abroad, both groups shall ensure
that the above migration policy objectives are factored into formulation of
policies in other related areas such as trade, aid, investment, human rights
and the environment.
(C) All participating countries shall take measures to make migration
control more cost-effective and minimize negative externalities, including in-
ter-state tensions, associated with irregular and disruptive movements. They
shall also enhance the credibility of the whole system of migration manage-
ment by making national migration laws and practices more transparent and
predictable.
(D) The framework agreement shall be comprehensive to embrace all
types of migratory flows including labor migration, family reunification,
asylum seeking and other humanitarian flows, to avoid undue pressure on
one channel and its clogging as a result of diversion of the flows from some
other channel or channels of entry. However, the agreement shall not sup-
plant the existing international instruments on the various flows but may
reinforce or supplement any of their provisions, if necessary to better achieve
its overall objectives.
                                                
4 Bimal Ghosh, Movements of People.The Search for a New International Regime (Pa-
per prepared for the Commission on Global Governance), Geneva 1993; idem, New
International Regime for Orderly Movements of People. What will it Look Like?, in:
idem (ed.), Managing Migration. Time for a New International Regime?, Ox-
ford/New York 2000, pp. 220–247.
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(E) The adoption of the overall framework agreement should go hand-
in-hand with better institutional arrangements, at present highly fragmented,
at the global level to ensure a more coordinated approach to migration man-
agement, including promotion of follow-up normative work, and monitoring
of the application of agreed instruments.
The framework agreement or regime, which will operate at macro level,
may be designed as a soft instrument (e.g. a solemn declaration). This will
need to be supported by a set of autonomous, but interrelated, sub-regimes
as soft or hard instruments, as appropriate, to deal with specific types or is-
sues of migration concerned. Labor migration or refugee flows, for example,
will be treated under separate agreements, but fully consistent with the main
objectives and norms of the overall agreement. The same would apply to spe-
cific issues like migrants’ human rights and integration. The mosaic will en-
sure full coherence and interactive support between macro- and micro-level
approaches to migration management. The interlocking of the two ap-
proaches is to constitute a critical nexus: issues of migrants’ human rights or
integration will be easier to handle when migration flows are orderly and
predictable than when they are forced, disorderly or unwanted. Conversely,
when human rights are respected and migrant integration is smooth and suc-
cessful, it does help in making migration more orderly and free of tension
and thus more manageable.
How do the existing regional consultative processes (RCPs)5 fit into this
picture? Depending on how they are designed, these could be stumbling
blocks or building blocks for establishing a harmonized global approach to
migration management. Most people would agree that migration is now a
veritable global process. Movements of people do not stop at the frontiers of
geographic regions; and the direction of the flows can change rapidly. An ex-
clusive regional approach cannot therefore adequately meet the challenge of
contemporary migration. Intra-regional migration asymmetry – the gap be-
tween emigration pressure and intakes of migrants – is often too striking to
be contained or managed within the limits of each geographic region. There
is also the additional danger that different regions might follow different
policies and norms for admission and protection of migrants. If this happens,
the situation could be quite messy. For example, it is most likely that migra-
                                                
5 RCP-Definition according to IOM: »Non-binding consultative fora, bringing repre-
sentatives of states and international organizations together at the regional level to
discuss migration issues in a cooperative manner. Some regional consultative proc-
esses (RCPs) also allow the participation of other stakeholders (e.g. NGO or other
civil society representatives)«, see: International Organization for Migration (IOM),
World Migration 2008, Geneva 2009, p. 497. Examples of RCPs include the so-called
Budapest Process in South-Eastern Europe or the Puebla Process in North and Middle
America.
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tion flows will then be diverted to the region which has the most liberal mi-
gration regime or has the least effective immigration control. This can easily
lead to inter-regional tension and friction and threaten global stability. On
the other hand, if the regional initiatives are fully attuned to the global ar-
rangement, share the same basic objectives and principles, and thus have a
common frame of reference, they could draw support from the latter and at
the same time help strengthen it.
Narratives and Terminologies: Why are they important?
I had started by mentioning some of the difficulties that arise over the lan-
guage or terminology used in the discourse on migration. One can of course
take a relaxed view of the problem and say, as Shakespeare’s Juliet did in as-
suring Romeo, »What’s in a name?« – it is the substance that matters. But, as
we also know, migration is a sensitive issue. What makes it markedly differ-
ent from exchange of goods, services and capital is that it involves movement
of people. Terms used in its narratives, if taken out of context, could easily
create uneasiness, emotional reactions and even misunderstanding.
My own experience is quite telling in this respect. I have just mentioned
that regulated openness shall be a guiding principle and a critical element in
the proposed new cooperative arrangement for managing migration. I recall,
back in 1997, when I used this term in a NIROMP6 meeting, it caused no little
uneasiness. A representative of a migrant-sending developing country, for
example, expressed his concern by saying »under the project we will cer-
tainly have plenty of regulation to restrict migration, but very little open-
ness.« A typical rejoinder from a receiving country was »we are sure to have
a lot of openness but very little regulation to restrain outflows.« In reality, as
mentioned above, both these fears are of course unfounded. But it took me
some time to explain to these participants that regulated openness should not
be construed as a one-sided affair or one-way traffic and that effective en-
forcement of the principle imposes obligations on sending as well as receiv-
ing countries and calls for action at both ends of the flow.
Let me now turn to another term that is being increasingly used in the
migration debate: governance. How useful is this term in advancing the mi-
gration discourse? The term is yet again an overused catch-all phrase, con-
veniently used to mean many things for many different purposes. Some find
the term, when used in the context of migration, to be overloaded, and
frightening; many others think it is vague and somewhat empty. Loosely
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used and shorn of specificity, the term indeed remains amorphous and elu-
sive in articulating what it really stands for. It is therefore safe and innocu-
ous. And this precisely may be the reason why the term has become quite
popular including in the migration literature.
The Commission on Global Governance (1993/94), in the work of
which I participated7 was perhaps the first international body to delve
deeply into the concept of governance. It defined governance as a broad, dy-
namic and complex process of interactive decision-making that evolves to
changing circumstances, but it must take, the commission added, an inte-
grated approach to human survival and prosperity. In other words, it is a
process, but it does not exist or operate in a vacuum.8 It is closely related to a
›product‹ or a specific goal or objective, even if the latter may change over
time and vary according to the subject area.
Interstate cooperation is often considered a key feature of governance
of international migration. But, interstate cooperation per se does not say
much about governance: it is more a means of action. »Cooperation for
what?« is the question that remains to be answered. Its salience or even rele-
vance can only be judged against the specific objectives it is expected to
serve.
I have already explained why it is important to spell out the objectives
of migration management, and specify what it stands for when we use the
term in the discourse on migration. It is even more important to do so when
we use the term governance in the same context. This is so because of the
amplitude as well as evasiveness of the connotation that it tends to carry with
it. To go back to where I had started, managing migration is no longer a ›dirty
word‹. It is now widely accepted and being increasingly used in the fast-
growing migration literature; and it is not likely to be discarded or over-
thrown any time soon. Even so, when the term is used, it will be wiser for us
to be specific about its connotation and context. We must make clear what it
really stands for.
                                                
7 Ghosh, Movements of People.
8 According to the Commission on Global Governance the term governance stands for
»the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage
their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse
interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes
formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as infor-
mal agreements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be
in their interest«, see: Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbour-




3 Migration and the World of Work:
Discursive Constructions of the Global
in ILO Narratives about Migration
Juan M. Amaya-Castro
»State simplifications can be considered part of an ongoing project of legibility, a
project that is never fully realized. The data from which such simplifications arise
are, to varying degrees, riddled with inaccuracies, omissions, faulty aggregations,
fraud, negligence, political distortion, and so on. A project of legibility is immanent
in any statecraft that aims at manipulating society, but it is undermined by
intrastate rivalries, technical obstacles, and, above all, the resistance of its
subjects.«1
Is migration a global phenomenon? This question seems strange, almost silly.
Most people, especially those with knowledge of migration-related phenom-
ena, will immediately answer: »Yes, of course it is!« But in order to answer
this question to an annoying ten-year-old, one would need to explain a cou-
ple of things, such as what exactly migration is, and when something can be
called a global phenomenon. More specifically, what about migration makes it
a global phenomenon? Another way of framing the question could be to ask –
global as opposed to what? Does the impulsive response (of course migration
is a global phenomenon!) mean that it is not its opposite? Is migration not a
national or local phenomenon? It seems difficult to answer this question af-
firmatively; at least one would like to say: »Yes, that too…« – but, if migra-
tion is both global and local, then what is the point of saying (and enthusias-
tically affirming) that it is either? One way of approaching these questions is
by looking at how international governmental organizations (IGOs) have ac-
tively pursued the production of a discourse about migration as a global
phenomenon. So, one first answer to the annoying ten-year-old would be to
explain that this is a relatively recent question, one that is related to the idea
of the global2, which in itself is a complex idea that immediately creates its
                                                
I am grateful to Jessica Lawrence, Sarah van Walsum, and Thomas Spijkerboer for
their support. The VSB Fonds provided funding for this project.
1 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human
Condition have Failed, New York 1998, p. 80.
2 One could look here for the origin of the notion of globalization, and the use of this
term to describe phenomena as globalized or as suddenly considered global. For ex-
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counterpart: the local. So, even though migration seems to have been of all
times and all places, the idea of migration as a global phenomenon seems to
be much more recent. A second answer would be to indicate that the idea of
a globalized migration is actively pursued in very specific circles and institu-
tions, and that we would need to look at how this idea of the global is care-
fully crafted, as well as resisted. In their recent study, Martin Geiger and An-
toine Pécoud, in the context of migration management, argue that actors,
practices and discourses are intricately connected:
»Migration management refers to at least three different trends. First, it is a notion
that is mobilized by actors to conceptualize and justify their increasing
interventions in the migration field. This points to the role played by the agencies
mentioned above and to the importance of their strategies and functioning. Second,
migration management refers to a range of practices that are now part of migration
policies, and that are often performed by the institutions that promote the notion;
these include, for example, counter-trafficking efforts or so-called capacity-building
activities. And third, migration management relies on a set of discourses and on
new narratives regarding what migration is and how it should be addressed. A
second key argument is that the actors, practices and discourses of migration
management are connected, but only partially and in complex manners. For
instance, actors develop discourses to justify their existence and legitimize their
practices; yet their actual activities and policy interventions often diverge
substantially from the rhetoric underpinning them.«3
My contribution is part of a larger project that aims to look rigorously at how
the idea of the global is discursively produced, and how it is linked to this
thing, or things, called migration. There are between one and two dozens of
international platforms that deal with migration, depending on how one
counts. In the last decade, the amount of reports and other documents pro-
duced in these forums on the topic of migration has been growing at an im-
                                                
ample, Immanuel Kant famously theorized that the fact that the world was a sphere
meant that, for the first time in history, it was contained rather than endless. Taking
up Kant and his legacy, one could look for references to humanity or even the cos-
mopolitan, which again is meant to articulate the containment of the whole. These
words – the sphere, humanity, and the cosmopolitan, as well as others – operate in
similar ways to the idea of the global. The point here is to highlight that the idea of
the global has its own history and trajectory, and, of course, its multiple politics. This
project has been partially inspired by Hannah Arendt, who rejected, or at least ques-
tioned, for many complex reasons, the idea of mankind and who I read as being very
sceptical of the idea of the global.
3 Martin Geiger/Antoine Pécoud, The Politics of International Migration Manage-
ment, in: idem (eds.), The Politics of International Migration Management, Basing-
stoke 2010, pp. 1f.
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pressive speed.4 This paper will focus very narrowly on one international
organization, the International Labour Organization (ILO), and more specifi-
cally on one of its recent documents, entitled ›The Global Economic Crisis
and Migrant Workers: Impact and Response‹.5 The idea is to perform a dis-
cursive analysis to examine how the global is identified, organized, and ulti-
mately distinguished from whatever its counterpart may be.
In order to do this I have identified four totalizing tendencies that are
identifiable in the mentioned document. These four totalizing tendencies are
very much interlinked, and unraveling them into four separate strands is a
highly forceful activity. However, once separated, their distinctiveness may
serve to provide a starker, and hopefully therefore clearer picture of what
this paper seeks to highlight. An important observation is that the global was
already there when the text under review was written.6 So, it is by no means
the intention of this essay to ascribe too much agency to the ILO research pa-
per. In fact, this text was only possible because the global is already there. It is
there because the ILO is there, and because of all the other international or-
ganizations that are there, and that function, among other things, as institu-
tionalized production sites of that very same global.7 In other words, this
                                                
4 A whole industry has emerged in this field, which extends to academia, in particular
to geography and social sciences departments, but also to the humanities and law.
The scramble for knowledge and understanding about this phenomenon called mi-
gration has been aggressively funded by public and private donors and has arguably
grown out of control. But, for better or for worse, it has contributed to and is the
product of the growing dominance of migration-related issues on the political agen-
das of many countries.
5 Ibrahim Awad/ILO International Migration Programme, The Global Economic Cri-
sis and Migrant Workers: Impact and Response, Geneva 2009. – Though this is not
an official ILO Document, it is published by the ILO and it is, generally speaking,
thoroughly embedded in ILO perspectives and vocabulary. As this article goes to
press, the IOM is announcing the publication of a more comprehensive analysis of
the same topic, but with less emphasis on the migrant worker and more on migra-
tion in general. See also Bimal Ghosh/ILO International Migration Programme, The
Global Economic Crisis and Migration: Where Do We Go from Here?, Geneva 2011.
– This work has not been analyzed for the purposes of this paper, even though a
very quick perusal indicates that it could be submitted to a similar type of analysis.
6 A very concrete, almost banal example of this is to be found on p. 5 of the research
paper, at footnote 6 and accompanying text, where it is explained that the division
into regions and sub-regions »follows the categories in the ILO Global Employment
Trends report«, see Awad/ILO, The Global Economic Crisis and Migrant Workers, p. 5.
7 See more generally Geiger/Pécoud, The Politics of International Migration Man-
agement, pp. 3–6, discussing a broad range of international institutional actors. Ad-
ditionally, one could look at regional actors as also being involved, as part of the de-
velopment, rationalization and justification of their activities, in their own construc-




text, like others from similar institutions, has to be about the global.8 That is
its purpose and function; that is what it is meant to be. The point of this pa-
per is not to imply that such a purpose and function are wrong in any way,
but that they are difficult.9 They require constant effort and rigorous disci-
pline. They require repeated reiteration of a variety of discursive ›moves‹ or
techniques. And it is these techniques that are the object of analysis of this
paper.
The ILO Research Paper and Its Four Totalizing Tendencies
The research paper, or ›paper‹, as it is called, is 71 pages long, including 8 ta-
bles and a seven-page bibliography. It aims to review
»the impact of the [international financial] crisis on the employment and
migration opportunities of migrant workers in selected countries in major regions
of destination. The resulting consequences for countries of origin will also be
addressed. It will examine the overall impact and also undertake a sectoral analysis.
The following two sections will focus on the impact in terms of migrant workers’
remittances to countries of origin and of discrimination, xenophobia and conditions
of work. A review of the differential impact of the crisis from a gender perspective
will then be undertaken. In the final section policies adopted by countries of
destination and origin to deal with the impact of the crisis will be examined. The
conclusions will include suggested policy measures to protect migrant workers
consistent with the interests of both countries of origin and destination.«10
                                                
  8 Various authors in the volume Geiger/Pécoud (eds.), The Politics of International
Migration Management, offer insightful analyses of the practices of international in-
stitutions and how they contribute to the idea and reality of international migration
management. However, the particular dimension that I offer here, that of the actual
production of narratives about the global being a fundamental practice of interna-
tional institutions, is not particularly emphasized. See Geiger/Pécoud, The Politics of
International Migration Management, pp. 6–8.
  9 Additionally, I would argue that an international organization’s success at con-
structing a particular global or regional identity is not necessarily good or bad for
the causes it represents. The point here is to dislodge the construction of the global
from the idea that this or that policy is actually good for everybody. In other words,
whether a particular area (e.g. migration of workers) is persuasively and successfully
sold as global does not say anything, in and of itself, about who wins or loses from
that construction. Even so, I would agree with Geiger and Pécoud when they argue
that »›knowledge‹ is selectively produced to accompany and legitimize migration
management activities and, more broadly, the existence and role of IGOs that gener-
ate it«, see Geiger/Pécoud, The Politics of International Migration Management, p.
10. See also Antoine Pécoud, Informing Migrants to Manage Migration? An Analysis
of IOM’s Information Campaigns, in: ibid., pp. 184–201.
10 Awad/ILO, The Global Economic Crisis and Migrant Workers, p. 2.
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Much of the research paper is an elaborate enumeration of data that is itself
based on a large number of reports, articles and papers from a diversity of
sources. It is, as far as I can judge, a very good and rigorous research paper,
and it exhibits all the aesthetic of solidity that one learns to expect from or-
ganizations such as the ILO, with its long trajectory, experience, and expert
staff. The research paper deals with four issue areas, provides recommenda-
tions, and is organized into 8 chapters. It looks at: 1) employment and migra-
tion opportunities for migrant workers; 2) the volume of financial remit-
tances; 3) discrimination and xenophobia; and 4) the various policies dealing
with the crisis.11 It gives numerous examples of how the international eco-
nomic crisis has had an impact on employment and on the numbers of mi-
grants, and examines how various states have responded. All of this is woven
together in a very dense but clearly written introduction, and capped off with
a conclusion.
As such, one can see this paper as part of an ongoing attempt to offer a
comprehensive perspective on what I term the ›aggregate of aggregates‹ of
the global labor migration phenomena. Reading it, it is difficult not to experi-
ence the long lists of states and numbers, the well-organized arrangements of
facts and data, as conveying a sense of overview. As such, this research pa-
per, like others in this important IGO genre, offers a perspective on the ›ag-
gregate of aggregates‹: a summation of available knowledge on the topic of
migration. One can even wonder at times, as I did, how do they know so much?
Despite this aura of comprehensiveness, the research paper is actually quite
nuanced in its conclusions, using turns of phrase such as »it could be in-
ferred«, or »one may say that«, etc.12 Moreover, the research paper indicates
humility in its introduction:
                                                
11 Chapter 1 offers an introduction; chapter 2 explores the economic performance, em-
ployment and migration opportunities and looks at 8 different sub-regions; chapter 3
analyses the impact of the crisis on remittances of migrant workers; chapter 4 looks
at cases of discrimination, violence, and xenophobia against migrant workers; chap-
ter 5 explores the crisis in a gender perspective; chapters 6 and 7 look at policies in
countries of destination and countries of origin; and chapter 8 concludes with sug-
gested policy measures.
12 For instance: »The regional analysis undertaken above shows that for some countries,
remittances grew substantially after the crisis broke out but then either declined or
increased by a slower growth rate than before. This may signal the beginnings of a
slowdown in countries hosting their migrant workers. In other cases, a very serious
drop in remittances after the crisis erupted was followed by some growth as 2009
progressed. This in turn may indicate an adjustment of migrant workers to the new
labour market situations in countries of destination. This adjustment could be at the
cost of formality or to the detriment of terms and conditions of employment« –




»The paper does not mean to be exhaustive given the lack of systematic, solid and
available data in many countries of origin and destination. In using the available
information, the objective is to validate its analytical approach. The ILO hopes that
this approach will be useful in refining the analysis when more and better data
become available. It is meant as a contribution to the valuable efforts undertaken by
a number of researchers, institutions and international organizations to analyze
the consequences of the crisis on labour migration. The ultimate objective of the
paper is for its assessment to prove useful for ILO constituents in drawing up
policy responses to the impact of the global crisis on migrant workers.«13
In spite of the nuance and the caveats, though, the research paper’s rigorous
lining up of facts and data and its organization into a narrative about global
labor migration offer a justification for a number of substantive recommenda-
tions and suggested policy measures.
Totalizing Tendency I: The World of Work and the Global Economy
The first totalizing tendency that I want to underscore is the above-men-
tioned tendency towards presenting the whole picture, the aggregate of ag-
gregates. For sure, this is part of the mandate of the ILO; what it is supposed
to do as a worldwide international organization. Huge amounts of data are
collected from all over the world and organized into a coherent story. This
story is then presented to the constituents, which in the ILO’s case are the so-
called tripartite representatives of national governments, employers and
workers’ unions. So, this tendency is more than a tendency: it works towards
the fulfillment of the object and purpose of the ILO itself.
As such, it seems to be a sign of enterprise when the research paper
starts with the following sentence: »The global financial crisis has hit hard the
world of work.«14 This phrase contains two references to the aggregate of ag-
gregates: in the word global, and in the word world. The word global is far too
common to attract attention, especially when it comes to talking about the
ongoing financial crisis. The word world, however, seems to be at least par-
tially metaphorical, in the sense that the world of work is the symbolic realm
that has to do with labor, just like there might also be the world of friend-
ships and the world of adventure. It seems to serve the function of opening
up the meaning of work, so that one understands that it is about work in the
widest sense of the word. So, if the word global seems to be a straightforward
geographical reference, the word world seems more symbolic; the first is more
literal, while the second means more in a manner of speaking. The two of
course are similar; both are aggregates of aggregates in their own way. But
both are also not entirely substantiated by the rest of the research paper. For
                                                
13 Ibid., p. 2.
14 Ibid., p. 1.
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one, we will see that the global financial crisis is not one single thing that
covers the entire planet. It is many different things in many different places.
Though one understands all the benefits of using the word global, and readily
uses it all the time, it is also clear that one should not take the word too seri-
ously or literally. In this sense, »the global financial crisis« is also a manner of
speaking.
In a similar way, the world of work is a good way of opening up the re-
search paper. The first sentences convey a mood, before one gets into the dry
stuff. The dry stuff is a very elaborate vocabulary, a system of categories and
quantifiables. Nothing gets into the research paper before it has been thor-
oughly operationalized. The world of work is not just there metaphorically. It
is also there in carefully selected facts that are measured and organized.
These facts are approached with carefully crafted definitions and a highly
specialized vocabulary. For instance, the second paragraph of the research
paper refers to the ILO Constitution’s reference to »workers employed in
countries other than their own.« This is a definition. It is one that is as con-
crete as it is problematic15, but a definition nevertheless, and one that is sup-
posed to produce focus and specificity, not metaphorical openness.16 In this
way, we see that the global economy is broken down into various regions and
sub-regions, as well as into the two dominant categories of sending and
receiving states. Moreover, states themselves are not as important as, for in-
stance, sectors of the economy, such as manufacturing, agriculture, construc-
tion, etc. Both in a political geography as well as an economic sense, the global
seems to be fragmented. Even the impact of the crisis itself happens in different
degrees, and the research paper is quick to formulate the responsible caveat
that
»Migrant workers are represented in varying degrees in the concerned sectors in
different countries. This increases the complexity of the impact, and one should
caution against blanket or sweeping generalizations.«17
In a similar vein, the research paper insists that it »does not mean to be ex-
haustive, given the lack of systematic and available data.« It seems totally
aware that it is groping in the dark, and that the data upon which it is based
is incomplete and chaotic. In fact, it seems very humble about its goals when
it describes its purpose: »the objective is to validate its analytical approach.«
                                                
15 What does worker mean? What does employed mean? What about transnational com-
muters? What about dual nationality citizens? What about third generation immigrants
in a ius sanguinis state? When is a country ones own? Et cetera.
16 I do not mean to chastise the use of this metaphor. As I hope to be able to illustrate,
this is but one example of something that happens throughout the text; perhaps of
something that has to happen throughout the text.
17 Awad/ILO, The Global Economic Crisis and Migrant Workers, p. 2.
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What we can see here is a double move, one boldly stating the global, the to-
tal, the entirety of the world of work, while the other is responsible and hum-
ble, warning not to generalize, indicating that this research paper is almost
solipsistic in its lack of megalomania. However, it is also clear that one is the
thrust, while the other is the caveat. One of the moves is clearly privileged
and cannot be discarded. After all, it is the global economic crisis, and it is the
international labour organization.
In the end, despite the caveats like the one mentioned, which occur at
all the right places throughout the text18, what one gets are the aggregates of
aggregates. There are figures about world trade19, and there is a constant ef-
fort to be as broad in the choice of countries and in the choice of labor activi-
ties as possible. Often, the sense of the whole and a sense of the parts coin-
cide, such as when optimism is expressed that »sooner or later, the global
and national economies will recover.« Moreover, the overall organization
and structure of the research paper presents lists of many countries, many
numbers, many practices and policies. It is very hard indeed not to feel that
so much stuff is going on here that we must be talking about global trends
and developments.
In short, the research paper, in spite of its care and nuance, tends to
elaborate a narrative of the whole, the global and the world. In spite of its ac-
knowledgement of differences and fragmentation, in spite of its awareness of
its limitations, it still pursues a global and world-spanning perspective, up
until the final chapter in which general suggestions are made for the purpose
of assisting all states.
Totalizing Tendency II: The Ideal-Type Migrant Worker
The second totalizing tendency in the research paper describes migrant
workers through a fairly unified mode. In order to come up with the broad
perspective that is required in this genre of document, and also in order to
                                                
18 See, e.g., ibid., p. 5: »the assumption is overall valid but […] it does not apply to all
migrant workers, in all sectors and in all forms of employment relationships.« Or,
also on page 5: »A combined destination country and sectoral approach will be at-
tempted in this analysis«. Also elaborately, such in the conclusion on page 61: »Be-
sides the differential impact across countries, there are differences in the impact be-
tween economic sectors within countries. Depending on countries, some sectors with
high concentrations of migrant workers – construction, manufacturing, services, and
hotels and restaurants – have been seriously affected by the crisis with migrant
workers experiencing the major shocks. But some other sectors with an equally high
concentration of migrant workers have maintained, or even expanded, their levels of
employment. Foreign workers stand to mostly benefit from this, although some cri-
sis-affected native workers would possibly be seeking employment in these stable or
growing sectors.« – So much for global or world.
19 Awad/ILO, The Global Economic Crisis and Migrant Workers, p. 6.
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provide valuable information and guidance to the member states, the re-
search paper needs to make broad sweeps and generalizations. The art lies in
doing this while capturing the complexity of the processes on the ground.
Migrants appear in the picture as a victimized group, together with women
and youth.20 Together with these other categories, they are supposed to be
especially affected by the international financial crisis. Moreover, their lack of
citizenship puts them in a position of disadvantage, as they enjoy fewer
rights than nationals. The overlapping of categories makes sense, since it
illustrates how belonging to either one or more of these groups may imply a
number of consequences. However, it does indicate that the group itself is a
bit ephemeral, which raises questions about the concreteness of the group
that is being studied, as well as about its victimized status. Pretty soon the
category migrant worker is then also broken down, into a sectoral and occupa-
tional distribution21, and at the same time into a diversity of destinations, both
national and sub-national. Consider the following passage:
»Along with economic performance, the sectoral distribution of migrant workers is
a major determinant of their employment situation. Depending on countries of
destination, migrant workers are known to be noticeably present in such sectors as
construction, manufacturing, hotels and restaurants, health care, education, do-
mestic service and agriculture. Drops in economic growth and in employment in
these sectors have not been equivalent. Construction, manufacturing, and hotels
and restaurants, have particularly suffered, both in terms of growth and
employment. In contrast, a number of sectors, in some countries, have witnessed
growth in employment. Therefore, in the same country, an overall reduction can
coexist with preservation, or even increases, of employment and migration
opportunities available for migrant workers.«22
Migrants are sectorally distributed, although a lot depends on the country of
destination. The number of sectors in which migrants have a significant pres-
ence is considerable, but also relatively limited. Migrants are also geographi-
cally distributed, in areas as well as sectors that have economic and employ-
ment growth, but also in those that are experiencing a decline, sometimes
even in the same country. In other words, in terms of occupation and geog-
raphy, either as an economically successful or as a vulnerable group, migrant
workers seem to be all over the place. Additionally, the research paper dis-
tinguishes between migrants who have recently arrived and those who have
resided for a longer period of time in the country of destination, and there-
fore have more social capital. There are more groups that fall into the cate-
gory of migrant worker. There are the irregular as well as the regular groups,
                                                
20 Ibid., p. 1.
21 Ibid., pp. 5f.
22 Ibid., p. 5.
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as well as those migrants that are employed in export economies as opposed
to import economies.
As with the first totalizing tendency, all of this description of the ideal
migrant is carefully nuanced, and the caveat mentioned earlier applies here
as well. However, the research paper also ventures into making a number of
assumptions about why this ephemeral and multi-diversified group of peo-
ple do what they do. For one, irregular migrants will be more likely to return
home in bad economic times than regular ones23, and a lot depends on the
sectoral and occupational distribution of the native labor force24 and how
they respond to the economic crisis. Even so, the research paper struggles to
explain the limited success of voluntary return policies in a way that »under-
scores the rationality of migration decisions.«25 Likewise, there are a number
of references to the integration of migrant workers and their families,
including arguments that the workplace is the best place to achieve this.26
Finally, there is a special chapter on gender27, which is basically about
women’s labor migration. Though it would be hard to come up with any rea-
son why there should not be some type of differentiation along the lines of
gender when analyzing migration and labor, it is also hard to see why other
categories, such as ethnicity and race, do not also deserve attention.
All in all, though the research paper constantly makes efforts to
acknowledge some of the more significant differentials, it also, by gravitating
again and again to the aggregate picture, presents these differentials as nu-
ances or even exceptions to a story that insists on being about one category:
the migrant worker.
Totalizing Tendency III: It’s the (Global) Economy, Stupid
The third totalizing tendency is the explanation of all outcomes in terms of
the global economy. Since this paper looks at the impact of the economic crisis,
it is only to be expected that it will perform an economic analysis. A main
challenge, however, lies in the fact that – as has been studied elaborately by
migration scholars – migration is not a purely economic phenomenon.
Throughout, the research paper attempts to explain why the various manifes-
tations of the global economic crisis led to a variety of effects and conse-
                                                
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p. 6.
25 Ibid., p. 7.
26 It is unclear what the obstacles to integration are in this reference. Is it culture, race
or ethnicity? Is it language or religion? Is it class and/or social status? Of all the
broad observations about the migrant, it is the one on integration that strikes this
reader as a particularly totalizing one.
27 Awad/ILO, The Global Economic Crisis and Migrant Workers, pp. 47–50.
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quences for migrant workers and for the world of work in general. It is here
that this totalizing tendency can be discerned: everything can be explained in
terms of economics, the global economy, and the economic rationales of (ra-
tional) economic actors. For sure, other factors must be recognized somehow.
One could read the focus on gender, for instance, as a recognition of the no-
tion that gender is an explanatory factor. However, it seems more credible to
see gender in this research paper as a structuring element in the otherwise
economic explanation for the impact of the crisis. This is immediately evident
in the paper, as the opening sentence of the gender chapter illustrates:
»The factors determining the impact of the crisis are the same for men and women,
all other considerations remaining equal. The consequences for women, therefore,
will be different because of the specific sectoral distribution of female employ-
ment.«28
In a similar manner, the research paper acknowledges the recent flaring up of
intolerant sentiments towards migrants in general, but ultimately returns to
an economic explanation of difference. Moving beyond merely observing
that such sentiments happen, the report puts them in a context that explains
their occurrence: »Reduced overall demand for labour may […] lead to re-
sentment and possible discrimination and xenophobia against migrant work-
ers.«29 All is subsumed under the factor of times of crisis, which means a crisis
in which »slack demand for labour creates the conditions of perceived com-
petition for scarce jobs.«30 Nowhere else in the research paper are other
potential factors explored or is the imprimatur of economic explanations so
evident.31 Another, so-called »subsidiary« factor – time of arrival – is also de-
scribed in terms of economic explanations:
»Recently arrived workers will have developed little social capital, such as
language abilities and networks, which allow them to keep their jobs or to stay
under conditions of shrinking employment opportunities.«32
Likewise, the legal status of a migrant worker is only interesting insofar as it
changes the cost benefit analysis that such workers will make, in particular
                                                
28 Ibid., p. 47.
29 Ibid., pp. 43–45.
30 Ibid., p. 43.
31 The ILO research paper does not refer to a source that analyzes the correlative or
causal relations between xenophobic practices and economic conjunctures. This
reader has not found a study that focuses on these possible relations. However, it
seems unsatisfying to discount practices of xenophobia and discrimination during
good economic times and to do this while avoiding factors such as race, ethnic ori-
gin, class or religion, among many others. Discrimination and other xenophobic
practices in Dubai, for instance, did not start with the economic crisis.
32 Awad/ILO, The Global Economic Crisis and Migrant Workers, p. 5.
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when deciding whether to return to their countries of origin33, or how impor-
tant remittances are. In fact, the topic of remittances is one area where the in-
dividual migrant workers are connected to »their families and their coun-
tries«34, as if to emphasize the macro-economic nature of their behavior.
Thus, what matters is economic performance or other economic factors such
as »the situation in sectors [of the economy] which predominantly employ
migrant workers«35, which justifies a »combined destination country and sec-
toral approach.«36 Even when it comes to explaining discrimination, the
various differentials between sectors and between countries are present, and
here too the research paper demonstrates caution and nuance. However, in-
tersections with questions of legal status, political leverage, race, religion, his-
torical circumstances, demographic developments and proportions, among
many others, are there only in the background, and only for the informed ob-
server. For the research paper, it boils down to economic explanations. And
since economic explanations are of a global dimension, they apply in Indone-
sia as well as in Belgium, and to all the possible variables in terms of context,
identity, or class and social status.
Totalizing Tendency IV: Can We Keep the Earth Flat, Please?
The fourth totalizing tendency is a desire to keep the earth flat. This tendency
is intimately related to tendencies I (we are talking about global work and
economy), and III (there is one explanatory framework – the economic one –
through which everything can be understood). Even the second totalizing
tendency (one-size-migrant-worker fits all) is implicated in this fourth ten-
dency. As such, this tendency is the most challenging to disentangle, even
though its analytical function is very important in the overall construction of
the global for this text. An example may illustrate this:
»International labour law provides for equality of opportunity and non-dis-
crimination at work for all workers, including migrant workers. However, in the
international state system, citizenship confers exclusive rights to nationals of each
State. Deprived of these rights and alien to different extents to societies and
cultures in their countries of employment, migrant workers are at a disad-
vantage.«37
We see here a reference to the so-called Westphalian system of international
law, a system that is based on the flat formal and legal equality of sovereign
                                                
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., p. 33.
35 Ibid., pp. 2, 6.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., p. 1.
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states. The reference to the international legal system as a whole implies a
global system of rules and standards that serve to protect workers, »includ-
ing migrant workers.« For sure, we cannot but expect and support the ILO in
emphasizing this normative point, even if it means ignoring the fact that
international labor law is, as most other fields of international law, a patch-
work of often historically contingent combinations of multilateral, regional,
sub-regional and even bilateral agreements, thinly covered by a blanket of
international customary law. In presenting the international normative
framework as a smooth surface of legal systematicity, the text understates the
rugged and hiatus-filled texture that any practicing lawyer would have to
face when trying to deploy concrete legal arguments. More serious, however,
is the fact the second sentence replaces the imagery of a protective blanket of
rules on equality with a more beehive-like structure in which states can
privilege (or not, depending on their want) their own citizens. This double
move of indicating that there are rights for all while at the same time indi-
cating that there are exclusive rights linked to citizenship maintains a flat
sense of the international state system. In short, both when international law
gives (labor rights) as when it takes (sovereign right to confer privilege), we
are talking about a horizontal system that does not see a multitude of differ-
ences and pluralities. Moving to the third sentence, we can see that the cracks
in the system that are not filled by international labor law, and understand
that migrant workers are at a disadvantage38, even when there are so many
variables at work. In general, there are three main categories here: interna-
tional law, the state, and the migrant worker. Or to put it differently: global
law, the global state39, and the global migrant worker.40
                                                
38 We are talking here about the one-size-fits-all migrant worker, to the exclusion of
foreign venture capitalists, global expats, business lawyers in Dubai and Hong Kong,
etc.
39 The state is global in the sense of being a globally recognized category of political
organization or the legal unit that has global currency.
40 A deeper look into the legal dimension of this picture reveals more complexities, cir-
cularities and problems that cannot be articulated in the short space of this paper.
Moreover, it would be too easy to take such an analysis as overly critical of the paper
under review, when what this particular paragraph does is to provide us, very accu-
rately in fact, with the dominant international legal discourse, which has its own to-
talizing tendencies towards the flatness of the earth. Even so, for the sake of pro-
viding the reader with a very brief taste, consider the following: states are, as far as
international law is concerned, not necessarily facts of nature, but rather legal fic-
tions. They are created by law. The same states make international law. If anything,
the migrant worker discussed in this story is, by implication of being an interna-
tional worker, a category that is created by a myriad of rules. In other words, there is
no migrant worker, no state, without international (labor) law, and there is no inter-
national (labor) law without migrant workers, without states. For a massive expo-
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For sure, the map of the world that the research paper pursues is very
complex, and it never stays too long in these comfortable categories. But
there is a constant push in the direction of equal sovereign states that are in-
creasingly interconnected by processes of globalization. The subdivision be-
tween countries of destination and countries of origin might break the flat-
ness of the map, if only this distinction were not also deeply embedded in the
third totalizing tendency, whereby these two types of countries are in fact the
same, in that they are only obeying the economic logic that keeps them in
either one of these two categories. If the research paper makes reference to
more complex historical, ethnic, or political dimensions of what makes a
country either of origin or of destination, these are hardly noticeable and
never completely separated from the dominant economic logic of migration
flows. To put it crudely, the third totalizing tendency of seeing the economy
as the logic in control requires a map of the earth as a flat space, and one in
which the legal/normative framework is flat as well.
This map is constantly being disassembled and reassembled. A focus on
the (international system of) states will shift to a focus on different countries
playing different economic roles (of origin and of destination), and this will
then shift again to a focus on the different sectors of the economy. At times,
there is a story about regions and subregions, but all along there are multiple
breakdowns into empirical examples. These examples, however, will be
about particular countries, and there will be no specific consideration of sub-
national geographic units.41 In the end too, the way that the research paper is
geared towards providing policy recommendations reinforces a picture of the
world that sees sovereign and equal states grouped together in a flat horizon-
tal plane. One can say that, as with the other totalizing tendencies, this mes-
sage is institutionalized in the ILO. The flat world of the research paper has
to be, in the end, the flat world of the formal category of member states of the
ILO.42
Each geographical disaggregation, into regions and sub-regions as well
as into economic sectors, serves to produce a sense of rigor and comprehen-
                                                
sure to the various international legal circularities, see Martti Koskenniemi, From
Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, Cambridge 2006.
41 For all of its sophistication, the report does not talk about the northern states of
Mexico or the southern states of the United States. Consider the analysis of the US
on pages 12–14, which does not mention any sub-national region: Awad/ILO, The
Global Economic Crisis and Migrant Workers, pp. 12–14. One has to read between
the lines to know that the references to agriculture are references to the labor-
intensive agriculture in the south, and not to the less labor-intensive agriculture in
the mid-west.
42 It is here perhaps that a broader analysis of more ILO documents, as well as one of
more international governmental organizations, is most significantly called for.
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siveness, rather than a sense of diversity and differentiation. In fact, each dis-
aggregation serves to reinforce the idea of a legally and economically flat
earth, where migrants move as labor to meet the economic requirements of
economic sectors. This is re-enforced by the overall presence of a narrative of
economic crisis that has a general global impact, and when this impact is dif-
ferentiated, it is differentiated along the previously mentioned categories of
disaggregation along (sub-) regional and sectoral lines. In this way, the re-
search paper avoids counter-narratives in which the impact is in fact highly
irregular and sparse, with many countries, regions, or localities not having a
discernible impact at all. In this way too, differentials can be seen as sustain-
ing the narrative that migration is an overall global phenomenon.
Conclusions
Overall, individual, regional, or other differentiated examples or variations
are presented as building blocks in a story about the whole world. The ag-
gregate of aggregates is organized into a cohesive narrative by discursive
maneuvers that seek to construct an immense amount of phenomena as all
revolving about one topic: migration work. In doing this, the main protagonist,
the migrant worker, is crafted not in spite of variation and difference, but by
means of an economy of selection and presentation of these, and into a discur-
sive organization that connects all variations through this one subject. A sin-
gular analytical framework, namely the economic one, helps the coherence of
this subject. This has the benefit that since the beginning of the ILO paper,
since its very title, we are talking about a global economic phenomenon. Finally,
geographical diversity, variation, and differentials are selected, organized,
and presented in such a way that there can be no doubt that we are talking
about the whole world here. If my dissections of this research paper have
focused on the cracks in the collage, they also illustrate that the global is pro-
duced by means of reiterated effort and through, rather than in spite of, a
world of diversity and plurality.
All these techniques bear the hallmark of an internationalism that is not
uncommon and that has effectively been institutionalized in intergovernmen-
tal organizations. Many IGOs are set up to perform technical functions,
including what James Scott described as the »project of legibility«43: the
comprehensive and rigorous collection, selection, elaboration, and organiza-
tion of knowledge about the aggregate of aggregates, even if organized
around crosscutting areas of international life, such as trade, ecology, or labor
migration. This type of work has consequences of a political and ideological
nature that not only fall outside of the scope of this paper, but also in fact
                                                
43 Scott, Seeing Like a State, p. 2.
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defy the possibility of any serious analysis. Some have pointed to the depoli-
ticizing dimension of this type of work. In the context of migration manage-
ment, Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud have summarized this dimension
quite succinctly:
»The very notion of ›management‹ is characterized by its apolitical and tech-
nocratic nature, and its popularity (to the detriment of other notions such as ›the
politics of migration‹) is in itself a way of depoliticizing migration. Policies would
not result from political choices, but from ›technical‹ considerations and informal
decision-making processes on the most appropriate and successful way of address-
ing migration. This depoliticization is further evident in the ›triple-win‹ objective,
which negates the existence of divergent interests, of asymmetries of power and of
conflicts (both between and within countries). It is also perceptible in the
managerial/technical language used by migration management actors. In their
view, there are policies that work and policies that don’t work – hence the
popularity of notions such as ›good‹ (or even ›best‹) practices. This evacuates
questions of power, principles, interests or conflicts. The apparently consensual
nature of many ›migration management‹ objectives also contributes to their
depoliticization: indeed, who is in favour of disorderly migration, trafficking abuses
or the non-respect of migrants’ rights?«44
This depoliticization starts with the ›project of legibility‹ and then leads to
policy recommendations, as in the research paper that is under review.
Though the recommendations themselves are not binding, the narratives
about what the global entails become part of what is available as vocabulary
to imagine that same global. Note for instance all the various things that are
not described as global, such as poverty, xenophobia, and the political integra-
tion of migrants. Some would work hard to include these as constitutive di-
mensions of the global.45 However, that too would require the type of work
and effort that we have seen in the research paper under review.
                                                
44 Geiger/Pécoud, The Politics of International Migration Management, pp. 11f.
45 See, e.g., Ronaldo Munck, Globalization, Governance and Migration: An Introduc-
tion, in: Third World Quarterly, 29. 2008, pp. 1227–1246. On a more general level one
can wonder whether it was possible for the research paper, institutionally, ideologi-
cally and/or politically, to include a critique or even a condemnation of the domi-
nant model of neo-liberalism and globalizing capitalism that many see as a struc-
tural part of the problem that cannot be addressed in any significant way with mar-
ginal policy recommendations.
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4 Global Migration Management,
Order and Access to Mobility
Sara Kalm
Migration governance is often described as an exceptional case in world poli-
tics. There are at least two ways in which it differs from the established pat-
tern: One is the lack of international cooperation. In the post-war decades,
states have established institutionalized forms for cooperation in an expand-
ing range of issue areas, usually by setting up a specialized agency within the
United Nations (UN) system. In contrast, the field of migration is character-
ized by its lack of multilateral cooperation.1 Another deviation concerns its
regulation. In an era often described by catch phrases such as flows, de-
territorialization and interconnectedness, what we have seen in migration policy
is instead a reassertion of sovereign territoriality as states increasingly have
sought to control and filter those who cross their borders.2 The result is that
conditions for international movement differ considerably between different
groups of people.3
If these two deviations from the pattern have characterized migration
policy in the first post-Cold War decade, they may now be modified. After
having been a neglected area in international affairs, cross-border migration
now attracts a great deal of attention from policy-makers at different levels.
Over the past relatively few years a number of international organizations,
agencies and institutions have started to engage with the issue from their re-
spective perspectives. Moreover, new forums have mushroomed both at the
regional and global levels.4 Although the complex and opaque governance
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structures that emerge are still far below the standards of a traditional and
binding international regime5, they nevertheless seem to testify to a recogni-
tion that this topical issue has to be met at least partly through cooperation
and dialogue at the global level.
Besides institutional developments there has also been a remarkable
turn-around in migration policy discourse. After having approached migra-
tion mainly as a problem or threat, politicians now tend to focus on its poten-
tial economic and social benefits.6 This renewed optimism particularly con-
cerns its potential to contribute to growth and development in both origin
and destination countries. Most of the international institutions and forums
just described tend to focus precisely on the issue linkage with development7,
which sets another tone than the previously dominating linkage with security.
This contribution aims to explore these recent policy developments. It
does so through investigating the meanings and implications of migration
management, which has become the new buzzword in this institutional and
discursive context.8 The term management signals a relatively optimistic
view of migration, recognizing the benefits of international cooperation and
of opening up more regular channels for movement, and therefore ap-
proaches migration as something to be managed rather than controlled –
what are the actors mobilizing the term migration management at the global
level? How are the issue of migration as well as the goals of migration policy
articulated? Does migration management pose a challenge to the existing
structure of mobility rights?
Globalization and Mobility
»[T]here is a curious inconsistency between the nature and extent of controls on
human freedom and the dominant ideology of our time: liberalism […] the free,
rational individual – unbound by authority – is a principle tenet of liberalism. It is
odd, then, that political and economic liberalism has come to blossom at a time
when political authorities effectively shackle these rational individuals to a given
territory.«9
                                                
5 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences. Regimes as Inter-
vening Variables, in: International Organization, 36. 1982, no. 2, pp. 185–205.
6 See the contribution of Bimal Ghosh in this volume.
7 Stephen Castles, Development and Migration. Migration and Development. What
Comes First? Global Perspectives and African Experiences, in: Theoria, 56. 2009, pp.
1–31, here p. 5.
8 Martin Geiger/Antoine Pécoud, The Politics of International Migration Manage-
ment, in: idem (eds.), The Politics of International Migration Management, Basing-
stoke 2010, pp. 1f.
9 Jonathon W. Moses, International Migration. Globalization’s Last Frontier, London
2006, pp. 36f.
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The current era of trans-border interconnectedness contrasts starkly with the
so-called first global century (1820–1913): That period was characterized by
the dismantling of mercantilism and the rapid expansion in transatlantic
trade and investments, and also by the relatively unrestricted migration re-
gime.10 It has been estimated that at least 50 million people left Europe for
the New World in this period. Many of the emigrants were poor, which
demonstrates that mobility was not treated as merely a privilege for the elite.
Furthermore, international norms of the time regarded free migration as a
central element of individual liberty, as evidenced by documentation from
several international conferences and high-level meetings.11 The First World
War ended the free regime of movement and it has not been restored since.
Instead, as the quote above describes, contemporary liberal politics is charac-
terized by its neglect of free migration. The current form of globalization has
so far been partial, selective – tearing down barriers to the movement of
goods and capital, while simultaneously strengthening control over the
movement of people.
To begin to understand this apparent contradiction one needs to take
into account the pessimistic view of migration that until recently has marked
this period of globalization. Among policy makers as well as among many
social scientists, migration has been approached as a sign of development
failure rather than as a resource for development; something that could and
should be avoided by policies aiming for growth, efficiency and develop-
ment, prescribed in for instance structural adjustment programs associated
with the so-called Washington Consensus. Specifically, the notion has been
that if trade and investment flows were liberalized, gains in growth and em-
ployment would follow which eventually would cause labor migration flows
to ebb out.12 The consequence has been a marked asymmetry in mobility
rights between capital and labor.13 Moreover, different groups of people also
tend to move with widely varying degree of ease. To some sociologists, mo-
bility is now becoming an increasingly important dimension of transnational
inequality.
                                                
10 Jeffrey G. Williamson, Winners and Losers over Two Centuries of Globalization,
Cambridge 2002.
11 Moses, International Migration, p. 47.
12 Deepak Nayyar, Cross-border Movements of People, in: idem (ed.), Governing
Globalization. Issues and Institutions, New York 2002; Douglas S. Massey et al.,
Worlds in Motion. Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millen-
nium, Oxford 1998.
13 Doreen Massey, Imagining Globalization. Power-Geometries of Time-Space, in: Av-
tar Brah/Mary J. Hickman/Martin Mac an Ghaill (eds.), Global Futures. Migration,
Environment and Globalization, Basingstoke 1999, pp. 27–44.
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Anja Weiß argues that social positions within a world system are not
only determined by differing access to resources, but also by varying levels of
»spatial autonomy«.14 Zygmunt Bauman holds that the actual freedom to
move is becoming »the main stratifying factor of our late-modern or post-
modern times.«15 Then how is access to transnational mobility structured? It
partly reflects the division between North and South. Mark Salter writes:
»In this post-Cold war, post-modern, postcolonial era, we see a bifurcation in the
contemporary regime of international movement. Citizens of the developed North
have a freedom of movement that is legitimated by domestic and international
government structures. Citizens and refugees of the developing South, however,
are restricted in their movement both domestically and internationally.«16
The freedom of movement one enjoys is hence partly determined by one’s
citizenship. It is therefore one important example of how profoundly one’s
life prospects are affected by such an arbitrary condition as place of birth. To
Joseph Carens, »Citizenship in Western liberal democracies is the modern
equivalent of feudal privilege – an inherited status that greatly enhances
one’s life chances.«17 Several political theorists now also want to expand the
notion of global justice to not only include just distribution of resources but
also just distribution of membership.18
Besides citizenship, social class also significantly impacts the stratifica-
tion of freedom of movement.19 Western elites, including businesspeople,
journalists and academics are in a privileged position. But highly skilled citi-
zens of the global South who possess qualifications that are needed in North-
ern labor markets also often have relatively good chances of transnational
mobility. In contrast, the current phase of globalization is much less friendly
to the migration of low-skilled people than the previous wave of globaliza-
tion referred to above. The low-skilled are largely expected to stay within
their borders, or – if they choose to move anyway, they often must expose
themselves to the risks associated with irregular movement.20 The stratifica-
                                                
14 Weiß, The Transnationalization of Social Inequality.
15 Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization. The Human Consequences, New York 1998, p. 2.
16 Mark B. Salter, Rights of Passage. The Passport in International Relations, Boulder
2003, p. 2.
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19 Sara Kalm, Governing Global Migration, Ph.D. Thesis, Lund University, 2008.
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tion of mobility hence tends to reflect, and maybe also reinforce existing
global inequalities. In the words of Mark Duffield, »What is at stake […] is
the West’s ability to contain and manage international poverty while main-
taining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its needs.«21
As these remarks outline, migration controls have been tightened at the
same time as the movement of trade and capital has been liberalized. This
seems to clearly contradict the ›spirit‹ of globalization. Moreover, different
groups of people enjoy very different levels of freedom of movement, where
the movement of the low-skilled citizens of the global South is subject to
most restrictions. An important question for the current century is whether or
not the contradiction in terms of mobility rights between capital and labor
will be possible to sustain or how it otherwise will be resolved; by putting an
end to global trade, or by opening up for more migration.22 The global
migration management initiatives represent a call for the latter alternative,
emphasizing the positive contributions of migration and the need for a more
open migration regime. Thereby, and as we will see below, it diverges in
several and interesting ways from the stratification of freedom of movement.
Towards A Global Governance of Migration?
Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud argue that the term migration management
refers to several different trends: how an expanding set of actors have become
involved in migration, the specific discourses on migration and the goals of
migration policy that justify actions, and a number of concrete policy prac-
tices.23
Starting with the actors and institutions of migration management the
first observation to be made is the comparatively low level of institutional-
ized cooperation between states in comparison to many other areas of inter-
national affairs. The issue of refugees and forced migration marks a clear ex-
ception: the refugee regime is based on the norms set out in the Geneva Con-
vention of 1951 and has a clear center in the organization of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). But refugees constitute
a separate area in international law, and so-called voluntary or economic/
labor migration significantly lags behind when it comes to international co-
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operation. Another caveat should be added immediately: there are examples
of far-reaching interstate cooperation in some world regions, most notably in
the EU.24 But there is no binding international regime setting out norms,
rules and decision-making procedures for governing (labor/voluntary) mi-
gration at the global level, in contrast to issue areas such as trade, climate
change and human rights.25 One reason is states’ general unwillingness to
cooperate on issues such as migration that are perceived as being closely re-
lated to the core of Westphalian sovereignty: the control over territory and
population. Another factor that inhibits cooperation is the absence of a joint
vision and the existence of widely differing interests between origin and des-
tination states in this issue area.26
Nevertheless, the recent past has witnessed a surge in interest in inter-
national migration on part of the international community. For the very first
time, migration was discussed in an international policy setting in 1994, in
the context of a subtheme of the International Conference on Population and
Development (ICPD) in Cairo (Egypt). The ICPD’s program of action made a
relatively optimistic outlook on the developmental potential of migration,
and advocated more cooperation between sending and origin states. It
would, however, take a long time before interstate cooperation again ap-
peared at the global policy agenda. Over the course of the 1990s, several UN
General Assembly resolutions called for an international conference exclu-
sively focused on migration; however, the major destination countries swiftly
thwarted this. Apart from the question of refugees and the area of forced mi-
gration, international migration was largely absent from the global agenda
for most part of the 1990s.27 Yet, the need for more international cooperation
was not wholly forgotten. For instance, in 2001, it was restated in the UN
World Conference against Racism. Two years later, the UN Secretary-General
along with a number of governments established the independent Global
Commission on International Migration (GCIM). This forum was mandated
to put international migration at the global agenda and to suggest improve-
ments in the field of migration governance, it was made up of representatives
of governments from different world regions as well as business, labor, hu-
man rights groups etc., and the final report (entitled: ›Migration in an Inter-
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connected World: New Directions for Action‹), containing six principles and
33 specific recommendations, was seen as an important consensus docu-
ment.28
New decisive steps were taken in 2006, when the UN General Assem-
bly held its first High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development.29 At
that occasion, state delegates displayed only little appetite for new highly
institutionalized forms of cooperation. In a report preceding the High-Level
Dialogue, the Secretary-General had suggested that forms for continued dia-
logue be organized. Most states approved this idea but had different prefer-
ences as to the specifics of such dialogue. One group opted for an open-
ended, non-bureaucratic, non-decision-making forum for consultation. An-
other group, that included China and the Group of 77, wanted discussions to
be more formal in character and take place within the UN framework. A few
states rejected any sort of forum. This position was taken among others by
the United States and Australia. Other important destination states, such as
the EU members, were however favorable to the idea of setting up a forum.30
The following year, Belgium was the host of the first Global Forum on
Migration and Development (GFMD). The forum has been convened annu-
ally since then, each year in a different country. The organizational structure
is closest to the one promoted by the first group mentioned above. It is not an
arena for formal negotiations and it is not an international organization. It
merely offers a space for informal discussions between state delegates,
standing formally outside of the UN system.31 In comparison to many other
forms of international cooperation and dialogue, the GFMD’s interaction
with civil society is quite restricted. Each year, a civil society organization
from the host country has organized so-called civil society days parallel to
state sessions, but consultation with states has so far been limited to a short
interface session. Still, civil society activities have burgeoned during the
GFMD sessions. Some groups seek influence through participation in the
civil society days while others reject the GFMD altogether and instead or-
ganize oppositional events and demonstrations.32 The non-committing/non-
binding character of the GFMD is quite telling of global migration govern-
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ance. States have so far tended to avoid binding multilateral instruments in
this area. Only a small minority of states has ratified the relevant ILO Con-
ventions. The UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant
Workers and Members of their Families has met a similar fate. After it was
adopted in the UN General Assembly in 1990 it took 13 years before it got the
sufficient number of ratifications to enter into force.33 At the time of writing,
it has only been ratified by slightly more than 40 states, not including any of
the major destination states. On the other hand, soft law instruments, vague
guidelines and principles have flourished. The most important one is proba-
bly the ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration, which spells out a
set of non-binding principles and guidelines for the formulation and imple-
mentation of labor migration policies.
Another example is the Berne Initiative, which was initiated in 2001 by
the Swiss Government. In its work it organized consultations with states in
all regions in order to develop a joint approach to migration management. Its
final document, called International Agenda for Migration Management
(IAMM), is explicitly non-binding, and it consists of common understandings
and effective practices. A final example is the so-called Hague Process. Launch-
ed in 2000 by the Netherlands’ chapter of the Society for International Devel-
opment, it included around 500 representatives from governments, interna-
tional organizations, nongovernmental organizations as well as academia
and is widely perceived as a civil-society initiative. Its final report, the Hague
Declaration, includes 21 principles for migration policy.34
In the light of all these developments and institutions, what is most im-
portant, is the fact that at present there is no single international organization
that can provide the core of migration management in the way that WTO and
UNHCR do for the trade and refugee regimes respectively. Instead, a large
number of international organizations tackle migration from their respective
points of view. For instance, while the ILO deals with questions regarding
labor migration, the WHO deals with the migration of health care workers
and the UNHCR handles mixed refugee-migrant flows. Following upon a
lengthy period of uncoordinated activities, in 2006 the Global Migration
Group (GMG) has been set up to coordinate the actions of the 14 most in-
volved organizations through recurrent meetings between directors. Within
the GMG, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) deserves spe-
cial mentioning. At present IOM is the only interstate organization that deals
exclusively with migration. Established in 1951, it has grown considerably
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over the course of the two decades as Western states’ control ambitions have
increased after the end of the Cold War. It now has 127 member states, 440
field offices and 7,000 members of staff. It is not part of the UN system and is
therefore often described as lacking in normative authority. Its work is al-
most exclusively project-based and its operations are commissioned by
states.35 The IOM is also a key promoter of the term migration management.
Bimal Ghosh originally coined the term in the early 1990s. The NIROMP
project (New International Regime for Orderly Movements of People)36 ad-
vocated the establishment of a binding regime, and it was in this sense that
IOM (the main executing agency in this project) first used the term.37 But in
the early 2000s, the post-Cold War optimistic view of international coopera-
tion had waned. As governments’ attitude to binding international regimes
became increasingly weaker, IOM began to use the term migration manage-
ment in a more loose and imprecise way.38
To sum up, there is still no binding international regime on migration.
However, an expanding number of international actors have lately become
involved in migration. States still want to avoid binding commitments in this
area, but new forums and arenas provide space for discussion, and several
collections of guidelines and principles have been elaborated.
The Discourse of Migration Management
This section explores the discourse on migration management as it appears
among agencies and forums operating at the global level.39 It has been ar-
gued that cooperation on migration is inhibited by a lack of consensus on the
subject, as states disagree on the causes of migration as well as whether it is
desirable to liberalize or restrict it.40 However, many actors are now involved
in consensus-shaping activities. We have seen above that a number of or-
ganizations, commissions and initiatives have published reports on how to
improve migration governance. Although weak and non-binding, the guide-
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lines and principles thus elaborated reflect a minimum level of consensus,
and they may also have a certain normative power in the longer run. The
dominating way in which a social phenomenon is understood will have con-
sequences for policy. In this context, it is therefore important to study the
particular knowledge of migration that is expressed in migration manage-
ment documents.
International migration, first, is increasingly described as a permanent
or normal phenomenon in world affairs. For instance, the previously men-
tioned Hague Declaration emphasizes that »[i]t is essential to understand
migration as a normal fact of life for individuals, families, communities and
states.«41 Specifically, migration is seen as such because it now occurs in the
context of globalization:
»Today, globalization, together with advances in communications and transpor-
tation, has greatly increased the number of people who have the desire and the
capacity to move to other places.«42
The understanding of migration as permanent reflects the realization – or
perhaps resignation – that migration is an unavoidable reality in a world of
ever more intense trans-border flows and interdependencies.
»Migration reflects our times: with globalization bringing new technologies and
deepening international integration and dependency, the movement of goods,
services, capital and people has been greatly increased and facilitated.«43
In short, the way that migration is linked to globalization is often understood
as a combination of three elements: first, the persistent de facto disparities
between rich and poor countries. Second, the increased awareness of these
disparities that is brought about by such developments as the ICT revolution
and the global reach of the media, and which strengthens the allure of the
more developed countries. Third, the availability of means to overcome the
mentioned disparities, including improved and cheaper costs of transporta-
tion as well as the establishment of migrant networks and the operation of
the migration industry (legal or illegal) which facilitate the actual movement
and seem to defy any governmental regulative effort. As goods, capital and
information are moving ever more freely across national boundaries, it seems
in effect impossible to exercise complete control over the movement of peo-
ple. This stands in stark contrast to the previously dominating understanding
of the relationship between different sorts of flows. That view, referred to
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above, assumed that trade and investment flows would actually substitute
for the movement of labor. In contrast, it is now recognized that the liberali-
zation of these flows increases migration: migration is both produced by
globalization and made unstoppable by processes relating to it. As Stephen
Castles has put it, »Globalization has the inherent contradiction of producing
both a North-South gap and the technological and cultural means of over-
coming this gap«44, and: »Since the factors that enhance migration are un-
likely to be reversed, migration is generally thought to continue and proba-
bly even increase in the future.«45 What all this boils down to is the more or
less outright admission that individual states do not have the capacity to
prevent migration, something which they probably never did anyway but for
long were hesitant to admit: »History shows that trying to keep people at
home is not only costly, but futile.«46 Stating that migration is now a perma-
nent phenomenon seems to imply that pursuing a zero-immigration policy is
not a feasible alternative. Hence, it calls for a more comprehensive re-
orientation in migration policy. In an era of globalization, the world’s popu-
lation must be understood as potentially mobile. In such a setting it is not
realistic for states to handle the issue unilaterally and in an ad hoc manner,
treating it as temporary aberration from the normal state of things. The em-
pirical claim that migration is unavoidable therefore challenges the control
paradigm.
Migration is now also increasingly described as a (potentially) positive
phenomenon. This contrasts with the perceptions of migrants as socially dis-
ruptive and as threatening to the welfare and security of receiving states,
which have dominated affluent countries’ immigration policies in the post-
Cold War era.47 In commenting on the discussions in the first two sessions of
the Global Forum on Migration and Development, Philip Martin and Manolo
Abella concluded that »[m]ost participants in the GFMD believe that more
migration is inevitable, [and] that migration is generally beneficial to mi-
grants and receiving countries.«48 The self-presentation of the GFMD gives
the same impression:
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»The GFMD has established a new approach to migration by squarely moving
development to the centre of the migration debate; and enabled a shift of the mi-
gration and development paradigm by promoting legal migration as an
opportunity for development of both origin and destination countries, rather than
as a threat.«49
For destination states, the perceived benefits of migration mainly involve its
potential for tackling labor market scarcities and the problems of aging
populations. As mentioned above, developed countries are already compet-
ing over attracting highly skilled migrants who possess knowledge relevant
to certain technical and professional sectors. This demand has led to a signifi-
cant although highly unequal relaxation of migration policy, reversing the
previous European ban on primary labor migration, and tilting the US em-
phasis from family reunification as the foremost reason for immigration.50
But the need for migrants is not just limited to the highly skilled: aging
and higher job expectations among the native populations are also producing
shortages in sectors such as agriculture, construction and domestic services.51
Declining birth rates in many industrialized countries, notably Western
Europe and Japan52, have caused shrinking and older populations. This is not
only problematic for productivity but also for keeping pensions and welfare
on politically and socially acceptable levels, and it might have to be partially
solved by immigration.53 The other factor, that increases the need for migra-
tion, is the refusal of natives to take in certain kinds of jobs for low-skilled
workers. The GCIM explains that the competitiveness of the global economy
has created a demand for »a flexible labor force« – »prepared to work for low
wages and under difficult conditions. This demand can be satisfied by mi-
grant workers from developing countries.«54 In fact, it already is – we now
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have a »de facto liberalization of the global labor market«55 as the demand
for this specific labor is met by irregular migrants.56
The policy suggestion that follows is therefore to expand possibilities
for regular migration, not only of high-skilled but also for low-skilled work-
ers, in order to satisfy this demand in an authorized and safe manner.57 For
sending countries, labor emigration has important developmental poten-
tials.58 The most tangible benefit here is remittances, the volume of which has
expanded in recent years. The World Bank estimates that worldwide remit-
tances in 2010 reached USD 440 billion, 325 of which went to the developing
world.59 While remittances are usually used for consumption, they are some-
times also invested and saved. Other potential developmental benefits
include the enhancement of migrant skills, as well as the transfer of social,
financial and cognitive resources when the migrant returns.60 Diaspora net-
works may also contribute to development through collective investments in
development projects back home.61 It has therefore become a trend for gov-
ernments to tend to their diasporas, offering everything to them from formal
recognition to tax cuts and voting rights.62
There are two aspects of the optimistic outlook on migration that
should be emphasized. One is the perceived relation between migration and
development.63 In contrast to the formerly dominating view of migration as
being caused by (under)development, the direction of causality is now re-
versed: migration is now approached as a tool or instrument that can be used
in order to bring about development.64 It can even be argued that migration
provides a way of transferring developmental benefits that fits particularly
well with the spirit of our time. In the words of Devesh Kapur,
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»[r]emittances strike the right cognitive chords. They fit in with a communitarian,
›third way‹ approach and exemplify the principle of self-help. People from poor
countries can just migrate and send back money that not only helps their families,
but their countries as well. Immigrants, rather than governments, then become the
biggest provider of foreign aid.«65
While ›migration-development‹ is associated with increased freedom of
movement, this mobility also comes with a price. The responsibility for
development is shifted from governments and corporations to individual
migrants and diaspora groups who are expected to compensate for develop-
mental mismanagement and global inequalities.66 The particular embodi-
ment of the ›ideal immigrant‹ vision67 in migration management is mobile,
thrifty, entrepreneurial and with a strong sense of responsibility towards
homeland development. Partly following from the above, the second aspect
of the positive view of migration that I want to stress is that the contempo-
rary structure of global capitalism is taken for granted rather than questioned
in the migration management discourse. As Gerald Boucher has argued,
capitalism is somewhat implicitly assumed to be a solution rather than a
problem:
»Not only are capitalists and the global capitalist system not part of the problem,
the solution involves more capitalism in the form of neoliberal policies to deregulate
states’ control over the free mobility of migrant labour… After all, is it not
capitalist employers, benefiting from neoliberal policies, who profit the most from
the international migration of high- and low-skilled, and irregular labour?«68
The Shift from Control to Management
This conceptualization of migration has consequences for the goals and the
forms of migration policy and results in a shift from control to management.
The permanent character of migration suggests that we cannot control, and
the recognition of migrants’ contributions suggests that we shouldn’t – at least
not in the sense of 100-percent migration restrictivism. Aiming at a restrictive
migration regime would be both unrealistic and economically unwise. The
term management is sometimes taken to suggest that states acknowledge that
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they find themselves in an unavoidable situation with which they must
deal.69 As was demonstrated previously, this situation is also perceived as to
be turned into something positive. As explained by the Berne Initiative,
»[d]ebates regarding whether to have immigration or not are being replaced by
debates on how to manage migration to maximize the positive effects that migration
– skilled and unskilled, temporary and permanent – can have.«70
The overall goal of migration policy here appears as one of optimization: to
maximize the positive contributions while at the same time minimizing the
negative consequences of migration.71 But then, we have to ask ourselves: for
whom is migration to be optimized? Whose interests shall it be designed to
serve? The position in the migration management discourse is that every-
body could gain.
»The challenge for States is to maximize the positive effects while
minimizing the negative implications of migration for States, societies and
the migrants themselves.«72 This discursive element together with the main
slogan of the IOM, Managing Migration for the Benefit of All, connotes the
general idea of a win-win-win (triple win) situation when it comes to gov-
erning international migration. Migration is described as potentially working
in the service of both sending and receiving states as well as the individual
migrants themselves:73 »There is an emerging consensus that countries can
cooperate to create triple wins, for migrants, for their countries of origin and
for the societies that receive them.«74
The insistence on shared interests and a triple win outcome is instru-
mental insofar as it creates possibilities for cooperation in an issue area that
has so far been marked by divergent interests between origin and destination
countries. But it also displays a liberal institutionalist conviction that joint
gains are attainable. This idea seems a modern and secular manifestation of
»harmony ideology«, as anthropologist Laura Nader has pointed out.75 By
emphasizing common interests and downplaying conflict and power asym-
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metries, the term migration management, like other managerial concepts
(such as security management or water management), depoliticizes its sub-
ject by presenting it as a technical problem rather than a matter of political
choice.76 In Fabian Georgi’s words:
»What previously was politics of migration, with all its connotations – principles,
power, interests and conflicts – has been transformed into nondescript, apolitical
migration management.«77
What, then, does migration management entail concretely – given that it is
presented as a tool for maximizing the benefits of migration? According to
the IOM’s ›Glossary on Migration‹ the term is used to
»encompass numerous governmental functions and a national system of orderly
and humane management for cross-border migration, particularly managing the
entry and presence of foreigners within the borders of the State and the protection
of refugees and others in need of protection.«78
In general terms, migration management refers to a comprehensive approach
to migration policy79: Migration cannot be dealt with in isolation, but an
integrated approach must be taken so that migration policy is complemented
by measures in other areas. The Berne Initiative states that migration is
linked to, for instance, economic, social, labor, trade, health, cultural and
security domains.80 Whereas the linkage between migration and security has
got the most attention, especially since September 11, the Global Commission
on International Migration (GCIM) emphasizes that migration is also linked
to such areas as development, human rights and good governance. In order
to produce positive outcomes, migration policy needs to be complemented
by policies in these other areas which do both: They affect migration and are
affected by migration themselves.81 This stresses the need for enhanced
capacity and coordination at the national level. Issues of migration are often
addressed by several governmental ministries, and with poor coordination
between them, the result is policy incoherence. Therefore, enhancing the
coordination between various governmental agencies is perceived as vital for
effective migration management.
The comprehensive approach also concerns the scope for migration
policy. Migration policy does no longer equate only control at the border, but
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should span all the stages of the migratory process – from the causes of
migration, its means and routes, to the regulation of entry, settlement, inte-
gration and return.82 The comprehensive global migration management
documents therefore contain sections on a wide variety of fields. The recom-
mendations of the GCIM, for instance, concern everything from addressing
root causes, the regulation of labor migration and the prevention of irregular
movements, to policies of integration as well as return. Addressing such a
wide variety of issues, the general goal of optimizing the positive effects of
migration is necessarily broken down into a number of sub-goals and rec-
ommendations within different fields of policy. However, there is one over-
riding concern which marks the texts on migration management, and that is
the quest for making migration orderly. It is this orderly migration, or some-
times »orderly and promptly managed« migration83 that has the potential of
bringing about the positive effects for states and individuals. Orderly in this
sense equalizes authorized movements, movements that comply with laws
and regulations in all its different stages.84 On the one hand, irregular migra-
tion is a constant reminder of the lack of state capacity whereas with orderly
movement this is not a problem. Also, it is orderly migration that can be
managed, i.e. can be adapted to social, developmental or labor market re-
quirements and so on. To achieve orderly movements is thus a precondition
for subsequent maximization strategies. From a human rights perspective, it
seems beyond doubt that orderly and authorized movement is preferable for
the individual migrant. Combating trafficking in people for the purposes of
slavery, sexual exploitation and so on is certainly imperative. For individual
migrants, authorized movement probably decreases the risk of exploitation
from both smugglers and employers. Irregular movement is not only seen as
threatening state sovereignty but threatening the migrants themselves.
Finally, migration management is comprehensive in that it calls for
cooperation among a larger range of actors. In international law, states have
the sovereign right to decide whom to admit into its territory, with very few
restrictions (mostly concerning refugees). In migration management propos-
als this right is thoroughly respected. But the complexities of contemporary
migration call for increased cooperation with various actors – for example
IGOs, NGOs and the private sector – at national, regional and global levels.85
Most importantly, however, there are invariably calls for increased inter-state
cooperation on migration. The transnational character of migratory move-
ments, the effort of broadening migration policy to cover all stages in the
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migratory process, along with the general efforts for achieving orderly migra-
tion makes cooperation between states appear necessary in order to bring
about the positive potentials of migration.
»Given the internationalization of migration, national migration strategies devel-
oped in isolation are unlikely to result in effective migration management. Thus, a
sine qua non for migration management is inter-State cooperation.«86
Enhancing international cooperation, particularly in the form of multilateral-
ism, is a cornerstone in the recommendations of the GCIM, the Berne Initia-
tive, the Hague Process and the IOM. According to the Berne Initiative, it is a
»common understanding« that »[a]ll States share a common interest in
strengthening cooperation on international migration in order to maximize
benefits.«87
To summarize this necessarily brief overview, global migration man-
agement initiatives understand migration as a normal and potentially posi-
tive feature of world affairs. The goal of migration policy can thus no longer
be to prevent migration but to optimize it, by addressing and managing it in a
more comprehensive manner – importantly through inter-state cooperation
and multilateralism. In general, there is also emphasis on human rights in
these documents.88 The GCIM, for instance, calls on states to protect the hu-
man rights of everybody on their territory and to use the UN human rights
instruments more effectively.89
Manageable but Beyond Control?
As we have seen, the notion of migration management recognizes that migra-
tion is an inevitable reality, which states have to deal with in the best possible
ways. Then, in the first instance, management becomes a question of handling
a situation that is experienced as uncontrollable. Simultaneously, though, the
term suggests that although migration cannot be turned on and off at the
borders as one pleases, there is still a whole lot that can be done about it. Ac-
knowledging the permanent and (potentially) positive character of migration,
the objective becomes one of steering and guiding it so as to maximize its
positive effects at the same time as its negative consequences are avoided.90
There is a clear belief in the potential capacity of migration policy to bring
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about the desired goals, which gives the notion of migration management a
»technocratic ring.«91 Surely, the flaws and inadequacies of current policy
and implementation measures are acknowledged; improving the handling of
migration is the whole point. But there is a great confidence that if the
knowledge about migration is increased by the collection and dissemination
of timely and accurate data, if migration officials get more professional
training, if national administrative capacity is enhanced by increased
resources and expertise, and if inter-state cooperation is promoted… then,
migration policy can be used as an effective tool with which to capitalize on
the opportunities presented by the constant of human movement. The faith
in the capacity of migration policy thus indicates that migration is something
that can (and must) in fact be brought under control.92 This may seem a bit
paradoxical, as the conceptualization of migration as permanent and normal
betrayed the acknowledgement that it is now beyond the control of states. If
management is put forward as a realistic alternative to control because control
is no longer possible, yet management itself seems to equalize control – then
what does management really mean, and how are we to understand the rela-
tion between the terms?
A dictionary throws some light on the issue by exposing the multiple
meanings of the terms.93 A first possibility of understanding the apparent
contradiction is that control is given up only in the sense of preventing or
restraining and not in the sense of »exercising authoritative or dominating
influence over.« This latter meaning coincides with the connotations of
management as precisely »exerting control over« and »making submissive to
one’s authority.« Apart from handling (which is possibly the most common
association to the term) management is thus actually synonymous to control.
If this interpretation is correct, then the rhetorical change from control to
management is to be understood as follows: migration can no longer be
prevented but it can still come under the effective authority (of states). If the
recommended management measures are adopted (approaching migration in
a comprehensive way, spanning all stages of the movement, enhancing coop-
eration and so on), then there is a good chance that the unruly and disorderly
phenomenon of migration can indeed become if not restrained then at least
disciplined, orderly, submitted again to the authority of the state. In this
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sense, and although it appears on the contrary, migration management sig-
nals the quest for more rather than less control.94
The term migration management may sometimes be used instrumen-
tally in order to create an illusion of control while in reality there is little.
When Sabine Hess interviewed staff members of the migration policy think
tank International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), one of
her interviewees said that
»[m]anagement pretends that one has migration under control or as if it [were]
possible to control it, and as if this is only a matter of technique and how to make it
more efficient. And this, I doubt quite a lot.«95
Continuing, he admitted the tactical use of the term: »For the public it seems
to be good to use this term in order to show that the government has migra-
tion under control.«96
Irregular migration seems to epitomize the lack of control. In a way,
this form of movement could be interpreted as an act of resistance to states’
claims to exclusive authority over territory and regulation over movement.
The point is not to romanticize the situation in which irregular migrants find
themselves, but to grasp the challenge that this kind of movement poses for
states. Néstor Rodriguez argues that irregular or autonomous migration
holds an enormous transformative capacity. The strategies and process
whereby workers, families and transnational communities organize move-
ment »decentres the state as the regulator of human movements across inter-
national boundaries.« Therefore, irregular migrants are not just docile vic-
tims, but historical actors since they participate in reconfiguring state power.
In Rodriguez’ analysis there is a constantly ongoing battle for the border be-
tween autonomous migrants and their transnational communities, on the one
hand, and state authorities striving to halt the »worker-led transnational
socio-spatial reconfiguration«97, on the other. Sandro Mezzadra similarly
emphasizes the autonomous agency of irregular migrants. He also suggests
that migration control actually tends to follow the migrants rather than the
other way around. That is, rather than first establishing a control system to
which migratory movements adapt, the governments’ control system itself
tends to adapt to the routes established by migrants: »In a certain sense, the
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migrants are in control, since their movements establish this geographical
route, relegating the exclusionary measures to the status of a mere re-
sponse.«98 From this perspective, the goal of migration management appears
in a somewhat different light. The concern about irregular migration pro-
vides a major impetus for international cooperation, and it is also at the cen-
ter of the global migration management initiatives’ preoccupation with order.
Thus, the discourse could be interpreted as a massive quest for order in an
area of human activity that has developed far beyond the effective regulation
of states.
The question is whether achieving orderly movement of people really is
attainable. If human movements are of such a character today that they can-
not actually be prevented, then what makes them likely to be manageable?
Even if channels for regular migration are opened to a greater degree than at
present, even if some efforts were made to increase well-being in the states of
origin, even if greater coherence is achieved at the national level and multi-
lateral cooperation strengthened and so on – wouldn’t we still be in the same
situation as regards the difficulties in controlling migration? It would seem as
if the same reasons that make migration impossible to be prevented also
today make it impossible to be managed, even if a greater degree of openness
is introduced into the system. For the foreseeable future, world disparities
would still be there, as would the global economic and cultural interconnect-
edness, and the inventiveness of the various migrant-exporting schemes and
the smuggling industry to circumvent governmental restrictions would not
be likely to weaken just because the restrictions are of a somewhat different
character. Moreover, perhaps the most important question concerns whether
there is anything in this world of orderly migration that would increase peo-
ple’s sense of loyalty towards its regulations. Just like any regulatory system
ultimately depends on the majority’s voluntary compliance, isn’t the long-
term survival of states’ actual power to control movement conditioned by
whether or not people at large respect this authority? Here, it is important to
realize that whereas people enjoying comfortable lives in developed coun-
tries may tend to have a positive view of the state and the law, this experi-
ence is far from universal. The majority of the world population still lives
under corrupt and inefficient regimes and may experience the state as some-
thing which has to be overcome, something you have to survive despite of
rather than as a benefactor whose rules you willingly follow. Then migration
regulation is only another restraint to be overcome, as part of one’s survival
strategy.99
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It is against this background that we should understand the governing
role of information campaigns. As part of its recommendations to fight
irregular migration, the GCIM recommended the use of information cam-
paigns for »providing prospective migrants with a better understanding of
the risks entailed in irregular migration.«100 The IOM is actively directing
such campaigns at the populations in origin areas. As Antoine Pécoud has
noted, this policy practice aims to work on individuals’ self-control. It there-
fore complements the tougher border control measures that have so far not
succeeded in halting irregular migration:
»[I]nformation campaigns hope to achieve the only goal that would ensure the
success of migration control: the adherence of those primarily concerned – the
migrants – to the objectives of Western governments.«101
Such campaigns are fighting an uphill battle. In one of the rare empirical
studies on irregular migrants’ own perceptions concerning their breach of
migration law, David Kyle and Christina Siracusa’s findings seem to support
this hypothesis. The prevailing attitude among the interviewed Ecuadorians
in Spain was not to regard their illegal status as a crime – instead, these mi-
grants considered their illegality defendable on the basis of both current and
historical injustices.102 Another interview-based investigation similarly dem-
onstrates that irregular migrants often make use of existing ways of argu-
mentation to defend their irregular movement. Their arguments tend to fall
into one of two main categories. Some base their argumentation on the fact
that businesses move freely across the world. Wanting to be given the same
opportunities, this category presents itself along the lines of the neoliberal
idea of the free, entrepreneurial, economic actor. Others, however, tend to
present themselves as collective actors and motivate their movement by
social justice arguments. In their opinion, migratory movements are required
for the transnational distribution of resources. Neither group considers state
regulation legitimate.103 Adding failing legitimacy to the other factors, there
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are definitely some formidable hindrances for ›international migration man-
agers‹ to achieve orderly movements.104
There is something very ambiguous in the assertion that migration is at
the same time impossible to prevent and yet possible to manage. On the one
hand, if we really are capable of developing all the administrative tools, the
technical means for surveillance, the police capacities, and the cooperative
structures to really make migration orderly – then, shouldn’t we also be able
to totally prevent migration in case we want to? On the other hand, consid-
ering what migration policy is up against, it seems that anything short of a
serious redistribution of world wealth, along with reformed political systems
and administrative cultures in a majority of the world’s poor countries would
have poor chances to succeed.
Conclusions
Migration management is often understood as a middle way between repres-
sive control measures and open borders.105 Migration is recognized as some-
thing potentially positive, and various global migration management actors
are advocating the opening-up of regular channels for labor migration. In its
most important recommendation106, the GCIM encourages the elaboration of
temporary labor migration programs.107 Such a measure would promote
world growth by achieving a better match between the supply and demand
for labor; it would help developed countries in meeting their demographic
challenges and labor market scarcities and it would enhance development in
sending countries. Furthermore, it would provide the individual worker with
a secure legal status. It is also hoped to decrease irregular migration, since
this type of movement often arises as a response to labor demands.108 The
guest worker recommendation illustrates how migration is approached as
something that can be influenced and maximized to the benefit of everyone
involved. Then, what does it teach us about mobility rights? Clearly, the low
skilled of the South would be endowed with greater access to mobility, were
regular labor migration opportunities to be expanded. Maybe guest worker
programs, that limit workers’ rights situation in important ways, can be criti-
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cized on the account of only offering the status of »live-in servants«109 to its
beneficiaries. But in terms of mobility, this might still be an upgrade from the
role of immobilized ›serfs‹ of the system; »…tied forever to the soil on which
they were born.«110 However, considering the terms for this increased
mobility, it should be noted that it is still very much predicated on preserving
the ties to the homeland: In contrast to the Northern migrant, the Southern
migrant travels as an agent of development for his or her home country as
well as a labor market asset for the receiving state, rather than in his or her
individual capacity. Reinforcing national belonging and loyalty thus becomes
instrumental for the maximization exercise in question. Whether this is to be
seen as a problem or not depends on one’s stance on mobility rights. If migra-
tion is primarily thought of as something that can and should be used in
order to achieve other goals (development, global equality, labor market effi-
ciency or the like), then this does not have to be problematic. If on the other
hand one considers mobility as a human right, closely connected to personal
autonomy, then state-managed migration appears in another light.
As we have seen, global migration management can be considered an
effort to bring disorderly human movement back under the authority of
states. This does not necessarily have to be restrictive – in fact, arguing for
orderly movement in a context where movement itself is understood as inevi-
table amounts to arguing for more regular migration opportunities, as exem-
plified by the guest worker recommendation. But the relatively greater open-
ness is still an openness guided and managed by states, that in new and
inventive ways seek to preserve the monopoly of the »legitimate means of
movement«111 in a context transformed by globalization. Hence, migration
management should not be misinterpreted as free movement. In fact, if at all
possible, achieving orderly migration would seem to require a heavily
bureaucratized system of governance. Moreover, the aim of putting an end to
irregular movement often translates into cutting off spontaneous or supply-
based migration, replacing it with demand-based movements.112 This implies
a larger emphasis on the selection of migrants: movement is not accessed
freely but instead granted on the basis of (most importantly) labor market
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demands, which signifies a larger degree of »national manpower plan-
ning«113 through picking-and-choosing of migrants.
The mobility rights resulting from global migration management will
certainly depend on the more precise elaboration of programs to control and
facilitate human movement, as well as on the cooperative structures devel-
oped. Or, perhaps one should say that it might – as was discussed above, the
capacity of states to actually bring human movement under their authority
remains to be proven. Apart from problems concerning implementation, the
governance of migration requires a highly flexible conceptual basis that
evolves at least as fast as actual population movements.114 At a more meta-
political level, Zygmunt Bauman claims that the overriding goal of order is a
typically modern concern, which always entails the imposition of an artificial
structure onto the world. Therefore, all efforts aiming at order simultane-
ously and invariably produce also ambivalence and disorder – which again
makes us feel that our categories and practices are insufficiently precise and
we call out once more for a better order.115 Relating to the issue at hand, this
suggests that human movement might be ultimately impossible or at least
very difficult to manage.
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5 Globalization and International
Migration Governance
Catherine Wihtol de Wenden
With an estimated 214 million international migrants and 740 million internal
migrants in a world of more than 6 billion inhabitants, migration now affects
the whole planet and has become a major international issue.1 Nearly all
countries are concerned by human mobility, as sending, receiving or transit
states. Categories of economic, political or family migrants are no longer
strictly defined, as the same people may change legal or social status several
times in the course of their life. Over the last thirty years, the world has
entered a second major wave of migration, after the first that took place
between 1880 and 1920. In recent decades, globalization has facilitated mo-
bility while lessening its costs; it has also diffused the way of life in rich coun-
tries via the media, encouraged the transfer of remittances (more than 300
billion dollars per year) and led to denser, transnational economic, cultural
and religious networks. A growing share of the population has shrugged off
determinism by refusing to remain in countries they consider poor and
futureless.2
Mobility is nowadays promoted and celebrated, while international
migration (due to the territorial boundedness of nation-states) still is feared
and is repressed by receiving nations. People who move have overall fewer
rights than those who are sedentary. A hierarchy of the right (and access) to
cross-border mobility and migration is emerging, according to education,
skills, resources, information, transnational networks or areas of origin.
Those most favored can circulate, but the lesser endowed must do with the
birthplace given to them by chance, or resort to irregular immigration net-
                                                
1 United Nations (UN), Trends in Total Migrant Stock. The 2008 Revision, New York
2009; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Re-
port 2009. Overcoming Barriers. Human Mobility and Development, New York
2009, p. 1.
2 Stephen Castles/Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration. International Population Move-
ments in the Modern World, New York 2009; Global Commission on International
Migration (GCIM), Migration in an Interconnected World. New Directions for
Action. Report of the Global Commission on International Migration, New York/
Geneva 2005, p. 1; Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, La Globalisation Humaine, Paris
2009.
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works. The democratization of border crossing is not yet on the agenda in a
world where everything circulates more and more freely, except people.3
International migration is particularly intense along the main economic,
demographic, political, geographical, cultural and environmental fault lines
of the world. The Mediterranean, the border between Mexico and the US, or
between Russia and China, the boundaries of the new Europe and a few
other points on the globe have become sites of passage, despite their dangers.
Former countries of departure have become countries of destination: this is
the case for southern Europe and, today, for Mexico, Morocco and Turkey,
which also remain countries of departure and transit. Former host nations
have become countries of departure, e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and
Chile whose citizens of Japanese, Spanish or Italian origin tend to some ex-
tent to return to their homeland. In South-East Asia, certain states are coun-
tries of either departure or destination according to the fluctuation of eco-
nomic situations: this is the case for Thailand and Malaysia, while others are
either one (India, China, Pakistan, the Philippines and Indonesia) or the other
(Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Australia).4 Such
movements suggest regional migratory systems formed by complementary
economic and demographic positions and transnational proximity (whether
historical, linguistic, geographic or cultural), where most migration originates
in the same region rather than elsewhere. North and South America, Europe
and sub-Equatorial Africa, the Russian world, the Arab world and South-East
Asia constitute regional migration systems of this sort.5 These complex politi-
cal, economic and social constellations or migratory contexts have direct,
sometimes deadly, effects on migrants and their livelihoods. Economic mi-
grants and asylum seekers, on the other hand, have become international
players in their own right, trying to realize their migratory projects despite
state efforts to limit resp. to block their migration and settlement. Labor
shortages in qualified and unqualified sectors in regions characterized by
aging and declining populations (Europe, Russia and Japan) and in the con-
text of a general surplus of young people/workers in other (often neighbor-
ing) regions (e.g. Maghreb and the Arab world more generally, Africa and
                                                
3 James F. Hollifield, The Emerging Migration State, in: International Migration
Review, 38. 2004, no. 3, pp. 885–912, here p. 885; Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, The
Frontiers of Mobility, in: Antoine Pécoud/Paul de Guchteneire (eds.), Migration
without Borders. Essays on the Free Movement of People, Oxford/New York 2007,
pp. 51–64; Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, Introduction. The Migration without Bor-
ders Scenario, in: ibid., pp. 1–30.
4 International Organization for Migration (IOM), World Migration Report 2010. The
Future of Migration. Building Capacities for Change, Geneva 2010, pp. 111–234;
Castles/Miller, The Age of Migration.
5 Wihtol de Wenden, La Globalisation Humaine.
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Latin America) have led to work-related immigration starting anew in re-
gions like Europe which thought, thirty years ago, that migration had come
to a close. Planetary environmental upheavals (climate warming, drought,
soil deterioration, natural catastrophes) and political crises also bring about
new population movements.
Migration is one of the main factors of transformation of the world in
which we live. It is also a consequence since, in a world moving over ever
greater distance, it maintains complex relations with the mutation of societies
and economies, which are interdependent in many ways. A lot of world
regions which have entered a transitional phase have become regions of
migration and are experiencing rapid urban development, education and
upheaval. Migration accelerates the development of the population who
remains at home and is thus better educated, attain a higher level of wellbe-
ing and refuse fate. However development also accelerates migration, by vir-
tue of the resulting rural exodus, urban growth and information flow. There
is no alternative to migration, because departing populations are involved in
a process of mobility which is self-maintained by the transfer of funds, in
most cases these funds are several times higher than official development
assistance (ODA) provided to so-called developing countries – It is in this
context that the United Nations (UN) and the international community are
trying to elaborate new mechanisms to govern migration. The governance of
migration (regardless if on a global, regional or national level) is a complex,
multifaceted and difficult endeavor6 and this chapter, after a short historical
overview, addresses specifically the role and contribution of the Global
Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD).7
A Short History of World Migration Governance
The starting point of the project to build a world regime or governance sys-
tem for migration can be traced back to the 1990s8: A consensus took also
shape within the framework of the 1994 Cairo International Conference on
Population and Development (ICPD), which mentioned migration as a major
world issue for the first time: the idea was born of applying the principles of
international rules to migration. In 1990, the United Nations (UN) had al-
ready prepared the Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers, intended
                                                
6 Alexander Betts, Introduction. Global Migration Governance, in: idem (ed.), Global
Migration Governance, Oxford 2011, pp. 1–33; Martin Geiger/Antoine Pécoud, The
Politics of International Migration Management, in: idem (eds.), The Politics of
International Migration Management, Basingstoke 2010, pp. 1–20.
7 See the contribution of Sara Kalm in this volume.
8 See the contribution of Bimal Ghosh in this volume.
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for worldwide use, to set the basic minimum rights needing recognition.9 It
also referred to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its as-
sertion of the right to emigrate as a universal principal. In 2003, Kofi Annan
took up the idea that global governance principles should be applied to mi-
gration, placing them at the heart of a process of multilateral decisions that
he had advocated on other occasions. A group of experts, the Geneva Migra-
tion Group, brought together several international organizations in Geneva
in 2004 with the IOM, the UNHCR and the ILO at the core, in order not to
leave host states with a monopoly on migration management. In 2005, the
Geneva Migration Group became the Global Migration Group (GMG) with
ten core international organizations. Its aim was to put forward governance
models involving players other than the host states alone. In the same year,
an international expert panel – known as the Global Commission on Interna-
tional Migration (GCIM; initiated by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan) –
presented its final report and gave recommendations how to govern migra-
tion and to reform existing practices and organizations dealing with migra-
tory movements.10 One year later, the United Nations subsequently organ-
ized the so-called High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development: On
that occasion, the 140 members of the United Nations who met in New York
in 2006 stressed the global character of international migration and the link
between migration and development; it was affirmed that international
migration constitutes a growing phenomenon, both in scope and complexity,
affecting virtually all the countries in the world. World leaders agreed that
international migration could be a positive force for development in both
countries of origin and countries of destination, provided that it was sup-
ported by the right set of policies. The need emerged for greater political
coherence between migration and development, a cooperative, multilateral
approach for understanding the global impact of migration and development
through sharing best practice, exploring innovative approaches and jointly
involving governments and other players. The aim was to integrate migra-
tion into development policies by using the transfer of funds, encouraging
temporary circulatory migration, promoting co-development initiatives,
aiding return and re-assimilation in the country of origin and taking into
account labor needs, the respect of migrant rights, informal markets, the role
played by member states, civil society, the diasporas, the private sector and
                                                
  9 Antoine Pécoud/Paul de Guchteneire, Introduction. The UN Convention on Migrant
Workers’ Rights, in: idem/Ryszard Cholewinski (eds.), Migration and Human
Rights. The United Nations Convention on Migrant Workers’ Rights, Cambridge
2009, pp. 1–45.
10 Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), Migration in an Intercon-
nected World. New Directions for Action. Report of the Global Commission on In-
ternational Migration, New York/Geneva 2005.
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unions. The topic of security was also present: the fight against smuggling
and trafficking in workers/human beings and black-market goods, the pre-
vention of workers’ and migrants’ exploitation, the protection of women and
children, public security and human safety and the technical requirements of
countries of origin regarding migration policies are also mentioned. In this
context it is important to point out that until 2006 no important event at the
UN headquarters had been organized that was devoted exclusively to the
close relations between international migration and development. The High-
Level Dialogue however showed that constructive debate and world consul-
tation on such subjects was possible.
During the meetings of this dialogue, the Secretary-General Kofi Annan
launched the idea of a new Global Forum on Migration and Development
(GFMD).11 The GFMD was created as a broad, open and transparent forum
for the discussion of questions linked to migration and development in an
informal, non-restrictive, voluntary context. It is led and organized by gov-
ernments of countries of departure and host nations as well as civil society. It
exists outside the UN system and does not produce negotiated texts or ideo-
logical decisions. The working mechanism of GFMD is explicitly multilateral,
the forum brings countries of origin, transit and destination together around
the same table, whatever their stage of economic, social or political develop-
ment, through representation by the political leaders of a broad range of
government agencies, including Ministries and Departments of immigration,
development, employment, foreign affairs, gender equality, internal affairs,
justice, integration and immigration. The GFMD is also based on the knowl-
edge and experience of international organizations, regional organizations,
NGOs, unions, the private sector and migrant associations, experts and asso-
ciations for the defense of human rights. It is not part of the United Nations
system, but is open to all UN member states. The link with the United
Nations is ensured by the attendance of the Secretary-General at the annual
meetings of the GFMD and the support provided by the Special Representa-
tive of the Secretary-General and the Global Migration Group (GMG) to the
President in office of the GFMD. The Forum offers a platform for sharing
experience, innovation and good practice in order to encourage synergies
and reinforce cooperation between migration and development policy at
national and international level using a cross-sectoral approach to issues and
players. The so-called civil society days of the GFMD, which offer a forum for
representatives (NGOs, migrant associations, diaspora organizations, unions
and employers, local government areas), are held prior to the intergovern-
mental Forum with a multi-player governance helping define shared goals.
An interface with governments is anticipated.
                                                
11 See the GFMD Website: http://www.gfmd.org.
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The current flaws in the management of international migration12
clearly result from a perspective focussing too exclusively on security along
with short-term management and hypocrisy faced with the failure to recog-
nize a labor-market reality.13 They are related to breaches of human rights,
poor usage of mobility as an opportunity for host countries and countries of
origin as well as for the migrants themselves, and policies aimed mainly at
satisfying public opinion.
The Global Forum on Migration and Development
(GFMD) and its Meetings in Brussels, Manila, Athens
and Puerto Vallarta
The first GFMD meeting was organized by the Belgian government. It took
place in Brussels on 9–11 July, 2007 with the participation of representatives
of 156 UN member states.14 The meeting focussed essentially on the devel-
opment of human capital and worker mobility, the transfer of funds and
skills, the role of diasporas, institutional political coherence and partnerships.
Cross-sectoral issues, such as the fundamental causes of migration, human
rights and gender issues were also debated. The opportunities offered by the
Brussels Forum had several positive outcomes. The issue of migration left the
bilateral inter-state domain for a global platform; it was no longer limited
solely to issues of security and territory control, while the preparation of the
positions of member states led to consultations at national level. Migration
governance became a topic to be discussed by states and NGOs and civil-
society representatives.15
The dialogue continued at the second meeting of the GFMD in Manila16
(29–30 October, 2008) on the main theme of ›Protecting and Empowering Mi-
grants for Development‹, which emphasized the human dimension of migra-
tion in a debate which, often, dealt only with the political state concerns and
the economic arguments for migration and development. The two priorities
of protecting and empowering formed the basis of the Forum’s discussion and
the central themes of an ad hoc working group run by the Philippines and
the United Arab Emirates. The importance of data (to be made available for
                                                
12 See most of the other contributions in this volume.
13 Khalid Koser, Introduction. International Migration and Global Governance, in:
Global Governance, 16. 2010, no. 3, pp. 301–315.
14 See the GFMD Website: http://www.gfmd.org.
15 Romeo Matsas, The Global Forum on Migration and Development. A New Path for
Global Governance? (Paper presented at the ACUNS Annual Meeting, 5–7 June),
Bonn 2008.
16 See the GFMD Website: http://www.gfmd.org.
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comparison and accessible to political decision-makers) was emphasized for
developing policies founded on conclusive evidence as well as enriching
public debate. The decision was made in Manila to create a working group
led by Morocco and Switzerland on ›Policy Coherence, Data and Research‹ to
make progress in these areas. Recommendations were made for carrying out
several studies and a compilation of good practice, pilot programs and policy
evaluations. The Manila Forum thus marked a new stage in international dis-
cussions on migration and development. It was the first truly global meeting
on the subject for the Philippines and Asia as a whole.
The following Athens Forum (2–5 November, 2009) dealt again with
the complex relation between migration and development. The main theme
›Integrating Migration Policies into Development Strategies for the Benefit of
All‹ was defined to increase awareness of the need to link migration more
closely to development in view of the UN Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs).17 The first MDG, the fight to end poverty, is of capital importance in
relation to migration. Although the issue of migration is not cited formally in
the MDGs, it is closely linked to their realization. It is assumed that labor
migration can contribute to eliminating poverty, achieving gender equality,
improving health and establishing world partnerships. In this context, migra-
tion can be considered a key element in human development. It can be inte-
grated into national development strategies although it is not a substitute for
global and coherent public policies. The choice to incorporate migration into
development planning is based on the shared conviction that policies can
contribute to a positive relation between migration and development by
organizing migration and its consequences while taking priorities in terms of
development into consideration. Migration policies and those related to the
fight to end poverty in developed countries need to set goals for immigration
planning and legislation in close collaboration with countries of origin.
The Athens Forum relied on certain conclusions drawn in the 2009
United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) ›Human Development
Report‹18, according to which the national and international initiatives in
favor of development should improve human development by raising living
standards and expanding freedom and the choice to stay or leave. The goal is
to make migration not just a survival strategy but a choice. According to the
Human Development Report, migrants need to be considered as active
participants in development and policy relating to migration; consequently
development planning and migration policy should be designed in order to
                                                
17 See the UN Website concerning the Millennium Development Goals: http://www.
un.org/millenniumgoals; GFMD Website: http://www.gfmd.org.
18 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report
2009.
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benefit migrants and the countries of origin and destination. However, the
win-win-win model on which the hypothesis of a global public good is based
is far from being realized. The Athens Forum also enabled discussion of inter-
regional initiatives and regional forums, such as the Euro-African Conference
on Migration and Development, the South-American Conference on Migra-
tion, Development and Human Rights, the Bali Process on People Smuggling,
Trafficking in Persons and Related International Crimes, the Regional Con-
ference on Migration (Puebla Process) and the Bangkok Meeting involving all
the heads of these regional consultation processes (RCPs19). Although not all
RCPs are concerned with the issue of development and give priority instead
to managing regional migration movement, the participants agreed on the
mutual reinforcement of the GFMD and the Interregional Forums and certain
RCPs, and on the fact that the Forum’s discussions of migration and devel-
opment can deliver a considerable contribution to regional processes and
interregional Forums. Issues linked to diasporas, brain drain and transfers of
funds were also discussed in terms of their contribution to development.
The last round of the GFMD took place in Puerto Vallarta (Mexico; 8–11
November, 2010) and was entitled ›Partnerships For Migration and Develop-
ment: Shared Prosperity – Shared Responsibility‹.20 The participants of this
fourth forum included representatives from 131 countries and 400 delegates
and observers. Attention was paid to partnerships for better protected and
regulated migration, joint strategies for understanding illegal migration, links
between mobility and human development as well as policies and institu-
tional coherence, in order to tackle the relation between migration and devel-
opment. Shared responsibility in a partnership context is crucial for devel-
oping government thinking and enabling policies to function better: multi-
player partnerships (governments, civil society, public and private sectors,
migrants) are a key tool enabling migration and development to be managed
in a global, balanced way. Mexico estimated that the promotion and rein-
forcement of partnerships between countries of origin, transit and destination
could facilitate a global, balanced approach to international migration and
development. The experience of non-governmental players in these two
fields has also been recognized by governments, as the reinforcement of
                                                
19 RCP-Definition according to IOM: »Non-binding consultative fora, bringing repre-
sentatives of states and international organizations together at the regional level to
discuss migration issues in a cooperative manner. Some regional consultative proc-
esses (RCPs) also allow the participation of other stakeholders (e.g. NGO or other
civil society representatives)«, see International Organization for Migration (IOM),
World Migration 2008, Geneva 2009, p. 497. Examples of RCPs include the Budapest
Process for South-Eastern Europe or the Puebla Process in North and Middle Amer-
ica.
20 See the GFMD Website: http://www.gfmd.org.
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partnerships with all parties enables the creation of a consensus on shared
responsibility while contributing to designing global approaches.
In Puerto Vallarta, several new ideas came to light, e.g. the strong ref-
erence made, and importance attached to partnership and shared sovereignty
that previously did not play a role in the forums of the GFMD. Now, a new
round table 1 (›Partnerships for More Regular and Protected Migration‹) was
established, while the two other round tables respectively dealt with (2) ›La-
bor Mobility and Human Development‹, and (3) ›Policy and Institutional
Coherence to Address the Relation between Migration and Development.‹21
In round table 1, the General Rapporteur insisted on the need to encourage
legal migration with respect for human rights and to make greater use of the
benefits of migration on development. Brain drain and the transformation
from brain drain into brain gain marked one of the corner stones of the debate.
Furthermore, the necessities of avoiding the criminalization of illegal migra-
tion were stressed and of considering migrant/migration legalization as a
source of positive impacts; states were called to work together on return and
reinsertion policies and to develop a common approach to illegal migration
in shared bilateral and multilateral strategies between host nations and coun-
tries of departure and transit. The call to develop regional migration systems,
more immigration networks notably for migrants with few skills, mecha-
nisms for fighting prejudice, promoting human rights and access to citizen-
ship for circular migration and protecting the most vulnerable groups
(women, lone minors) was heard repeatedly during the roundtable.
The emphasis placed on development in its broadest sense was central
to the meeting in Puerta Vallarta; more general discussion on the labor mar-
ket and the purely economic effects of migration aimed at fuelling the issues
of the human development of migrants and their contribution to the devel-
opment of host nations and countries of origin. Integrating the so-called hu-
man development perspective into the forum offers an additional opportunity to
discuss broader issues like health, education, training, gender issues and
human rights that are closely intertwined with migration. The impact of cli-
mate change on migration was mostly taken into consideration in the context
of development. To reinforce this, the meeting in Mexico aimed to go beyond
the exchange of good practice and experience. One of the central aims for the
future lies in translating all these ideas, recommendations and conclusions
into public policy.
                                                
21 Ibid.
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The Future of the GFMD
The Presidency of the Forum was to be assured until 2012 by Spain and Mo-
rocco, who both volunteered to host the GFMD for the next two years, but
then declined the offer; a smaller forum took place in Geneva in December
2011, under the leadership of Switzerland, with civil society activities coordi-
nated by the International Catholic Migration Committee (ICMC). In view of
the High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development of the UN General
Assembly planned for 2013, the projected Geneva Forum forms the venue for
a discussion concerning the future of the GFMD and (potential) GFMD
meetings in 2012 and 2013. Against the background of the uncertain future of
the forums, the whole GMFD process, its impact on policies and its broader
framework for reflection should be a matter for appropriate evaluation by the
participating countries at the end of this current cycle. Over the last four
years, the GFMD forums built a new, concrete approach in the global debate
on migration; the link between migration and development can now no
longer be ignored. The forum marked the beginning of a new global process,
designed to improve the positive effect of migration on development (and
inversely) by adopting a more coherent approach with new tools and better
practices, through the exchange of practices and innovative methods and,
lastly, establishing cooperative links between the different players. As an
incubator of migration governance, the GFMD did not (and probably won’t do
this in the future) lead to negotiated results – the success of the GFMD lies in
putting forward recommendations and evaluations for action to govern-
ments; however, the shortage or indeed non-existence of reports on the
results of the four preceding forums gives the impression of going backwards
on certain points and leads to a lack of method for moving forward in devel-
oping policies linking migration to development. The themes tackled during
the Forum are very numerous and the global approach sometimes stands in
the way of developing a detailed analysis taking the diversity of migrant
itineraries into account. In addition, the rotating Presidency often leads to
confusion and deviation. To fulfil its role correctly, the GFMD should move
forward in three directions22:
– reinforcing research: although basic data is sometimes incomplete, there is
a welcome increase of abundant, informative scholarly material, but it re-
mains insufficient, as does the definition of pertinent research areas for
decision makers. Improving basic data on migrant characteristics and their
reasons for migration forms a priority, along with gender specificity. Basic
data collection on conditions and activities of diaspora members as well as
                                                
22 Bertrand Badie et al., Pour un autre Regard sur les Migrations. Construire une Gou-
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on remittances is also considered essential. A better understanding of the
impacts of migration on development is also needed, as well as of devel-
opment on migration, the effects policy has on migration flows and, in
general, the impacts of migration and development;
– developing better synergy between inter-governmental organizations, as
much for making use of their work as for their operational dimension in
the recommendations of the GFMD; 16 IGOs form the GMG;
– reinforcing consultation with non-governmental players. Multilateral
cooperation now seems absolutely indispensable. The GFMD process, in
showing the limits of a purely national approach to issues related to
migration, encourages governments to view migration and development
issues globally within a multilateral framework.
Despite the reference to partnership and the promotion of bilateralism and
multilateralism, the sovereignty of each member state is safeguarded along
with the right to decide on its migration policies. The GFMD is a consultative,
inter-governmental process open to all UN member states; it is voluntary,
non-binding, informal and led by member states. In this respect, it seems
difficult to reconcile this assertion of sovereignty with the will to form a sort
of ›Bretton Woods Agreement‹ for migration to define an international
mobility policy.
Some perceive the process pursued by the Forum as a ›smokescreen‹
dominated by inter-governmental agreements which are merely the unspo-
ken ›back door‹ of migration policies, or an opportunity offered to institu-
tions like the International Organization for Migration (IOM) or the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to increase their funding and broaden
their agenda.23 Nevertheless, several policy breakthroughs were made and
found entry into the 2010 Forum agenda: (1) the need for not just a global
approach but a bilateral and regional one and greater policy coherence be-
tween North and South, as well as the (2) inclusion of illegal immigration,
women and migration, (3) evaluative policies based on ›good practice‹, (4)
improvement in data collection and the (5) impact of climate change on
migration (and migration & development).24
Pursuing multilateralism as a mode of global migration governance is a
way forward. The wide range of players who are involved and are partici-
pating in the Forum meetings characterizes this new multilateralism. In fact
global governance of migration today means reconciling important and typi-
cally contradictory goals and interests, such as these of countries of origin
and destination, businesses/corporations, unions, churches, IGOs and NGOs,
                                                
23 Geiger/Pécoud, The Politics of International Migration Management.
24 International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), Connecting the Dots. A Fresh
Look at Managing International Migration, Geneva 2009.
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migrant and human rights associations and the fears of public opinion. Since
the beginning of the Forum, only the coupling with development has made it
possible to pursue a more commonly shared goal, thanks to a theme pushed
to the fore under Mexican presidency: partnership.
From Rhetoric to Practice
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6 Migration and Development.
A New Policy Paradigm in Germany?
Doris Hilber and Tatjana Baraulina
In this contribution we discuss whether the international migration-
development discourse, as one aspect of the broader frame of the migration-
management discourse, can be incorporated into German migration policies.
Our study analyses, on the one hand, the migration-development-nexus as
an issue of political discussion and, on the other hand, the implementation of
the discourse by different actors of migration, integration and development
policy. In the following, we will first of all outline current policies on migra-
tion in Germany and argue that they currently evolve around two main prin-
ciples: on the one hand, a restrictive entry policy and, on the other, an inclu-
sive integration policy, based on a so-called resource oriented approach. We
then will portray the international discourse on migration and development.
After that we will analyze how aspects of international migration and devel-
opment discourse institutionalize themselves in the German context. The
analysis is based on 35 semi-structured qualitative interviews with experts
representing different institutional actors of the German migration, integra-
tion and development policy. We consider two dimensions of institutionali-
zation: (1) the appearance of dominant topics and issues on the discursive
political level and (2) the practical implementation of political ideas on the
institutional level. We argue that in Germany at least four viewpoints on the
nexus between migration and development exist. Up to now, none of them
has gained a leading role in the political discourse. The institutional actors
are more concerned with defining their view on the migration and develop-
ment nexus than with implementing concrete policy programs. Thus, the mi-
gration and development policy in Germany rarely leaves the discursive po-
litical level. However, some aspects of the migration-development discourse
seem to have more chances to be implemented. To show different institution-
alization paths we will focus on two central topics in the German context: di-
aspora-cooperation and circular migration.
Diaspora-cooperation is an approach based on the idea of strengthen-
ing the agency of migrants with regard to the development of their home
countries. This approach has found its way into the portfolio of different state
and non-state actors. The circular migration approach postulates that high
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international mobility rates as such are beneficial for the development of
sending and receiving countries. Different actors show a great deal of interest
in this approach. Our analysis shows that the diaspora-cooperation approach
nevertheless has more potential to be implemented in the German context.
Based on these empirical observations we conclude that the institutionaliza-
tion of the migration-management discourse proceeds selectively. It depends
to a large extent on the chances to place new political ideas within the policy
paradigms dominating in the given national context.
Global Discourses and the Question
of National Implementation
Since the beginning of the 1990s a new discourse called migration manage-
ment is gaining importance in the international debate on effective migration
policy.1 Migration management has a more encompassing, pro-active notion
compared to the previous concepts of migration control. The notion of migra-
tion management was first introduced in 1993 in one of the studies of Bimal
Ghosh, initiated by the UN Commission on Global Governance. It was
brought in to juxtapose the narrower term of migration control.2 In the first
place it is an issue of international politics. The concept of migration man-
agement implies that migration is an issue that can be managed globally. The
dominant belief is that effective migration management requires cooperation
and input of various political actors and additional support of intergovern-
mental organizations and civil society actors to develop and supplement mi-
gration policies of governments. The notion of migration management also
includes partnerships with countries of origin and opportunities for all in-
volved parties – from receiving countries to countries of origin and migrants
themselves – to participate in and to benefit from migration management
measures. Comprising a wide spectrum of discourses, such as border man-
agement, human trafficking as well as irregular migration, it also highlights
indirect ›development-friendly‹ effects of migration which is conceptualized
in the so-called ›migration-development-nexus‹.3
                                                
1 See the contribution of Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud in this volume.
2 See the contribution of Bimal Ghosh in this volume.
3 Martin Geiger/Antoine Pécoud, The Politics of International Migration Manage-
ment, in: idem (eds.), The Politics of International Migration Management, Basing-
stoke 2010, pp. 1–20; Stephen Castles, The Factors that Make and Unmake Migration
Policies, in: International Migration Review, 38. 2004, no. 3, pp. 852–884; Sarah Spen-
cer, The Politics of Migration: Managing Opportunity, Conflict and Change, Oxford
2003; Kristof Tamas, Mapping Study on International Migration, Institute for Fu-
tures Studies, Stockholm 2004.
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The ideas that are summed up within the notions of migration man-
agement are only slowly trickling down from the international sphere to na-
tional policies. Few international agreements in this policy field have a com-
pulsory character; in most cases national governments can adopt migration
management measures on a voluntary basis. Accordingly, the general ques-
tion is whether international ideas of migration management can influence
national migration policies. The international migration and development
debate has found different points of entry in different national contexts.
While the ›co-development‹ policies in France and Great Britain are well
established, the same cannot be said about Germany.4 Without doubt, the
discourse has found its way into the academic as well as public debates.5 It is,
however, less acknowledged by state and non-state actors that are imple-
menting national integration and migration policies. The question is therefore
whether the international migration-development discourse can truly be part
of German migration policies.6
Migration Policy in Germany:
The National Policy Paradigm
The legal frame of current migration policies is set by the German immigra-
tion law. In the new millennium, the previously applicable Foreigners Act
was transformed through the new Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz),
                                                
4 Stephen Castles, Development and Migration or Migration and Development: What
Comes First?, in: Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 18. 2009, no. 4, pp. 441–471;
Hein De Haas, Engaging Diasporas. How Governments and Development Agencies
Can Support Diaspora Involvement in the Development of Origin Countries
(Working Papers, International Migration Institute/IMI), Oxford 2006.
5 Sandra Bröring, Zur Problematik des Entwicklungsbegriffes und seinem Gebrauch in
der Migrationsforschung (ForStaR Arbeitspapiere no. 7, Universität Bremen), Bre-
men 2009; Uwe Hunger, Brain Drain oder Brain Gain: Migration und Entwicklung,
in: Dietrich Thränhardt/Uwe Hunger (eds.), Migration im Spannungsfeld von Glo-
balisierung und Nationalstaat (Leviathan Sonderheft), Berlin 2003, pp. 58–76; Diet-
rich Thränhardt, Entwicklung durch Migration: Ein neuer Forschungsansatz, in: Aus
Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 27. 2005, pp. 3–11.
6 The analysis is based on the empirical study Migration and Development. Actors and
Approaches in Germany carried out by Tatjana Baraulina and Doris Hilber, research
associates in the research group of the German Federal Office for Migration and
Refugees (German abbreviation: BAMF). This study analyzes the ›migration-
development-nexus‹ and its institutionalization within the German context and was
carried out in 2009/2010. The views expressed here reflect the views of the authors
alone, and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Office for Migration
and Refugees.
Doris Hilber and Tatjana Baraulina
92
which was ratified in 2005 and reviewed in 2007.7 The ›Act to Control and
Restrict Immigration and to Regulate the Residence and Integration of EU
Citizens and Foreigners‹ clearly outlines the priorities through its title: the
two main domains of German migration policy are restrictive entry policies
and inclusive integration policies. The entry policies are framed by a para-
digm of control; they consist, on the one hand, of highly restrictive measures
that aim at selecting migrants according to their economic and professional
resources. On the other hand, the entry policies aim to reduce the numbers of
non-economic immigrants, mainly refugees and migrants that make use of
admission possibilities related to family reunion. In general, migration con-
trol measures limit the possibilities for legal entry and aim to control irregu-
lar entry to the territory, combined with a stress on return and readmission.8
At the same time, legally residing migrants are eligible for a wide set of
rights: human rights, social rights and welfare benefits as well as equal rights
on the labor market.
Germany not only grants rights for legally residing migrants but also
offers different integration services. Starting in the 1990s, integration slowly
became a topic and is to be seen on the backdrop of Germany’s acknowledge-
ment to be a country of immigration. The debate has led to comprehensive
integration policies striving to provide migrants with equal opportunities.
The scientific debate describes this policy development as a ›political climate-
change‹ or rather a paradigmatic turn from the ›deficit approach‹ of the inte-
gration policies of the 1970s and 1980s to the ›resource-oriented approach‹
focusing on the agency of migrants.9 In the framework of the deficit approach
migrants were considered as mere objects of integration policy.10 It was as-
sumed that they have considerable deficits concerning their abilities and
qualifications. Deficits were seen, for example, in language difficulties, insuf-
ficient professional skills, and cultural otherness. The aim of the integration
measures was to compensate for those deficits and to achieve the integration
of migrants, especially in the economy and the labor market.
The resource-oriented approach changed the viewpoint on migrants
radically. Migrants became subjects – agents of integration with their own,
                                                
  7 Jan Schneider, Die Organisation der Asyl- und Zuwanderungspolitik in Deutschland
(BAMF Working Paper 25/German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees),
Nürnberg 2009.
  8 Schneider, Die Organisation der Asyl- und Zuwanderungspolitik in Deutschland.
  9 Thränhardt, Entwicklung durch Migration.
10 An exponent of this approach is Hartmut Esser (see Hartmut Esser, Pluralisierung
oder Assimilation? Effekte der multiplen Inklusion auf die Integration von Migran-
ten, in: Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 38. 2009, no. 5, pp. 358–379).
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individual integration strategies.11 The resource-oriented integration para-
digm assumes that migrants have fewer deficits than abilities, talents and
special resources. For example, proficiency in the languages of their home
countries could be used by German companies for launching economic coop-
eration and therefore could be a special qualification of migrants on the Ger-
man labor market. While a couple of years earlier, migrant networks were
considered as a problem of cultural segregation, the same networks have
been evaluated positively from the viewpoint of the resource-oriented
approach. It was argued that migrants get jobs, social support, and valuable
information, using their ethnic and neighborhood networks. The aim of the
resource-oriented integration policy is to strengthen this integration potential
of migrants. Especially the activities of migrant self-organizations were con-
sidered as helpful for resource-oriented integration programs. Migrant or-
ganizations are seen as important mediators between state actors of integra-
tion policy and migrant communities. Following the ratification of the Immi-
gration Act in 2005 the responsibility for integration issues was handed over
to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. The Federal Office – a
federal agency formerly dealing mostly with asylum issues – redefined itself
first of all as an integration agency and adopted the resource-oriented ap-
proach as its core policy paradigm.12 Hence the resource-oriented approach
became accepted by the state and dominates the political perspective on mi-
grant integration in Germany till this day.
The short overview of the German migration policy shows that it is
generally aiming at reducing numbers of migrants and selecting only eco-
nomically attractive migrants but, at the same time, granting the legally
residing migrants considerable rights and including them actively into the
society and economy. Germany’s low numbers – more rights policy is an at-
tempt to balance different national interests: on the one side, to persevere a
national welfare system and therefore to reduce numbers of migrants poten-
tially depending from the state and, on the other side, to attract highly skilled
migrants.13
                                                
11 For the resource-oriented approach (Potenzialansatz) and its relevance for the debate
on integration, see the theoretical insights in Gunilla Fincke, Abgehängt, chancenlos,
unwillig? Eine empirische Reorientierung von Integrationstheorien zu MigrantInnen
der zweiten Generation in Deutschland, Wiesbaden 2009. For an empirical study ba-
sed on the resource-oriented paradigm, see Bettina Engelmann, Die Anerkennung
von ausländischen Qualifikationen in Deutschland. Ergebnisse der Studie Brain Wa-
ste, in: Migration und Soziale Arbeit, 30. 2008, no. 3/4, pp. 222–229.
12 Michael Griesbeck, Integration als gesamtgesellschaftliche Aufgabe und Integrati-
onsaufgabe des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge, in: Bildung und Erzie-
hung, 60. 2007, no. 3, pp. 273–283.
13 Martin Ruhs/Philip Martin, Numbers vs. Rights: Trade-Offs and Guest Worker Pro-
grams, in: International Migration Review, 42. 2008, no. 1, pp. 249–265.
Doris Hilber and Tatjana Baraulina
94
Migration and Development
as a New International Policy Paradigm
The new debates surrounding ›migration and development‹ first appeared
on the agenda of international organizations.14 The interconnection of the
two policy fields ›migration‹ and ›development‹ were previously mainly
thought together when the detrimental consequences of the so-called brain
drain for developing countries, i.e. the emigration of highly qualified people,
such as doctors, was contested. In 2003, a World Bank study15 emphasized
the tremendous implication of remittances from industrialized to developing
countries. Since then the reciprocal relations between migration and devel-
opment have found their way into a large amount of studies and have cre-
ated the discourse on the migration-development-nexus. This new perspec-
tive tries to emphasize the positive interconnections of migration and devel-
opment. The main argument is that development – on the one hand – reduces
migration push factors: Thus, a sustainable development of the sending
countries reduces emigration motives and leads to lower migration rates.16
On the other hand, migration brings economic benefits not only to the
receiving countries, but also to the countries of origin. Not merely the afore-
mentioned remittances enhance this effect, but also know-how transfers, re-
turn or circular migration or other forms of engagement, such as activities of
migrant organizations or direct investments.17 By designing approaches that
emphasize the positive effects of the interconnection between migration and
development, different policy approaches aiming at enhancing the develop-
                                                
14 See the contribution of Catherine Wihtol de Wenden in this volume.
15 Dilip Ratha, Workers’ Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External De-
velopment Finance, in: World Bank (ed.), Global Development Finance 2003, Wash-
ington 2003, pp. 157–175.
16 The emphasis here is on the notion of sustainability, i.e. a long-term approach to de-
velopment, as it is by now well known that a short-run development approach is in-
creasing the push factors in the first place, due to the fact that more people acquire
the resources to pursue a migration project – a phenomenon referred to as »migra-
tion hump«: e.g., Philipp Martin, Economic Instruments to Affect Countries of Ori-
gin, in: Rainer Münz/Myron Weiner (eds.), Migrants, Refugees, and Foreign Policy.
U.S. and German Policies Toward Countries of Origin, Providence/Oxford 1997, pp.
231–272, here pp. 244f.
17 Daniel Kubat (ed.), The Politics of Return. International Return Migration in Europe
(Center for Migration Studies), New York 1984; Savina Ammassari/Richard Black,
Harnessing the Potential of Migration and Return to Promote Development. Apply-
ing Concepts to West Africa (Working Paper 3, Sussex Centre for Migration Re-
search), Farmer 2001; Kathleen Newland, A New Surge of Interest in Migration and
Development (Migration Information Source, Migration Policy Institute), Washing-
ton 2007, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID =580 (21
Jul 2009).
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ment potential of migration were born. The general goal is to reach a triple-
win situation where sending and receiving countries as well as the migrants
themselves profit from the migration process. The international debate
focuses today on three main issues: the enhancement of the developmental
effects of remittances, the support of circular migration and the circulation of
know-how, and the promotion of transnational activities of diaspora organi-
zations often framed under the concept of co-development.
The migration and development discourse found its way into the halls
of the UN and other international organizations and is currently framed in
the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), a voluntary set-
ting that gives government officials as well as civil society actors the oppor-
tunity to discuss possible and effective policy approaches in the area. This
forum provides merely a discussion platform and does not have any binding
character because migration still remains an issue of national competence.18
One of the examples to realize an interconnection between migration and
developmental aspects on a supranational level, namely the EU-level, are the
so-called mobility partnerships. According to the idea of mobility partner-
ships, the possibilities of legal entry are to be combined with development-
oriented return policies and re-entry options, thus enhancing transfer of
money and knowledge through migration by promoting circular movement
of people between sending and receiving countries.19
Before the discourse on migration and development became prominent
in the new millennium, the inter-linkage between the two fields was con-
noted in a rather negative way. Migration out of developing countries was
understood as ›brain drain‹, as a loss of valuable human capital, while the
inflow of migrants into industrial countries was seen as resulting in high
competition on national labor markets. The new international migration and
development discourse is based on two basic ideas that emphasize the posi-
tive effects of migration. On the one side, it calls for less restrictive migration
control mechanisms. In principle, the discourse defends liberal ideas of open
borders: High-income countries should open up their borders to migration –
which is not only beneficial to receiving and sending countries but also
attractive for migrants themselves. This position could be summarized under
the basic postulate more numbers – more development. At the same time, the
migration-development discourse implies that migrants are not just victims
of poverty and social disorder but also agents of development and moderni-
zation. Therefore the tremendous resources of migrants have to be acknowl-
                                                
18 Sandra Lavenex/Rahel Kunz, The Migration-Development Nexus in EU External
Relations, in: European Integration, 30. 2008, no. 3, pp. 439–457, here p. 440.
19 Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (BMZ), Migration, Harnes-
sing the Opportunities to Promote Development, Berlin 2010.
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edged by sending and receiving countries. To realize this position, new poli-
cies supporting the important role of migrants for development are neces-
sary. This position could be seen as a resource-oriented approach to migra-
tion in the development debates.
Migration and Development in Germany:
The Analysis of an Emerging Policy Field
The first overview of the institutional setting around the migration-devel-
opment discourse in Germany shows clearly that the traditional top-down
model of policy enactment cannot be applied in this case. According to the
top-down model, states formulate a political agenda and develop programs
that regional and local state actors as well as non-state actors implement in a
multi-dimensional process.20 Especially in the case of the migration-develop-
ment nexus, the advance of the policy field is a complex issue as we have a
cross-sectoral theme at hand, which encompasses a range of different actors
and responsibilities – in the political realm as well as at the implementation
level. This is due to the fact that in Germany migration policy has tradition-
ally been a responsibility of internal affairs while development policies are
located in the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development as well
as in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
When identifying relevant actors in the field of migration and devel-
opment we found out that federal, regional and local state actors, but also
non-state actors, play an important role in the policy formulation process
trying to implement their policy visions into practice (see table 1). Interest-
ingly, actors with different competencies considered themselves as responsi-
ble. On the federal level, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs as well as the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment were active players. On the regional and municipal level, departments
with competencies for integration issues and integration commissioners21,
                                                
20 Volker Schneider/Frank Janning, Politikfeldanalyse. Akteure, Diskurse und Netz-
werke in der öffentlichen Politik, Wiesbaden 2006.
21 Integration commissioners (Integrationsbeauftragte) work at all three levels of German
government bodies (Federal State, in each of the 16 Länder and in large municipali-
ties) where they are appointed to support migrants’ interests and integration. They
advise government bodies with regard to integration policies, advocate equal oppor-
tunities for migrants, support migrants’ organizations to further their participation,
establish preconditions for mutual tolerance and counteract xenophobia. In the
German Länder Hesse, Saxony and Thuringia they are called ›foreigners’ commis-
sioners‹ (Ausländerbeauftragte). In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania the responsibil-
ity of the immigration commissioner is held by the head of section of the department
for immigration and integration in the Ministry for Social Affairs, whereas in Ham-
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but also sometimes departments concerned with international cooperation
projects, have seen themselves in charge of migration and development is-
sues. Non-state actors which were active in the field of international mobility,
facilitation of return or integration, but also central players of German devel-
opment policy such as the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusam-
menarbeit (GIZ) or the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation
and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit
und Entwicklung, BMZ) saw themselves as important actors in this field. At
last we conducted 35 expert interviews with state actors at the federal, Bun-
desländer- and municipal level, as well as with civil society organizations that
we were able to identify as active in the field of migration and development.22
Table 1: Relevant Actors/Stakeholders in the Field of Migration
and Development
Levels Actors/stakeholders
Federal Government authorities: Ministry of the Interior, Ministry for Economic
Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Im-
plementing organizations of German development policy: GIZ, Centre
for International Migration (CIM); Non-profit civil society organiza-
tions operating mainly in the field of development cooperation
Bundesländer Government authorities, i.e. departments responsible for return pro-
grams, departments with competencies for migration and integration
issues and integration commissioners
Municipalities Municipal integration agencies and departments with competencies for
international cooperation or international affairs
The variety of actors with different competencies and the non-hierarchical
organization of the field brought us to the conclusion that the model of non-
hierarchical institutionalization is more appropriate.23 According to this
                                                
burg the manager of the headquarter for integration and civil society is responsible
for this task.
22 The research was carried out through semi-structured qualitative interviews. At the
same time we sent out standardized questionnaires to government bodies on the
Länder- as well as municipal level to identify the main activities of these administra-
tive levels within the field of migration and development; furthermore, the ques-
tionnaires served as a sampling for the qualitative interviews on these levels. The
field research was carried out within the period August 2009 to March 2010. Quotes
of these interviews are translated by the authors.
23 The model of nonhierarchical institutionalization of new ideas is used within the
realm of the innovation research, see Larisa V. Shavinina (ed.), The International
Handbook on Innovation, Oxford 2003. It is also an important analysis tool in stud-
ies on international politics and in development studies, see e.g, Karin Bäckstrand,
Doris Hilber and Tatjana Baraulina
98
model the institutionalization process develops itself within two realms: the
discursive realm of the agenda-setting in which institutional actors define
relevant political issues and responsibilities and the realm of policy concreti-
zation which involves first attempts to explore some concrete measures, to
develop programs and to allocate resources.24 According to the model of
non-hierarchical institutionalization there is no actor or legislative body that
holds a monopoly on the formulation of key policy principles. Thus, different
actors have differing definitions of the policy goals and measures according
to their competencies and main activities. These definitions can be comple-
mentary, but also competing with each other. Some researchers believe that
the institutionalization of a particular policy takes place when a so-called
agenda-setter emerges who manages to win other actors for his vision of the
appropriate policy. Another concept of institutionalization suggests that a
policy emerges through the conflicts around its definition and that a consen-
sus is not a necessary requisite for its institutionalization.25 In our research
we explore which discourses exist around the nexus of migration and devel-
opment in Germany and if there is one dominating paradigm.
Not only with regard to agenda-setting but also with respect to imple-
mentation, one or another view on a specific policy can survive. This means
actors should recognize their responsibility for the issue at hand, develop
concrete measures and provide resources for their implementation. The
incorporation of the migration-development discourse into the portfolio of
relevant institutional actors was therefore another focus of our empirical
research.
                                                
Democratizing Global Environmental Governance? Stakeholder Democracy after the
World Summit on Sustainable Development, in: European Journal of International
Relations, 12. 2006, no. 4, pp. 467–498 and Harald Fuhr, Decentralized Policies: Ex-
penditure and Revenue Assignment Options. Is There Any Best Practice? What Can
We Recommend?, in: Documento di discussione. World Bank Latin America, New
York 2003.
24 We analyzed the agenda-setting process with the help of a discourse-theoretical ap-
proach and based the analysis of the policy implementation on the actor-centred in-
stitutionalism formulated in Fritz W. Scharpf, Interaktionsformen. Akteurszentrier-
ter Institutionalismus in der Policy-Forschung, Wiesbaden 2000.
25 As regards the agenda-setting process see Klaus Schubert, Politikfeldanalyse. Eine
Einführung, Opladen 1991. For a discussion about development, establishment and
impact of policy paradigms see Frank Fischer/John Forester (eds.), The Argumenta-
tive Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning, Durham 1993; Peter Hall, Policy Para-
digms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Brit-
ain, in: Comparative Politics, 25. 1993, no. 3, pp. 275–296; Paul A. Sabatier/Hank C.
Jenkins-Smith, Policy Change and Learning. An Advocacy Coalition Approach,
Boulder 1993.
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Migration and Development and the Federal Level
Actors operating on the federal level often focus their activities on diaspora-
cooperation. Noticeable is a program of the former Gesellschaft für Techni-
sche Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)26, supporting development-oriented activities
of migrant organizations in their countries of origin.27 Up to now about 30
organizations have been supported by the program. The funding is depend-
ent on a 50-percent contribution by the migrant organizations and can be
capped with a sum of 50,000 euros. The responsible department within the
former GTZ is cooperating with the BMZ and is promoting this topic actively
in the German development debate.28 Non-state development actors are also
interested in the concept of diaspora-cooperation. But none of them have im-
plemented any concrete projects yet.
Furthermore, return and reintegration programs play an important role
on the federal level. These programs have a long history in Germany – al-
though the focus was mostly not development-related. However, some pro-
grams focus explicitly on supporting local development activities. For exam-
ple, the activities of the Centre for International Migration (CIM) in their
program to facilitate the return of highly skilled migrants are an approach to
bring back the know-how of migrants to their countries of origin. This very
idea of bringing back the human capital to developing countries (brain gain)
was until recently considered an issue of return and reintegration. But in the
last years the actors are beginning to redefine their programs as programs
facilitating circular migration (brain circulation). These actors are very inter-
ested in initiating new projects focusing on circularity. Nevertheless, they
state to face considerable political constraints, based on the very notion of
circularity, in trying to establish projects that do not only facilitate return, but
also try to promote real circulation29 of migrants between their countries of
origin and Germany. The most important constraints are the existing restric-
tive entry regulations.30
                                                
26 Since 1 Jan 2011 GTZ, DED and InWent are united under one roof, the GIZ (Gesell-
schaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit).
27 Due to the organizational restructuring of the former GTZ, the Centrum für interna-
tionale Migration und Entwicklung (CIM), an agency that works with the GIZ, is in
charge of the diaspora-cooperation program.
28 Personal Communication: Representative of former GTZ.
29 There is no consensus on the definition of circular migration in the literature. Jan
Schneider and Bernd Parusel indicate that a real circulation is only established once
an international border has been crossed for at least three times, see: Jan Schnei-
der/Bernd Parusel, Zirkuläre und temporäre Migration. Empirische Erkenntnisse,
politische Praxis und zukünftige Optionen in Deutschland (BAMF Working Paper
34/German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees), Nürnberg 2010.
30 Personal Communication: Institution on the federal level.
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Especially non-state actors active in international humanitarian relief
promote the idea that free movement of people is an important aspect of the
global human rights discourse. It is argued that free temporary or permanent
migration and return are very strong development motors as such. The non-
state actors criticize the restrictive migration policy of the European Union as
well as of Germany. Based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the Verband Entwicklungspolitik deutscher Nichtregierungsorganisationen
(VENRO)31 – the umbrella organization of development non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) focusing on development work in Germany – is de-
manding »the adaptation and liberalization of current European migration
politics in favor of a liberalization towards third countries, to do justice to the
global responsibility of Europe.«32
As mentioned previously, most non-state development actors inter-
viewed have not yet implemented any activities in the realm of migration
and development. Their main activity so far is to define their role in this pol-
icy field. Therefore they are mostly concerned with organizing conferences
on the topic of migration and development, with networking and participat-
ing in the conferences of other actors. Some non-state development actors
argued that they do not see any necessity to implement migration and devel-
opment programs, because their poverty-reduction projects as such contrib-
ute to the economic growth and social stability in the developing regions
with high migration rates. As a result, people have more local opportunities
and are less interested to migrate to Europe.
Diaspora-cooperation and circular migration are the main issues asso-
ciated with the migration-development-nexus on the federal level. In the
realm of diaspora-cooperation we saw that the central actors of the develop-
ment policy in Germany – the former GTZ and BMZ – have promoted this
cooperation actively and made concrete steps to facilitate development
projects of migrant organizations. In the realm of circular migration we saw
that different actors are very interested in the topic, but hardly any concrete
program has been developed.
                                                
31 »VENRO is the umbrella organization of development non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) in Germany. The organization was founded in 1995 and consists of
around 120 organizations. […] 16 one-world networks are part of VENRO. These
represent about 2,000 local development initiatives and NGOs«, see http://www.
venro.org/english.html.
32 Verband Entwicklungspolitik deutscher Nichtregierungsorganisationen (VENRO),
Migration zulassen. Flüchtlinge schützen (VENRO-Positionspapier 6), Bonn 2009.
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Migration and Development and the German Bundesländer
On the level of the German Bundesländer33 we found that the migration-
development-policy was very rarely on the agenda. Only North Rhine-
Westphalia has established a specific program for the facilitation of develop-
ment-oriented activities of diaspora organizations.34 In other regions we
were able to identify certain activities; that they were taken up was however
mostly because some individual, highly engaged civil servants had been lob-
bying for these activities. In all cases of our sample the most engaged civil
servants were the integration commissioners of the Länder. One of them ex-
pressed their position in the following way:
»It is the result of my own personal engagement, if you want to put it
like that. It is not covered in my portfolio in any way.«35 The responsibility of
the integration commissioners is to collaborate with migrants and their or-
ganizations. Often, migrant organizations request support to start up activi-
ties for the development of their home countries. The engaged integration
commissioners saw themselves in the position of intermediaries or brokers
between the migrant organizations and government authorities. In one re-
gion, for example, the integration commissioner initiated a public-private-
partnership between a hospital in Vietnam and one in Germany in order to
circulate staff and convey know-how. The role of the commissioner was not
only to initiate contacts but also to persuade the regional government to sup-
port this private-public partnership. The regional government agreed to de-
liver residence and working permissions for selected medical service special-
ists from Vietnam and backed the project especially in the regional public.
The departments with competencies for development issues identify
diaspora-cooperation as a possible mandate for them, but specific measures
in this realm are rare. As the Länder have rather restricted competencies for
development activities, the main focus in this realm is intercultural educa-
tion, i.e. the presentation of problems in developing countries to the German
                                                
33 Through standardized questionnaires we could obtain information on the activities
of all 16 Bundesländer. On the basis of these answers we drew a sample of six de-
partments with whom we carried out qualitative interviews. On this level we con-
centrated our investigation on the administrative bodies and did not look at civil so-
ciety actors.
34 We conducted interviews with representatives from the former Ministry for Genera-
tions, Family, Women and Integration (MGFFI). Since 15th July 2010 this Ministry is
re-labeled in Ministry for Health, Emancipation, Care and Elderly. The former sec-
tion on integration is now located in the new Ministry for Labour, Integration and
Social Affairs, while the section for international cooperation is taken over by the
state chancellery.
35 Personal communication: Integration commissioner of one German Federal State
(Bundesland).
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public.36 Different civil society organizations on the regional level compete to
receive funding for development-related educational activities. Potentially,
also migrant organizations could conduct such education programs. How-
ever, different experts underlined that migrant organizations have not yet
reached the level of professionalism to compete with traditional NGOs for
resources. Some regional political networks, for example, the ›Hessen-Net-
work for Development‹ which lobbies the interests of non-profit organiza-
tions in the regional development policies have become aware of the
migrants’ development potential and have initiated different training and
qualification measures for migrant organizations.37 These regional non-
government actors see the capacity-building measures for development-
oriented migrant organizations as an attempt to include migrant communi-
ties into the regional development debates. Interestingly, they position these
measures not only as an instrument of the regional development agenda but
also as a part of the regional integration policy. The programmatic texts of
these actors proclaim that they aim at the inclusion of migrant communities
into the German civil society structures. For example, the Fund called
›Bridges between North and South‹ which is one of the prominent non-
government development policy actors in Berlin argues in its policy docu-
ment on migrant engagement for development as follows: »To support the
migrant organizations in their development activities means for us to support
their public visibility, their activism and their know-how. This support could
also be seen as very small but very effective steps to combat every-day racism
in the new Bundesländer.«38
On the Länder-level, return measures have a long tradition. There are
two main return programs, REAG and GARP39, that are implemented by the
departments of internal affairs of the Bundesländer in cooperation with the
Federal Ministry of the Interior. The programs mainly consist of a financial
compensation of return costs for refugees and other migrants with insecure
legal residence status. In the public, the return programs of the Länder are of-
ten seen as a politically correct substitute for deportation.40 Therefore it
seems difficult to locate them within the framework of migration and devel-
opment. However, some Länder have begun to shift the focus of their return
                                                
36 See Jürgen Wiemann, Neuausrichtung der Entwicklungspolitik der Bundesländer
vor dem Hintergrund der veränderten internationalen Rahmenbedingungen, Deut-
sches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Bonn 2008.
37 For more information see http://www.epn-hessen.de.
38 For more information see http://www.nord-sued-bruecken.de/politik.html.
39 For more information see www.bamf.de.
40 Stefan Dünnwald, Politiken der freiwilligen Rückführung, in: Sabine Hess/Bernd
Kasparek (eds.), Grenzregime. Diskurse, Praktiken, Institutionen in Europa, Berlin
2010, pp. 179–200.
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programs from the emphasis on the departure to the emphasis on the reinte-
gration process in the countries of origin. They argue that their return pro-
grams partly function according to humanitarian principles; the argument is
that the reintegration of returnees in their countries of origin would lead to
social and economic stabilization of these regions and in the long run con-
tribute to lower migration rates originating from these regions.
Some of those Bundesländer also considered themselves as principally
open for a liberalization of the German migration policy. They would espe-
cially support circular migration schemes and the politics of open borders
with neighboring non-EU states. In their own words, circular migration could
stimulate economic cooperation between the sending and receiving regions.
The Länder especially highlight and connect the topic of labor-market integra-
tion of migrants with the idea that economically well-doing migrants should
have possibilities to return home with investment capital in order to re-invest
later in their region.
»I think this is the greatest effort my Land is contributing to the topic of migration
and development. We would try to make circular migration possible. And we try to
find ways in which people from our neighboring countries can integrate as quickly
as possible into the labor market.«41
This shows that the German Bundesländer show a special openness for well-
qualified migrants and economic entrepreneurs. But it is important to point
out that the political initiatives of the Länder for mobility presuppose princi-
pal political decisions on the federal level that have not yet been taken.
In sum, migration and development is rarely an issue on the regional
level. Only diaspora-cooperation is a topic which has been supported by
some engaged integration commissioners of the Länder and by some non-
governmental regional actors and networks. Their measures concentrate on
capacity-building and political support for development-oriented migrant
organizations. The aim is to foster the participation of migrant organizations
in the regional development policy and in the civil society in general. The re-
gional return programs are currently moving away from a strict orientation
on fostering the departure of migrants with insecure legal status towards
supporting their reintegration in their countries of origin. Moreover, some
Länder would not dislike the idea of introducing federal circular migration
programs. Thus, the Länder seem to open up to the discourse on circular
migration and development. However, no concrete measures in the realm of
circularity have been introduced on the regional level. In this respect the
German Länder do not take an initiative but expect political signals from the
federal level.
                                                
41 Personal communication: Integration commissioner of one German Federal State
(Bundesland).
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Migration and Development and the German Municipalities
The migration and development policy is not a top priority on the agenda of
German municipalities. So far, only diaspora-cooperation has become an is-
sue on the municipal level. To implement migration and development policy
meant for municipalities to enhance the developmental potential of migrants
and their organizations.42 Some integration and international relations de-
partments of the municipalities in our sample considered themselves respon-
sible for the topic.
The resource-oriented approach, which is currently determining Ger-
man integration policy, gave rise to intensive cooperation between the inte-
gration departments and migrant organizations on the municipal level. Good
relationships with active migrant organizations engaged into the local inte-
gration policy have created a situation in which integration departments lend
an open ear to the interests of migrants in regards to their home countries.
One of our interview partners illustrates this situation in the following way:
»The migrants also approach us with their concerns that do not directly affect
integration efforts. I think this is dialogue on equal terms that we also support
initiatives of the organizations which do not directly benefit our residents, but that
have positive effects beyond.«43
Migration and development has not yet become a specific policy field in the
municipalities; if activities in the field of migration and development are
promoted this is mostly the result of demand-based engagement of migrant
organizations. Municipalities have difficulties to legitimize measures without
direct impact on their population. Thus, concrete development measures
(especially with respect to projects abroad) cannot be financed by the muni-
cipal authorities directly. As a consequence, the cooperation with migrant or-
ganizations is limited to awareness-raising activities and to the organizatio-
nal support of migrant activities, like the provision of office facilities and the
facilitation of networking between migrant organizations.
›International departments‹44 on the municipal level implement deve-
lopment-related educational activities and so they mainly organize activities
in this realm. Among others they support migrant associations in the orga-
nization of cultural events.
                                                
42 See Katrin Fröhlich, Kommunale Entwicklungspolitik in Deutschland: Studie zum
entwicklungspolitischen Engagement deutscher Städte, Gemeinden und Landkreise
(Discussion Paper Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, DIE), Bonn 2009.
43 Personal communication: Representative of one municipal office.
44 In this contribution, we are using the term ›international department‹ for agencies
and institutions that are situated at the local government (municipal) level and are
responsible for issues related to international cooperation and relations.
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»We organized the availability of a venue in the city hall, the technical equipment,
the food, the greeting of the mayor etc. That’s our contribution so that the
happening is best communicated to the wider public and that it reaches certain
visibility and weight.«45
The home countries are the typical focus of these events, that are often used
to raise funds for projects; at the same time, the citizens are sensitized for
development problems.
Another important role of the international departments within the
municipal structure is to facilitate networking activities. This includes the
organization of intercultural weeks or the interlinking of bodies with similar
objectives. As financial support for projects abroad is not possible for the
municipal bodies and is only available with the classical donors of develop-
ment cooperation, migrant organizations acting on the local level are in direct
competition with the established civil society actors. So the international de-
partments see themselves as advocates of the development-oriented migrant
organizations. One of their activities is the organization of networking
events, which would »sensitize the big development organizations«46 for
development activities and the know-how of migrants. The collaboration
between integration departments and departments of international affairs on
the municipal level is limited to capacity-building activities and to organiza-
tional and political assistance, for example, by organizing intercultural events
in their cities. Nevertheless, neither this kind of support for migrant organi-
zations is institutionalized on the municipal level. Collaboration happens
only on sporadic demand of the migrant organizations and where they find
engaged multipliers. Apart from that, the municipal level does not possess
competencies and resources to initiate development projects in the countries
of migrants’ origin.
Migration and Development in Germany –
From Discourse to Implementation?
Agenda-setting
Our observations show that different actors in Germany adapt different po-
litical views on the nexus of migration and development. Four political views
could be considered prominent: (1) Migrants advance development, (2) Migra-
tion advances development, (3) migration is the result of development disparities,
and (4) migration is a barrier to development (see table 2). Depending on these
viewpoints, actors formulate and concretize different political strategies.
                                                
45 Personal communication: Representative of one municipal office.
46 Personal communication: Representative of one municipal office.
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origin lose their youngest, most active, most
innovative and most educated members.
Negative consequences of
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The concept migrants advance development views migrants as brokers between
cultures, whose financial as well as social transfers contribute to the devel-
opment of home countries. This view can be called pragmatic, as the role of
the migrants in relation to the development of their home countries is appre-
ciated, while current national migration policy is not challenged. The political
programs and projects following this perspective are less oriented towards
the management of migration processes themselves, but develop measures
which facilitate the participation of diaspora in development cooperation (di-
aspora-cooperation programs). Basically, measures facilitating diaspora-
cooperation are typically justified with the help of this concept. The activities
of the biggest organizations implementing development policies, such as the
GIZ or CIM, could be considered a driving force promoting the concept mi-
grants advance development on the political agenda. The concept was put into
writing in a recent information booklet on the opportunities of migration to
development, released by the BMZ:
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»Migrants can build bridges across which capital and expertise can move from
receiving to sending countries. In this way they make a major contribution to social
and economic development in their own countries […].«47
On the regional and local levels migrants have also been discovered as activ-
ists for development. Integration departments, departments for international
affairs and some regional non-governmental development policy networks
have developed ideas aiming at the facilitation of diaspora engagement. They
argue that the competencies of migrants should be used in regional and local
development policy. The diaspora engagement was seen not just as an issue
of development cooperation but also as an issue of migrants’ participation in
the regional or local civil societies.
The second view that migration advances development portrays migration
as a structural phenomenon that contributes per se to development – through
the free movement of labor and know-how. This view is characterized by a
liberal approach to migration and human mobility. The primary goal of
actors who follow this view is to lessen restrictions on international move-
ments. Circular migration ideas are based upon this approach. One of the in-
terviewed experts argues for example:
»The movement of people between countries has to be facilitated, no matter how. It
could be promoted through the facilitation of visa requirements or through dual
citizenship. A lot of migrants stay here because they are afraid that they wouldn’t
be able to return to Germany. Otherwise they would go back with more ease and
stimulate the development of their home country.«48
Interestingly, different federal state actors, non-governmental actors and
regional state actors see the topic of circulation differently. The views differ
from the concepts of the two-way-migration (migration and return), which is
central to federal state actors, to the concept of free movement understood as
a basic human right, which is central to many non-governmental organiza-
tions. Some Bundesländer see migrant circulation as an issue of economic
cooperation between themselves and the regions of origin.
The third approach to migration and development assumes that migra-
tion is the result of development disparities and therefore postulates a sustainable
approach to development policies that can tackle the root causes of migration
in the countries of origin. This view has a long tradition, as development dis-
parities are identified as central scientific explanation of international migra-
tion till this day.49 Especially the development actors not actively engaged
                                                
47 BMZ, Migration, Harnessing the Opportunities to Promote Development, p. 7.
48 Personal communication: German politician.
49 Susanne Schmid, Vor den Toren Europas? Das Potenzial der Migration aus Afrika
(BAMF Forschungsbericht 7/Federal Office for Migration and Refugees), Nürnberg
2010.
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into the migration and development agenda-setting think this way. They
state that specific migration-development-approaches are redundant for
them, as all of their programs in developing countries reduce the push factors
of out-migration. These actors typically do not see the purpose to implement
particular migration-development measures.
In the cases when actors picture migration as a barrier to development they
typically see the exodus of migrants as a loss of human capital. This view is
most likely the oldest view and is related to the concept of brain drain – an
argument mainly presented in the past by development actors in Germany.50
This argument is remaining central for state and non-state actors promoting
return. Return programs basically follow the hypothesis that out-migration is
a loss for developing countries. The logic is that the facilitation of return and
reintegration would contribute to the development of the sending societies.
Is There a Dominant Paradigm?
In the previous section we could see that different political views on the mi-
gration and development nexus establish themselves in Germany. Moreover,
there are different institutional interpretations of each political view. For
example, the concept migration advances development has different interpreta-
tions according to the institutional interests of the federal, regional or non-
governmental actors. But the view migrants advance development is not homo-
geneous either. Some actors such as BMZ or GIZ see this concept as a new
aspect of development policy, whereas some actors on the level of Länder and
municipalities consider the same concept as one aspect of civic participation
of migrants and therefore as an issue of integration. We found out that there
are not only different interpretations of different views on the migration and
development nexus. Consequently, actors actually do not pursue one and the
same viewpoint but take different stances according to the political context
they are participating in. Federal state actors promote, for example, the topic
of the migrant’s contribution to development, but also support ideas of
circular migration. At the same time they deliver political support to state
return programs, arguing that return could compensate development costs of
migration. Based on these observations, we came to conclude that the dis-
course on migration and development is very fragmented and there is no
dominant perspective. Thus, no political actor on the federal level has taken
over the agenda-setting process and has forged the creation of a consensus on
a political paradigm. Many of the experts pointed out their confusion about
the topic and declared that they are right now looking for their institutional
view and for their mandate concerning the issue. Conferences, round tables or
                                                
50 Deutsche Bundesregierung, Aufschwung, Teilhabe, Wohlstand. Mehr Chancen für
Deutschland, Meseberg 2007.
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position papers belong to the major activities of a large number of actors.
Those activities are aimed at providing platforms for negotiations about dif-
fering interpretation of the migration and development nexus.
Despite the high fragmentation of the discourse we could observe a cer-
tain tendency to formulate the nexus between migration and development in
positive terms. Most actors saw the views migrants advance development and
migration advances development to have a promising future. Based on our ob-
servations we could make a tentative conclusion that the international migra-
tion and development discourse in fact has an influence on the political per-
ception of the migration-development-nexus in Germany. This perception is
moving away from negative assumptions around the nexus between migra-
tion and development that focused on the risks of international migration
towards a rather positive thinking which highlights the positive dimensions
of the interconnection.
Implementation of the Policy Paradigms: Which Policy is not just Talk?
In the previous analysis we came to the conclusion that the political views
migrants advance development and migration advances development, which are
new and positively defined notions of the migration-development-nexus in
Germany, are gaining acceptance by institutional actors of German migration
and integration policies. Now we will analyze whether the discourses find
their manifestation in concrete measures. Our observations on the federal,
regional and local political levels show that both the paradigm migrants
advance development and the paradigm migration advances development have
serious implementation constraints. The paradigm migrants advance develop-
ment seems to have difficulties to overcome barriers of institutional compe-
tencies. It is placed in-between two established policy fields: the development
and the integration policies. On the federal level it is considered as a compe-
tence held by development actors. Their activities mostly define central pol-
icy strategies and develop measures of explorative nature that ideally should
become best-practice measures for other involved actors. At the same time,
federal actors have rather limited resources to implement or fund bigger pro-
grams promoting migrant engagement for development.
On the other side, the paradigm migrants advance development is often
seen as a responsibility of integration policy actors on the regional and local
level. However, regional and local actors in the realm of integration policies
do not possess formal competencies for development issues and could only
sporadically support some demand-based activities of migrant organizations.
There is a lack of cooperation between actors of development policy and
regional and local actors of integration policy engaged into the migration-
development discourse. In spite of these implementation constraints we
could find different small-scale activities strengthening the development
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agency of migrants on all levels of our analysis. Therefore we could argue
that the paradigm migrants advance development has to overcome institutional
barriers and is endowed with limited resources but was nevertheless put into
effect on all political levels in Germany.
The paradigm migration advances development remains first of all an issue
of political discussion and is considered by most actors as a contested political
project and a project of the future. The concept of circular migration is seen as
the key option to realize this paradigm in Germany. Some federal and
regional actors we interviewed saw the concept of circular migration as a
potentially interesting field of activity for their institution. But nobody has
developed any concrete implementation strategy. On the local level the para-
digm migration advances development was not a relevant issue at all. Therefore
we could argue that the paradigm did not leave the realm of policy formula-
tion and did not find any practical concretization.
According to the opinion of the experts the main implementation con-
straint is a restricting entry policy, which makes experimenting with ideas on
mobility and development for the institutional actors impossible. Further-
more experts argued that implementing the concept of circularity would re-
quire steady negotiations of different institutional and political interests con-
cerning the criteria of migrants’ selection for circularity programs, conditions
of stay, nationality, return and possibilities of renewed migration. Moreover,
the development effects in the sending states should be taken into considera-
tion. The creation of circularity programs seems to be complex, time-
consuming and a risky venture. It would exceed competencies and resources
of small institutional actors and especially of actors on the regional and local
levels. Interested actors therefore expect initiatives coming from above –
from the stakeholders of migration policy and/or development policy. One
of our experts indicated: »When there is no political signal that this topic is
treated as seminal, then everybody remains within their competencies and is
reserved and only acts upon their legal mandate.«51
By trying to implement ideas on circular migration, potential stake-
holders like BMI, BMZ or GIZ have to invent comprehensive legitimizing
strategies, which would take into account differing and very often conflicting
institutional and political interests.
Conclusions
Our central question was whether the international migration-development
discourse can really become an issue of German migration policies. The
analysis focused on the different institutionalization paths of the discourse on
                                                
51 Personal communication: German migration expert.
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the three political levels: federal, regional and local. The analysis considered
two dimensions of institutionalization: the appearance of dominant topics
and issues on the discursive political level and the practical implementation
of political ideas on the institutional level. On the grounds of the enquiry
based on qualitative expert interviews, the following findings were made. In
Germany exist at least four viewpoints on the nexus between migration and
development: migrants advance development, migration advances development,
migration is a result of development disparities, and migration is a barrier to devel-
opment. To date, none of them have gained a leading role in the political dis-
course. The institutional actors are concerned with defining their view on the
migration and development nexus rather than with implementing concrete
policy programs. Thus, the migration and development policy in Germany
rarely leaves the discursive political level.
However, some aspects of the migration-development discourse seem
to have better chances to be implemented. It seems that the paradigm
migrants advance development has better chances to be implemented on the
federal, regional and local levels than the paradigm migration advances devel-
opment. We assume that the following factors could explain the differences in
the implementation. The paradigm migrants advance development addresses
migrants who already reside legally in Germany; therefore its implementa-
tion does not call for new entry regulations. So the paradigm does not ques-
tion the established migration policy approach. Projects supporting engage-
ment of migrants and especially of migrant organizations for their home-
countries are often seen as one aspect of their integration into the German
civil society. The paradigm presents migrants as resourceful subjects, which
could and should participate in German development policy. So it fits per-
fectly into the resource-oriented integration paradigm and does not need fur-
ther legitimation.
On the contrary, the paradigm migration advances development calls for
more liberal entry policies. In principle, this paradigm defends liberal ideas
of open borders. By describing the international migration and development
discourse, we argued that this position is based on the postulate more numbers
– more development. This view on the so-called migration and development nexus
stays in conflict with Germany’s low numbers – more rights migration policy.
The implementation of this paradigm demands extensive legitimation strate-
gies. Thus, despite the high interest of different actors to try out some circu-
larity schemes, actors associate the development of such schemes with high
costs of political coordination and different institutional constrains and with
uncertain outcomes. It seems that the implementation of the paradigm migra-
tion advances development will be possible only when new political strategies
of dealing with migration will be developed in Germany.
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Migration and development ideas belong to the international migration
management discourse that is trickling down into the national policies along
different institutionalization paths. We found out that the institutionalization
of the migration and development discourse proceeds selectively. It depends
to a large extent on the chances to place new political ideas within the policy
paradigms, dominating in the given national context. This conclusion in-
duces a general assumption that the institutionalization of other aspects of
the international migration management concepts could follow a similar
logic. It seems that only views not directly challenging the existing national
migration policy paradigms are likely to be institutionalized. It may be an
interesting question for further research to investigate how the selective insti-
tutionalization works in respect to other aspects of the international migra-
tion management discourse.
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7 In and Out the Back Door:
Canada’s Temporary Worker Programs
in a Global Perspective
Victor Piché
The significance of international migration, and in particular the role of mi-
grant workers, is being profoundly affected by crucial economic and social
transformations linked to globalization. We are presently witnessing an im-
portant paradigm shift with the elaboration of a two-tier migration regime,
focused, on the one hand, on highly selective mechanisms of recruitment of
qualified workers and, on the other hand, on temporary work permits for less
skilled job-seekers. This paradigm shift is embedded in the migration man-
agement approach, which has become a major reference in international
migration discussions and analyses.1 The new consensus, emanating from
international organizations and academic theories dealing with international
migration, seems to be that temporary migration programs are best suited in
today’s global world. One of the key objectives of this contribution lies in
illustrating the development of temporary migration using the Canadian
model, which is often cited as a best practice example. Although academic
interest with respect to policies affecting refugees and irregular migrants in
Canada is relatively well developed, temporary migration policies are still
little discussed and analyzed in the Canadian context.
Evidently, the notion of migration management is not new and dates
back to the end of the 19th century.2 What is new, however, is the recent gen-
eralization of the global orderly migration management model. In the words
of Bimal Ghosh3, the founder of this new approach, migration management
means managing for more orderly, predictable and human objectives, and to
                                                
1 See the contribution of Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud in this volume.
2 Vincent Chetail reminds us that the US Supreme Court broke away from the princi-
ple of free circulation with its 1892 decision stipulating that every sovereign nation
has the power to forbid the entrance of foreigners and decide who can be admitted,
see Vincent Chetail, Migration, Droits de l’Homme et Souveraineté Nationale. Le
Droit International Dans Tous Ses États, in: idem (ed.), Mondialisation, Migration et
Droits de l’Homme. Le Droit International en Question, Brussels 2007, pp. 13–136,
here p. 24.




achieve these objectives, there is a need for a global governance migration
regime.4 Migration management is based on one essential premise: namely,
that migration, if well managed, can be positive for all, i.e. countries of ori-
gin, countries of destination and migrants themselves (thus the win-win-win
rationality). Given the main concern with irregular migration and border
security, e.g. in the case of Europe, operational aspects of migration man-
agement policies cover three important dimensions. The first dimension has
to do with more effective control of borders and involves basically the proc-
ess of de-territorialization, whereby migrants are intercepted before gaining
access to European Union countries, what has been labeled »preventive
refoulement«.5 The second dimension involves third countries, mostly some
weak states such as Albania and Greece, which are pressured to develop mi-
gration policies more attuned to effective border controls. This approach also
involves alliances with transit countries such as Morocco and Libya, which
are asked to curtail illegal emigration and where migrants are sent back
when intercepted.6 The third dimension refers to co-development programs
aiming at stopping emigration pressures from sending countries, programs
criticized for being developed with exclusive EU interests. Finally, interna-
tional organizations, mainly the International Organization for Migration
(IOM), play a significant role in diffusing the migration management dis-
course.7
Temporary Migration
in Global Migration Management Discourse
Utilitarianism and Consequentialism in Migration Policy
»The global agenda is still profoundly embedded in utilitarianism and conse-
quentialism.«8
Migration management is mainly the result of preoccupations with ille-
gal migration. However, another central dimension of migration manage-
ment discourse is the promotion of temporary migration as an appropriate
                                                
4 See the contribution of Bimal Ghosh in this volume.
5 Chiara Marchetti, Expanded Borders. Policies and Practices of Preventive Refoule-
ment in Italy, in: Martin Geiger/Antoine Pécoud (eds.), The Politics of International
Migration Management, Basingstoke 2010, pp. 160–183.
6 In the case of Morocco see the contribution of Clotilde Caillault in this volume.
7 All this is well analyzed in Geiger/Pécoud (eds.), The Politics of International Migra-
tion Management.
8 For more details, see Victor Piché, Migrations Internationales et Droits de la Per-
sonne. Vers un Nouveau Paradigme?, in: François Crépeau et al. (eds.), Les Migra-
tions Internationales Contemporaines. Une Dynamique Complexe au Cœur de la
Globalisation, Montréal 2009, pp. 350–369.
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policy choice. It is not possible to dissociate present-day discussions on tem-
porary migration from the new global management approach to international
migration, and in particular to its profound embeddedness in utilitarianism.9
Indeed, since the inception of international migration policies in the 19th cen-
tury, the utilitarianist paradigm10 has been dominant and rarely challenged.
In recent years, two competing paradigms, namely the globalization and
human rights approaches, have altered the way we think about migration,
but without really questioning the utilitarianist postulate. However, an
emerging paradigm, based on the notion of open borders, is the only one
radically challenging the utilitarianist paradigm.
Generally speaking, migration policies rest on four pillars: political,
demographic, humanitarian and economic. The political dimension repre-
sents the fundamental basis of the paradigm and considers national sover-
eignty as an absolute principle and states that migration policies must first
and foremost be geared towards national interests. A corollary of this postu-
late is the primacy of national security, a preoccupation that has become
overwhelming since September 11, 2001.11
The humanitarian dimension refers to refugees. Contrary to other types
of international migration, refugees and asylum seekers are governed by in-
ternational law under the Geneva Convention since 1950. Indeed, this consti-
tutes a breach with respect to national sovereignty inasmuch as states that
are party to this convention have accepted the principle of multilateral man-
agement. In this sense, this type of migration could be said to lie outside of
the utilitarianist model. However, it must be added that the rights of refugees
and asylum seekers have been severely curtailed in the last fifteen years.
Considered too liberal, the application of the Geneva Convention has become
more and more restrictive and more attuned to national and/or regional in-
terests as in the case of the European Union.12 The third pillar of migration
                                                
  9 Patrick Taran, Clashing Worlds: Imperative for a Rights-Based Approach to Labour
Migration in the Age of Globalization, in: Marie-Claire Caloz-Tschopp et al. (eds.),
Mondialisation, Migration et Droits de l’Homme. Un Nouveau Paradigme pour la
Recherche et la Citoyenneté, Brussels 2007, pp. 403–433.
10 I use the term paradigm throughout the paper to mean a set of basic assumptions
(values, ideologies, theories, hypotheses, interpretations) with respect to a specific
research field (here international migration). A dominant paradigm is often taken for
granted and it is very difficult for alternative paradigms to become accepted and le-
gitimized.
11 François Crépeau/Delphine Nakache, Controlling Irregular Migration in Canada.
Reconciling Security Concerns with Human Rights Protection, in: Choices, 12. 2006,
no. 1, pp. 1–39.
12 James F. Hollifield, Migration, Trade, and Nation-State. The Myth of Globalization,
in: UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, 2. 1998, pp. 595–636;
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policies is demographic. In traditional immigration countries as in Canada,
the demographic foundation of immigration has always been present.13
However, recently, demographic considerations have become general-
ized in developed countries. With population aging and anticipated
decreases in population, important labor shortages are anticipated and inter-
national migration becomes (or could become) the main component of
population growth. For example, for the period 2000–2005 in developed
countries, net international migration is estimated at 2.6 million while natural
increase (births minus deaths) is estimated at 1.0 million. It is in this demo-
graphic context that the notion of replacement migration (immigrants
replacing births) has been suggested.14
Of course, if the demographic context is considered somewhat ›unfa-
vorable‹, it is directly linked to economic considerations, the forth pillar of
migration policies. Ultimately, all migration policies pursue economic objec-
tives and these occupy a central place in the elaboration and justification of
migration policies. This can explain why scientific research on international
migration has tended to focus on the economic impacts or consequences of
immigration.15 The term consequentialism has recently been coined to charac-
terize this approach.16 In brief, the consequentialist approach is centered on
the positive or negative effects of international migration. Positive conse-
quences serve to justify a more open policy while negative effects are able to
justify restrictive policies. At the macro-level, the economic impact of immi-
gration is said to be either positive or indeterminate but never negative.17 At
the micro-level, however, studies tend to show that migrants tend to improve
                                                
Luc Legoux, La Réorganisation Mondiale de l’Asile, in: Luc Cambrezy et al. (eds.),
L’Asile au Sud, Paris 2008, pp. 9–22.
13 Victor Piché, Un Siècle d’Immigration Québécoise. De la Peur à l’Ouverture, in:
idem/Céline LeBourdais (eds.), La Démographie Québécoise: Enjeux du XXIe Siècle,
Montréal 2003, pp. 225–263; Alan B. Simmons, Immigration and Canada: Global and
Transnational Perspectives, Toronto 2010.
14 United Nations, Replacement Migration. Is it a Solution to Declining and Ageing
Populations?, New York 2001.
15 See for example George J. Borjas, The Economics of Immigration, in: Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, 32. 1994, no. 4, pp. 1667–1717; Bimal Ghosh, Economic Effects of
International Migration: A Synoptic Overview, in: International Organization for
Migration (IOM), World Migration 2005: Costs and Benefits of International Migra-
tion, Geneva 2005, pp. 163–183; Manon Domingues Dos Santos, The Economic Con-
sequences of Migration, in: Graziella Caselli et al. (eds.), Demography: Analysis and
Synthesis. A Treatise in Population, Oxford 2006, pp. 337–348; Antoine Pécoud/Paul
de Guchteneire, Migrations Sans Frontières: Essai Sur la Libre Circulation des Per-
sonnes, Paris 2009.
16 See e.g. Martin Ruhs/Ha-Joon Chang, The Ethics of Labor Immigration Policy, in:
International Organization, 58. 2004, no. 1, pp. 69–102.
17 Ibid.
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their economic situation.18 In sum, it can be argued that the four pillars of
migration policies are cemented by utilitarianist principles: they are embed-
ded in national sovereignty and are constructed around national economic
interests. Recently, many voices have risen to suggest that this paradigm is
seriously put to test by globalization processes. We now turn to these argu-
ments.
The Globalization Paradigm in Migration Policy
Many authors consider that the national level is no longer appropriate for the
management of international migration. The nation-state, in the globalization
context, is considered as less and less capable of controlling migration flows
in a unilateral fashion.19 Thus, it is important to ask whether globalization
has fundamentally changed the dominant migration paradigm. The answer
to this question is multifaceted and depends on the level of analysis. Here,
we examine four dimensions of this question: volumes of international
migration, decision-making levels, migrants’ rights and basic tenets of the
global migration approach. With respect to the volume of international mi-
gration, the answer to the question on the impact of globalization seems to be
positive. There is consensus in the literature that the present historical period
is marked by intense mobility and that this mobility will continue to increase
as a result of globalization. The evidence for this comes from a single source
of data produced by the Population Division of the United Nations based on
the number of persons enumerated outside their country of birth. According
to these statistics, foreign-born populations have increased from 75 million in
1960 to 191 million in 2006.20 In relative terms, these numbers represent 2.5%
in 1960 compared to 2.9% in 2005. While the relative increase has remained
small during the period at the world level, the increase has been particularly
important in developed countries (3.4% in 1960 against 9.9% in 2005), which
may explain why migration flows constitute a preoccupation characteristic of
the global North. Given pressures inherent in globalization (e.g. the creation
of regional blocks and increased socio-economic inequalities between rich
and poor countries), it is reasonable to expect still higher levels of interna-
tional migration in the future.
With respect to decision-making in migration policy, globalization is at
the root of the emergence of a school of thought in the 1990s advocating the
necessity of going beyond unilateral and national management of migration
                                                
18 Ghosh, Economic Effects of International Migration.
19 Alain Dieckhoff, La Nation Dans Tous Ses États, Paris 2000; Ghosh, Managing Mi-
gration.
20 Hania Zlotnik, Statement to the Commission on Population and Development,
Thirty-ninth session, United Nations, New York 2006.
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to multilateral and global management.21 It is clear that we have witnessed
an increase in multilateral discussions of international migration in the 1990s,
whether at the levels of governments or of international organizations such
as the United Nations system.22 However, regarding the content of such
discussions, there are important gaps between governments, international
organizations and NGOs involved in the promotion and protection of human
rights of migrants. States are more interested by issues of security and border
controls, in particular with respect to irregular migration and human traf-
ficking.23 On the other hand, international organizations insist on the impor-
tant development potential of migration as well as the promotion of human
rights. Finally, NGOs carry a more critical perspective, advocating for migra-
tion policies that are more open, less restrictive, and more centered on human
rights.
In this regard, the impact of globalization on the protection of human
rights of migrants is minimal. On the one hand, the present focus on security
is certainly not favorable to open immigration policies and to the extension of
migrants’ rights. On the other hand, the human rights approach to interna-
tional migration has become a global issue and is prominent among key
international organizations such as ILO, UNFPA and also among many
NGOs. It appears that there is a globalization of the human rights model.24
The final dimension with respect to the impact of globalization on mi-
gration policies is linked to the first fundamental pillar of utilitarianism and
consequentalism: Despite important shifts in the way migration is perceived,
the globalization approach to migration is still embedded in the utilitarianist
paradigm and does not question the two basic postulates linking interna-
tional migration to national sovereignty and national economic interests. In
the globalization perspective, migrants’ rights do not constitute an important
parameter in the elaboration of policies. Hence, if emigration is recognized as
a universal right, there is no symmetrical right to immigration. Immigration
is considered a privilege granted by states, which consider that they possess
an exclusive right on rules of entry. Of course, the utilitarianist paradigm
does not exclude the granting of certain rights to migrants, such as integra-
tion and residence rights, and in fact in certain countries these rights do exist.
However, the degree of extension of these rights varies from country to coun-
                                                
21 Bimal Ghosh, La Gestion des Migrations: Le Regime Manquant, in: Pécoud/de
Guchteneire (eds.), Migrations sans Frontières, pp. 139–168.
22 Hélène Pellerin, Intégration Économique et Sécurité. Nouveaux Facteurs Détermi-
nants de la Gestion de la Migration Internationale, in: Choix, 10. 2004, no. 3, pp. 1–
30; Victor Piché, Immigration, Globalization and Cultural Diversity. New Challenges
for the 21st Century, in: Labour, Capital and Society, 37. 2004, no. 1–2, pp. 210–233.
23 See, e.g., Crépeau/Nakache, Controlling Irregular Migration in Canada.
24 Jean-Marc Coicaud et al. (eds.), The Globalization of Human Rights, New York 2003.
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try and ultimately depends on the goodwill of each country. In some coun-
tries, residence and citizenship rights for certain categories of migrants are
easily accessible (e.g. Canada and the United States), while in most other
countries citizenship is not possible, or at least very difficult to achieve.25
The Migrants’ Rights Approach in Migration Policy
A third paradigm focuses on migrant workers’ rights. It is exemplified by the
›International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families‹ adopted by the UN General As-
sembly on 18 December 1990. It must, however, be noted and acknowledged
that the International Labour Organization (ILO) has explicitly promoted the
notion of migrant workers’ rights as early as in the 1940s. Indeed, in 1949, the
ILO adopted Convention No 97 on the rights of migrant workers, followed
by Convention No 143 adopted in 1975.26 The ILO has recently proposed
new guidelines in which article 8 stipulates that the human rights of all mi-
grant workers, regardless of their status, must be promoted and protected.27
This framework insists on equal treatment in the labor market, condemns
human trafficking, insists on multilateral management of migration, recom-
mends social and economic integration of migrant workers and, finally,
underlines the positive nature of international migration in the context of
development.
Other UN organizations play a strategic role in the promotion of the
human rights of migrant workers. For instance, the now ›extinct‹ UN Com-
mission on Human Rights28 had adopted a resolution entitled ›Human
Rights of Migrants‹ year after year (up until 2005). In brief, this resolution can
be summarized in six points: the mentioned Commission
1. strongly condemns all manifestation of racism and discrimination against
migrants (article 1–4);
2. urges states to promote and protect the human rights of all migrants, in-
dependent of their migratory status (article 5);
3. urges states to engage in multilateral discussions on migration policies
(article 6);
                                                
25 For a review of the situation with respect to citizenship rights, see Patrick Weil, Ac-
cess to Citizenship. A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws, in: Thomas A.
Aleinikoff/Douglas B. Klusmeyer (eds.), Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and
Practices, Washington, DC 2001, pp. 17–35.
26 International Labour Organization (ILO), Migration for Employment Convention
(Revised), Geneva 1949; ILO, Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Conven-
tion, Geneva 1975.
27 ILO, ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration: Non-Binding Principles and
Guidelines for a Rights-Based Approach to Labour Migration, Geneva 2006.
28 Replaced in March 2006 by the Human Rights Council.
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4. favors immigration programs that allow complete integration in receiving
countries and facilitate family reunification (articles 9–11);
5. asks states to respect labor laws in accordance with national legislations
and international conventions (article 13);
6. encourages states to combat human trafficking (article 19–20).29
The UN Commission on Population and Development is also interested in
international migration. Although this commission is responsible for the fol-
low-up to the Cairo Plan of Action adopted at the 1974 International Confer-
ence on Population and Development (ICPD), it was only in 2006, at the time
of its 39th session, that the commission dealt explicitly with the thematic
complex of international migration and development. Following up on a
report of the UN Secretary General, this commission presented a resolution
stressing the positive link between migration and development for countries
of origin, destination and transit (through remittances and the involvement
of diasporas). As we all know, international migration is a controversial sub-
ject particularly among developed countries, which are not open to holding
international conferences with binding resolutions. Thus, no consensus was
reached to organize such conferences, although a high-level dialogue meet-
ing was agreed upon and held in September 2006. The results of this meeting
were not different from previous discussions and dealt with the positive as-
pect of migration for development. NGOs and civil society were not formally
invited to this meeting; however, a consultation was held in New York on
12 July 2006 sponsored by the UN Non-Government Liaison Service during
which NGOs expressed their views on the report of the Secretary General
mentioned above.30 Two main criticisms were formulated: (1) that the report
did not sufficiently promote a global approach to migration rights, and (2)
that the angle adopted was too much based on economic needs.
ICPD + 15 (i.e. 15 years after the 1994 Cairo Conference) has produced
a series of regional reports in preparation for another international confer-
ence that may be held in 2014. These reports re-affirm the Cairo agenda,
namely that countries should ratify the ›International Convention on the Pro-
tection of the Rights of Migrants‹. One report, for example, goes even so far
as to state that everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment,
to just and favorable conditions of work and to protection against unem-
ployment.31 The most important international instrument with respect to
                                                
29 United Nations, Resolution on Human Rights of Migrants HR 2005/47, New York
2005.
30 UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service, NGO Responses to the UN Secretary-
General’s Report on International Migration and Development, New York 2006.
31 UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Appraisal and
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migrants’ rights at present is this very UN Convention. This convention,
although adopted in 1990, only came into force in 2003. As of July 2010,
43 states had ratified it, but no developed country had done so. Among oth-
ers, article 1 stipulates that it applies to all migrant workers and members of
their families, without distinctions based on migratory status (regular or
irregular): Nevertheless, what is important for our discussion is that the
migrants’ rights framework does not call into question the utilitarianist pos-
tulate of national sovereignty. Indeed it stresses the importance of multilat-
eral actions in migration management, but within a context of cooperation
between states that remain sovereign in migration policy matters. Hence,
article 79 states quite clearly that »nothing in the present convention shall
affect the rights of each States Party to establish the criteria governing the
admission of migrant workers and members of their families.«
In addition, three other examples illustrate the proposition that utili-
tarianism is still very much present in the global agenda on international mi-
gration and human rights. The first example is the report of the Global
Commission on International Migration (GCIM).32 In certain aspects, this
report presents innovative recommendations, in particular with respect to the
necessity to further develop the normative framework of migrants’ rights and
adopt more binding international conventions. The GCIM clearly specifies
the necessity to respect national sovereignty in migration management. Fur-
thermore, the report dwells heavily on the positive potential of migration for
development. The second example is the latest ILO multilateral framework
mentioned above which explicitly refers to migrant workers’ rights.33 The
title of the document is revealing since it refers to »non-binding principles
and guidelines for a rights-based approach to labor migration.« However,
this framework is based on the same basic principles as the GCIM, namely
national sovereignty and positive economic impact of migration (see for ex-
ample article 15). The third example, the UNDP 2009 Human Development
Report, merits a separate discussion because of its very strong position in
favor of greater human mobility. The report, viewing »development as pro-
moting people’s freedom to lead the life they choose, recognizes mobility as
an essential component of that freedom.«34 Among the six pillars to maxi-
mize the human development impacts of migration35, the first two deal with
liberalizing and simplifying regular channels that allow people to seek work
                                                
32 Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), Migration in an Intercon-
nected World. New Directions of Action, New York 2005.
33 ILO, ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration.
34 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report:
Overcoming Barriers to Human Mobility and Development, New York 2009, p. 8.
35 Ibid., ch. 5.
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abroad and ensure basic rights for migrants.36 With respect to human rights
of migrants, the report states that the six core international human rights’
treaties, ratified by 131 countries, all contain strong non-discrimination
clauses applicable to migrants, regular and irregular, citizens and non-
citizens.37 Thus, »even countries that have not signed the CMW38 are still
obliged to protect migrant workers.«39 Although the report presents the
strongest position ever for a UN body regarding the »intrinsic value« of
human mobility, the main argument still resolves around the positive devel-
opmental impacts of international migration and its »instrumental value.«40
Consequentialism and utilitarianism are still on the agenda as well as the na-
tional sovereignty principle inasmuch as the proposal »does not prescribe
any particular levels of increased admissions, since these need to be deter-
mined at the country level.«41
Hence, as for the second pillar of the utilitarianist postulate based on
the necessary links between immigration and national economic needs, it is
also not called into question by the migrants’ rights framework. To reconcile
the consequentialist principle and human rights, the migrants’ rights frame-
work has rephrased the migration-development equation by reversing the
question. The question is no longer – as in the previous paradigm – if migra-
tion is a positive or negative phenomenon, but how migration can be man-
aged in order to produce positive effects. In fact, there is a strong presump-
tion that migration can be positive if well managed. In particular, remittances
and transnational groups constitute key factors in fostering development.
Surely, for groups and organizations promoting migrants’ rights, this new
paradigm is extremely important and useful. Even if it remains within the
utilitarianist perspective, it is an important tool for the promotion and protec-
tion of migrants’ rights and can be used to pressure governments for
increased protection of human rights.
Nonetheless, the human rights paradigm is fraught by two shortcom-
ings. Firstly, international resolutions and conventions remain very little
binding. For example, the fact that no developed countries have ratified the
UN Convention on the protection of migrants’ rights yet considerably limits
                                                
36 Ibid., p. 95.
37 Chetail, Migration, Droits de l’Homme et Souveraineté Nationale.
38 United Nations, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Mi-
grant Workers and Members of Their Families, New York 1990, http://www2.
ohchr.org/english/law/cmw.htm.
39 UNDP, Human Development Report, p. 101.
40 Ibid., p. 17.
41 Ibid., p. 95.
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its power.42 The second limit to the migrants’ rights framework is linked to
the acceptance of consequentialism as the fundamental guiding principle.
Consequentialism is a double-edged sword with respect to the promotion of
migrants’ rights. As long as it can be demonstrated, or is believed, that
migration is positive, the promotion of human rights is possible and even
facilitated. However, an important change in the economic context, such as a
severe crisis, with consequent increased unemployment, promotion of mi-
grants’ rights would be considerably weakened. In such contexts, the percep-
tion of the economic impact of migration would become negative and states,
supported by public opinion, would feel justified to shut the doors and
increase border controls, and consequently migrants’ rights would become
relegated to a second, even marginal, place.
Thinking the Unthinkable:
An Open Borders Scenario in Migration Policy
A forth paradigm, labeled »open borders scenario«, constitutes a radical rup-
ture with the above paradigms since it is framed outside their utilitarianist
foundations. It essentially asserts that migrants’ rights should not be depend-
ent on the goodwill of individual states and is based on three basic tenets.
Firstly, the right to emigrate should be paralleled with the right go immi-
grate. In this sense, the paradigm completely reverses the dominant equation:
migration is not a privilege but a right. The second basic principle states that
there is an absolute necessity to build a strong international law with binding
mechanisms. Finally, in the open border framework, migrant (temporary)
worker programs, which do not offer the right of residence and integration,
are contrary to migrants’ rights, hence, therefore need to be abolished or
reformed.
The open borders paradigm has been well developed by a series of
books published by UNESCO under the editorial leadership of Antoine Pé-
coud and Paul de Guchteneire, in particular in their 2007 book entitled ›Mi-
gration Without Borders‹ (subsequently published in French in 2009). The
basic arguments of the book are as follows: Firstly, political responses to the
new international migratory context are largely inefficient, human costs are
high (one death per day at the US-Mexican border) and so are financial costs
                                                
42 Many studies have attempted to address the question as to why developed countries
refuse to ratify the convention: see the special issue of the French journal Hommes &
Migration 2009 and Paul de Guchteneire et al. (eds.), Migration and Human Rights:
The United Nations Convention on Migrant Workers’ Rights, Cambridge 2009; for
Canada, see Victor Piché et al., Obstacles to Ratification of the ICRMW in Canada,
in: de Guchteneire et al. (eds.), Migration and Human Rights, pp. 193–218.
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(the richest countries spend from 25 to 30 billion dollars per year).43 Sec-
ondly, on a more theoretical ground, the analysis of arguments against the
migration without borders scenario shows that no arguments, be they ethical,
economic or social, seriously go against open borders.44 Furthermore, the
scenario of massive outmigration as a result of open borders does not find
empirical evidence.45 In brief, it is argued that there is an important paradox
between globalization and the non-liberalization of migration flows.46 In this
context, the migration without borders scenario is certainly worthwhile to
consider. Obviously, this scenario is still considered far-fetched and utopian.
Most countries and regions of the world still have rigid borders, such as
South Africa, Asia, North America and the European Union.47 There seems to
be at least some opening up of borders in West Africa and Latin America.
Temporary Migration Programs.
Best Suited in Today’s Global World?
A few examples will illustrate the new consensus around temporary migra-
tion among international organizations. The first one comes from the Global
Commission on International Migration (GCIM). The argument in favor of
temporary migration is based on offer and demand. On the one side, there
exists an important offer coming from poor people in need of income. On the
other hand, there is an increasing demand for workers in low skilled occupa-
tions for which local recruitment is limited, oftentimes impossible. In brief,
allowing these poor workers to have access to income constitutes a win-win-
win situation: for the migrants, for countries of origin and for receiving coun-
tries. In the report of the GCIM, at least four recommendations deal with the
relevance of temporary migration programs.48
The second example is the ILO framework mentioned above.49 For in-
stance, article 15 of the framework stipulates that the contribution of labor
                                                
43 Pécoud/de Guchteneire (eds.), Migrations sans Frontières., ch. 1; idem, International
Migration, Border Controls and Human Rights. Assessing the Relevance of a Right
to Mobility, in: Journal of Borderlands Studies, 21. 2006, no. 1, pp. 69–86.
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coud/de Guchteneire (eds.), Migrations sans Frontières, pp. 55–78.
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48 GCIM, Migration in an Interconnected World, no. 2–5.
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migration to employment, economic development and the reduction of pov-
erty must be recognized and maximized for the benefit of sending as well re-
ceiving countries. Temporary labor migration is not considered negative with
respect to the equal treatment principle of migrant and native workers.50 It
must be recalled that these guidelines are not binding and that it is the idea
of temporary programs as legitimate that comes out of the ILO framework.
A third example is the International Initiative on Migration and Devel-
opment, launched by IOM in 2006 in cooperation with the private sector, the
World Bank and some governments. This initiative argues for greater tempo-
rary mobility of workers using the usual argument about offer and demand.
The IOM is not only advocating temporary migration but is also involved in
specific programs, the Canadian seasonal agricultural program involving
Guatemalan workers in Quebec being a case in point.
A final example comes from the UNDP 2009 Human Development
Report. Here it is argued in favor of the expansion of schemes for »truly sea-
sonal work in sectors such as agriculture and tourism.«51 Canada is even sin-
gled out as a country whose migrant workers programs have been success-
fully operating for decades, although the criteria for this ›success‹ are not
mentioned!52 As we shall see in the next section, Canada’s record in the field
of temporary worker programs needs far more attention and critical re-
assessment.
The idea of the relevance of temporary programs is not only promoted
by international organizations as seen above, but there is also such support
coming from the academic world. Two examples are noteworthy because of
the strategic position of the authors.
The first paper was written by two economists and published in the
journal ›International Organization‹.53 At the outset, it must be noted that
Martin Ruhs and Ha-Joon Chang argue in favor of including migrants’ rights
as a policy parameter along with the traditional consequentialist parameter,
and this is certainly a very important argument from a human rights perspec-
tive. They suggest a typology of immigration policy using a three-by-three-
matrix involving two basic parameters, degree of consequentialism and de-
gree of moral standards for non-citizens. Important for our purposes are the
final conclusions suggested by these authors. Firstly, they reject the four
extremes as not realistic (namely rights-based nationalism, consequentialist
nationalism, rights-based cosmopolitanism and consequentialist cosmopol-
itanism). Secondly, they advocate the moderate position (moderate conse-
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quentialism and moderate moral standing). To the question »what would be
the most desirable design of labor immigration policy?« they answer that the
design needs to be much less cosmopolitan and significantly more conse-
quentialist than the human-rights approach as advocated by international
organizations.54 Their final proposition is the need to design new types of
temporary foreign worker programs including a list of core rights and »we
need to deny migrant workers some of the rights that are generally granted
to citizens and permanent residents of the host country.«55 Needless to add
that this statement is contrary to international law since equal treatment in
the labor market is recognized in the United Nations Treaties on economic,
social and cultural rights and on the civil and political rights, which are in
force since 1976.56
A second, more recent example is an article published in the journal
›Ethnic and Racial Studies‹ by the well-known sociologist Alejandro Portes.57
According to his review of the literature, he concludes that ›cyclical‹ interna-
tional migration, as opposed to permanent migration, has the most positive
developmental effects. This is true for manual as well as professional and
technical labor flows. It must be underlined that in his view, permanent mi-
gration of manual labor has non-developmental effects.58
The re-emergence of temporary migration programs may appear as-
tonishing given that these types of programs, namely guest-worker pro-
grams, have been severely criticized and abandoned in the 1970s by many
European countries.59 In any event, the main point here is that there is con-
sensus on a new relevance of such programs.
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57 Alejandro Portes, Migration and Development. Reconciling Opposite Views, in: Eth-
nic and Racial Studies, 32. 2009, no. 1, pp. 5–22.
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tion Review, 40. 2006, no. 4, pp. 741–766.
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Temporary Worker Programs in Canada:
Some Critical Reflections
Canada is a good example of a country that is presently transforming its tra-
ditional immigration policy, geared towards permanent residence, into a vast
program of temporary workers. Canada has always been considered as part
of the so-called traditional immigration countries, and policies in the past
have largely favored the recruitment of foreign workers through a selection
process granting permanent residence. It is this immigration that has sup-
ported the economic and social history of Canada and Quebec.60 Although,
in the 1970s, Canada as well resorted to foreign workers via temporary pro-
grams61, the number of people involved in these programs was limited.
Furthermore, despite strong pressures from the growers in the agricultural
industry for the recruitment of Caribbean migrant labor in the face of persis-
tent shortages of labor, the Canadian government repeatedly refused to allow
such temporary recruitment until the end of the 1960s because of what Victor
Satzewich calls the »racialization« of post-war migration to Canada.62 Thus,
all through the 20th century, Canada conveyed the image of a permanent
immigration country. However, since the last 10 or 15 years, this image must
be seriously revised.63
As with most other developed countries, the Canadian economic and
demographic situation is nowadays characterized by important labor needs.
The present immigration system is seriously criticized by employers as being
inefficient, given the long delays between immediate labor needs and the re-
sult of the lengthy selection process for economic immigrants (through a
point system). Employer pressures are presently very strong towards linking
direct employment (demand) and labor (offer). The result has been the de-
velopment of temporary migration programs involving highly qualified as
well as less qualified workers.64 Detailed statistics are still hard to come by65,
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61 See for example Tanya Basok, Tortillas and Tomatoes. Transmigrant Mexican Har-
vesters in Canada, Kingston 2002.
62 Victor Satzewich, The Canadian State and the Racialization of Caribbean Migrant
Farm Labour 1947–1966, in: Ethnic and Racial Studies, 11. 1988, no. 3, pp. 282–304.
63 Kerry Prebisch, Pick-Your-Own Labor: Migrant Workers and Flexibility in Canadian
Agriculture, in: International Migration Review, 44. 2010, no. 2, pp. 404–441; Nan-
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Table 1: Temporary versus Permanent Foreign Workers in Canada:
2000, 2005 and 2009
Canada – Foreign workers present on December 1st by yearly sub-status
PANEL A
Temporary sub-status 2000 2005 2009
Numbers % Numbers % Numbers %
International Agreements (1) 15,413 28 14,819 18,6 22,590 13,8
Information technology workers 1,395 1,980 3,565
Live-in Caregiver Program 7,451 20,386 38,608
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program: 16,688 20250 23,437
 Mexican 9,226 11,848 15,722
 Caribbean 7,462 8,402 7,715
Other workers with LMO* 13,882 19,205 37,524
Workers with LMO* (2) 39,416 72 64,667 81,4 141,389 86,2
Sub-total (3) 54,829 100 79,486 100 163,979 100
% of total (4) 61 56,4 58,1
Grand total (5) 89,746 140,906 282,194
PANEL B
Permanent Immigration – Economic Class
Economic class (6) 136,285 156,312 153,498
% of total (7) 59,9 59,6 60,9
PANEL C
Ratio temporary vs. permanent (8) 0,66 0,51 1,10
* LMO: Labor Market Opinion.
Source: CIC, Immigration Overview: Permanent and Temporary Residents Statistics, Ot-
tawa 2009, www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts2009.
but they are very eloquent in documenting the important increase in the
number of foreign workers (migrant temporary workers) in Canada. A se-
lected range of statistics on temporary foreign workers is published annually
by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and is
made available through their website.66 The calculations presented in table 1
have been adapted from the latest report.67 Three years (2000, 2005 and 2009)
have been selected in order to give some idea of changes occurring approxi-
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67 Ibid.
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mately in the last ten years. As table 1 shows, the grand total of foreign
workers (line 5) increased from 89,746 in 2000 to 282,194 in 2009.
It has to be pointed out that many different types of categories are in-
cluded in the label foreign workers, such as students, humanitarian visas, etc.
In table 1, the focus is on two such categories: (i) temporary visas granted
under international trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement (line 1) and (ii) workers with Labor Market Opinion (line 2). The
latter category falls basically under different types of temporary migrant
worker programs under which employers must apply for a Labor Market
Opinion before they can hire a foreign worker or get pre-approval to hire a
large number of workers. A positive Labor Market Opinion will show that
there is a need for the foreign worker to fill the job offered and that there is
no Canadian worker available to do the job.68 These two categories represent
some 60% of all foreign workers (line 4).
Crucial to our analysis is the very important increase in foreign workers
as defined here (line 3): from 54,829 in 2000 to 163,979 in 2009. Furthermore,
entries under international agreements have declined while the proportion of
migrants in temporary programs (LMO workers) has increased from 72% in
2000 to 86% in 2009. Finally, the ratio of temporary to permanent workers has
also considerably increased at such a rate that in 2009 temporary migration
has exceeded permanent economic immigration (line 8).
In terms of human rights, it is the low skills programs that are most
preoccupying. Low-skilled foreign workers are under the legal authority of
their employer and are admitted under three main programs. (1) The ›Live-in
Caregiver Program‹ is the legal framework for the recruitment of foreign
workers (mostly women) for employment as caregivers with the obligation to
reside in the employer’s home as stipulated in the work permit. In December
2009, there were some 38,608 such caregivers (compared to 7,451 in 2000, ta-
ble 1). (2) The ›Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program‹ is targeted to nation-
als of Central America and the Caribbean, mostly Mexicans and Guatema-
lans, for temporary employment in the agricultural sector. Certain binding
conditions are explicitly integrated in work contracts. In particular, no for-
eign worker part of this program is allowed to work for an employer other
than the one specified in the contract, or can do so only with the authoriza-
tion of this employer. Furthermore, after a period ranging from 7 to 14 days,
the agricultural employer can put a stop to the employment of a foreign
worker and thus start repatriation procedures. In 2009, there were 23,437 for-
eign workers in this program (compared to 16,688 in 2000). (3) Other foreign
workers coming under temporary programs (mainly the ›Low skilled Tem-
                                                




porary Foreign Worker Program‹ see: other workers with LMO, table 1) also
increased considerably from 13,882 in 2000 to 37,524 in 2009.
The latter program was initiated in 2002 within the new immigration
law and defines the guidelines for the recruitment of low-skilled foreign
workers in occupations other than caregiving and agriculture. It is part of the
›Temporary Foreign Worker Program‹ initiated in 1973 for the recruitment of
highly skilled workers. This program has been expanded to lower-skilled
workers in 2002 with important changes facilitating such recruitment from
2002 to the present. If in 2002 26,3% of all temporary foreign workers were in
lower-skilled occupations, this percentage was up to 34,2 in 2008.69 However,
if the family members of foreign workers are included, it is estimated that be-
tween 40 and 55% of temporary foreign workers were in lower-skilled occu-
pations.70 It can be expected that the rise in the number of foreign workers in
lower-skilled occupations will continue in the future. A recent study has
shown that lower-skilled foreign workers, contrary to highly skilled workers,
have little access to employment-related rights, to family reunification and to
permanent residence.71
Temporary Foreign Worker Programs are troubling for two main rea-
sons. Firstly, they create a new category of non-citizens since settlement is
beyond the reach of these workers. Thus, Canada is presently developing a
two-tier immigration policy: one for highly qualified immigrants through the
point system (economic class) and/or through temporary programs with
easy access to permanent residence; and another one for lower-skilled work-
ers for whom integration is denied.72 Despite the fact that this is a fundamen-
tal change in Canadian immigration philosophy, there has been no public
debate to this effect. The second main problem with temporary programs is
that they do not respect fundamental human rights.73
However, the most unacceptable aspect of temporary programs is that
they are basically employer-led and that foreign workers are tied to one em-
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ployer. It is thus possible to apply the concept of unfree labor to this type of
employment: unfree to circulate in the labor market and unfree to refuse
work when required.74
Finally, it must be stressed that recent legal decisions have been made
in Canada, which grant the same rights to migrant workers as to all citizens.
For instance, in its 2010 legal opinion on the rights of foreign workers, the
Quebec Human Rights Commission concludes that these workers benefit
from the guarantees granted by the Quebec Charter of Human Rights.75 An-
other example is the decision by the Quebec Labor Commission, declaring
that article 21.a of the Quebec Labor Code, which stipulates that persons em-
ployed in a farm are not considered as salaried employees with the possibil-
ity of unionization if they are not ordinarily and continuously employed, is
unconstitutional because it is contrary to the Canadian Charter of rights and
liberties.76 As Delphine Nakache and Paula Kinoshita (2010) have shown for
the rest of Canada, there are some efforts to increase the protection of mi-
grants’ rights but the problem is that these rights are not really accessible in
practice because of the very restrictive nature of the work permits.77
In the 1980s, there was some discussion among Canadian scholars as to
the nature of temporary programs. While Lloyd T. Wong argued that they
were guest-worker programs78, Monica Boyd et al. (1986), analyzing tempo-
rary worker flows between 1973 and 1985, showed that significant and
growing proportions involved social and humanitarian reasons, thus were
not linked directly to labor market and therefore could not be labeled as
guest-workers for this group.79 However, as we have shown80, there is an
important increase in the labor-market component of migrant workers in
Canada and as such they can be labeled as guest workers.
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International migration and its management constitute major challenges for
the 21st century, parallel to the great social, economic and political transfor-
mations characterizing today’s world. In particular, globalization is changing
the basic parameters with respect to the role of international migration and
the place reserved for migrant workers. We are witnessing presently the set-
ting up of a two-tier migration regime, one for lower-skilled workers cen-
tered on the refusal of integration and citizenship, and another for highly
skilled workers whose mobility is favored with all kinds of rights and inte-
gration facilities. In other words, we are witnessing a new global migration
regime that is highly restrictive and repressive for all types of unskilled mi-
grants81, whether temporary, asylum seekers or undocumented. This regime
is actually new in four senses: (1) it is global, i.e. it is elaborated in the context
of multilateralism; (2) the demographic and economic needs create a new
bipolar, unequal, North-South reality; (3) there is a wide consensus on the
relevance of this type of migration regime, a consensus implying an alliance
between employers and governments, largely supported by public and me-
dia opinion on the need to limit immigration but not temporary migration;
and (4) international law with respect to migrant labor is weak and often
non-binding.
It is possible to conceive of temporary foreign worker programs that
they are acceptable from a migrants’ rights perspective, as long as five mini-
mal conditions are met: (1) the temporary nature of employment should be a
voluntary option of the worker who should have access to permanent resi-
dence, if so desired; (2) the worker should not be tied to one employer and
should be granted free circulation in the labor market; (3) independent and
efficient mechanisms need to be put into place in order to guarantee the pro-
tection of the rights of workers; (4) cases of abuse need to be efficiently pun-
ished and not only be complaint-based; and (5) Canada should sign and rat-
ify the UN Migrant Rights Convention.82
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8 The Implementation of Coherent
Migration Management through
IOM Programs in Morocco
Clotilde Caillault
In recent years, the fight against illegal migration has gone right to the top of
the political agenda of the European Union (EU) and its member states.1 In
this context, Morocco, together with other sending and transit countries, was
soon perceived as a strategic partner. The issues of emigration and transit
migration hence have been put in the forefront of all negotiations between
Morocco and European countries. In a strategy to externalize and exterritori-
alize a substantial part of their immigration policies, European states have
gradually delegated to Morocco some of their borders’ management activi-
ties, in exchange of substantial financial support.2 It is, however, not only
state actors that have become involved in this process. There has been a
growing number of new actors that are taking part in the implementation of
EU-sponsored migration management programs. Many NGOs and local or-
ganizations have been attracted by the funds made available for projects
dealing with migration. Intergovernmental and international organizations
(IOs/IGOs), such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), have also
emerged as essential actors in the migration field, either as services providers
for their member states or as a forum for cooperation on migration.
In Morocco, the International Organization for Migration started its
activities in 2001 but its involvement in that country took a significant twist
after the tragic events of Ceuta and Melilla in 2005, in which 14 migrants
were shot dead by Spanish and Moroccan authorities while they were
attempting to reach the Spanish enclave. These events received large media
coverage and drew the attention of the European Commission and interna-
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tional organizations to the issue of transit migration in Morocco.3 Shortly
after these events, Moroccan authorities intervened firmly: ›Migrant hunts‹
were organized, followed by massive arrests and deportations to the Alge-
rian and Mauritanian borders, giving rise to virulent criticisms from Moroc-
can and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs).4
At that time, the IOM with its voluntary return program provided a
welcome response to the undesired presence of sub-Saharan migrants in Mo-
rocco. Right after implementing its first return activities, the IOM signed an
agreement with the Moroccan government on the opening of a local IOM
mission. Since then, the activities of the IOM in Morocco dramatically ex-
panded and now take place in additional areas, such as development.
According to its organizational slogan and policies, IOM is dedicated to
promote »humane and orderly migration for the benefit of all by providing
services and advice to governments and migrants.«5 How is this translated
into practice? What role does IOM pursue within the framework of migration
policies, especially in North Africa, in relation to its own strategic orienta-
tions, the interests of its financial contributors, and the actors of the countries
in question? How much importance do the various programs and strategies
give to human rights and migrants’ rights? Is the migration context, as well
as the situation of the migrants themselves, taken properly into account?
This chapter suggests that the IOM, an organization that calls itself in-
ternational, is principally an executive, quasi-EU carrying out projects that
have been financed by European (essentially EU) countries. IOM actively
contributes to the externalization and exterritorialization of European migra-
tion policies, often to the detriment of migrants.
Migration and Migration Policies in Morocco
Morocco: From Emigration Country to Transit and Destination Country
Morocco has a long migration tradition: In pre-colonial times, circular migra-
tion between rural areas was common among nomadic and semi-nomadic
groups. Sub-Saharan caravan trade also engendered mobility and thus con-
tributed to form today’s ethnically diverse Moroccan population. The French
colonization of Algeria in 1830 dramatically changed immigration patterns in
the region. Attracted by the demand for wage labor on French farms in Alge-
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ria, many Moroccans left the country. After the establishment of the Spanish-
French protectorate on Morocco, the First and the Second World War created
new needs for manpower and led to the active recruitment of Moroccan men
in Morocco. 126,000 Moroccan men served in the French army in the Second
World War and in the subsequent wars.6 In the 1960s, the emigration of Mo-
roccans to Europe dramatically accelerated. Morocco became independent
from France in 1956. At the same time, Western European countries experi-
enced a rapid economic growth, generating a shortage of unskilled man-
power. Another factor was the closure of the Moroccan-Algerian border,
which led to the halt of the emigration of Moroccans to Algeria. Europe
became the main, if not the only, destination of Moroccan migrants. The Mo-
roccan government encouraged this trend, and signed labor recruitment
agreements with European countries, the former Western Germany and
France in 1963, Belgium in 1964 and the Netherlands in 1969. While prior mi-
gration flows from Morocco were mainly directly to France, in the 1960s des-
tinations gradually became more diversified.7 In 1973, the oil crisis deeply
affected the economic context of Morocco as well as the receiving countries.
Western European countries experienced stagnation and rising unemploy-
ment rates, and consequently decided to close off their borders to new labor
migration. Instead of halting migration flows, these restrictive policies
favored a shift to a more permanent migration. Economic and political insta-
bility in Morocco contributed to discourage migrants from returning to
Morocco. Emigration to Europe however remained sustained by marriage
migration and family reunification, which in turn contributed to the femini-
zation of the Moroccan migrant population abroad.
In the 1990s, the diversification of migration destinations went on with
the rise of new emigration destinations. Italy and Spain became the primary
destination countries for Moroccan labor migrants, while Canada and the
United States started to attract a growing number of Moroccan high-skilled
migrants. It is believed that three million people of Moroccan descent live
abroad today, among which 85% in the main European destination countries.
An important consequence and side effect of restrictive European policies
was the development of undocumented migration.8 Moreover, since the mid-
1990s, Morocco has become a transit and a destination country for migrants
coming from sub-Saharan Africa, especially West African countries.9 As a re-
sult of political turmoil and economic decline in their home countries, a
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growing number of sub-Saharan migrants come to Morocco, often in the
hope of reaching the European continent. Many sub-Saharan migrants also
decide to stay and try their luck in Morocco, which is still doing better eco-
nomically speaking than the majority of African countries. This turns Mo-
rocco in a destination of second, or even first choice. Although the presence
of sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco received considerable media and politi-
cal attention, the picture of an ›invasion‹ of starving and smuggled sub-
Saharan migrants is misleading and exaggerated. First of all, immigration
from Sub-Saharan African countries to Morocco is not a new phenomenon, as
Morocco has a long tradition of trans-Saharan migrations and trade networks
with West African countries. Second, recent studies show that most migrants
are actually well educated, and do not necessarily want to cross the Mediter-
ranean Sea.10 Finally, the few available statistics concerning sub-Saharan
migrants living in Morocco seem to indicate that their number remains rela-
tively limited, especially compared to the sizeable Moroccan emigrant
population. It is estimated that not more than some tens of thousands of sub-
Saharan migrants attempt to migrate to Europe illegally each year.11
The Europeanization and the Externalization of Immigration Policies:
Effects on Moroccan Migration Policy
From the beginning of the 1980s, European states started to restrict and avoid
further in-coming immigration. The economic crisis, the implosion of com-
munist regimes in Eastern Europe, and the outbreak of violent ethnic con-
flicts in many parts of the world led European states to be increasingly con-
cerned with mass immigration. They responded by imposing harsher immi-
gration and asylum regulations. At the same time, the signature of the
Schengen Treaty in 1985, created the need for common regulations concern-
ing the controls of the external borders. According to Andrew Geddes, the
EU’s Treaty of Amsterdam led to a communitarization of immigration pol-
icy12, a process that is different from a supranationalization of governance
because migration and asylum issues remained governed by national gov-
ernments. This communitarization has opened the way to a new control
regime based on inter-governmental cooperation.13 In the following, in the
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context of a growing securitization of migration issues14, measures to fight
irregular migration and keep migrants and would-be asylum seekers outside
Europe have been adopted both at the national and at the European level.15
The intensification of border control, it can be argued, is one of the main
compensatory measures for the liberalization of the EU’s internal borders.16
It can be linked to a quasi-militarization of European external borders with
the erection of fences at Ceuta and Melilla, the creation of Frontex17, the EU
external border control agency, and the installation of an early-warning radar
system, e.g. along the Spanish coast.18 European migration policies, in the
view of many critical observers, clearly focus on control and irregular migra-
tion, with little concern for the complex socio-economic reality of African mi-
grations. However, as Abdelkrim Belguendouz points it out, irregular migra-
tion is only the visible face of the iceberg, that is, migration.19
Despite these renewed efforts, policies aiming at curbing or controlling
migration seem to be quite ineffective. According to Stephen Castles, this
policy failure is due to factors ranging from migrant agency and networks to
the (growing) North-South divide, globalization and interest conflicts in im-
migrant-receiving countries.20 Focusing on border control seems particularly
inappropriate given that most African irregular migrants actually enter
Europe legally, subsequently overstay their visa, and only then become ir-
regular in the end.21 For Hein de Haas, European and African states have lit-
tle genuine interests in stopping migration, because the economies of receiv-
ing and sending countries have become increasingly dependent on migrant
labor and remittances. Instead of reducing migration, intensified border con-
trols have led to a rise in irregular migration, the use of new and more dan-
gerous migration routes, thus increasing the risks and costs for the migrants
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involved, and leading to the professionalization of smuggling methods.22 For
Hein de Haas, »policies to ›fight illegal migration‹ are bound to fail because
they are among the very causes of the phenomenon they pretend to com-
bat.«23
As a response to the increased costs but, nevertheless, still somewhat
limited effect of intensified border controls, the EU and its member states
have sought to elaborate alternative measures. On the one hand, European
countries have attempted to improve border control effectiveness by inter-
nalizing it, through mechanisms of »remote control«.24 On the other hand,
they have attempted to exterritorialize border controls to the Maghreb coun-
tries by pressuring North African countries, including Morocco, to fight
irregular migration and to readmit irregular migrants in exchange for devel-
opment aid, financial support and limited numbers of temporary work per-
mits for immigrants. European states have sought to address migration con-
trol through cooperation with migrant-sending countries and the transit
countries through which migrants travel. At the European level, migration
and asylum goals have been gradually integrated into the EU’s external pol-
icy.25 Christina Boswell discerns two approaches in this strategy: the exter-
nalization of traditional tools of border control and the implementation of so-
called preventive measures, »designed to change the factors which influence
people’s decisions to move.«26 This has been incorporated in the conclusions
of the EU’s Tampere Council in 1999 under the title ›A common EU asylum
and migration policy‹:
»The European Union needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing
political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin
and transit. This requires combating poverty, improving living conditions and job
opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating democratic states and
ensuring respect for human rights, in particular rights of minorities, women and
children. To that end, the Union as well as Member States are invited to
contribute, within their respective competence under the Treaties, to a greater
coherence of internal and external policies of the Union. Partnership with third
countries concerned will also be a key element for the success of such a policy, with
a view to promoting co-development.«27
                                                
22 Collyer, In-Between Places.
23 De Haas, The Myth of Invasion.
24 Samers, An Emerging Geopolitics of Illegal Immigration in the European Union.
25 Christina Boswell, The External Dimension of EU Cooperation in Immigration and
Asylum, in: International Affairs, 73. 2003, no. 3, pp. 619–638.
26 Ibid., pp. 619f.
27 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Tampere 1999.
Coherent Migration Management through IOM Programs in Morocco
139
In this context, Morocco was perceived as a kind of laboratory for the imple-
mentation of these policies. The Action Plan for Morocco, proposed by the
EU’s High Level Working Group (HLWG) during the Tampere Council in
1999, without consulting the Moroccan authorities, recommended the fol-
lowing priorities: (1) the intensification of the fight against irregular migra-
tion, (2) the signature of a readmission agreement, and the (3) introduction of
visas for sub-Saharan migrants. Though the plan was later rejected by Rabat,
it well reflects the intention of the EU to turn Morocco into a ›sanitary buffer‹
for Europe. The same priorities have guided the negotiations leading to the
adoption of the new EU-Morocco Action Plan in 2005. The Moroccan gov-
ernment, understanding the financial and political stakes, did not hesitate to
make the first move and show its willingness to cooperate. During a meeting
of the TREVI28 group in 1999, a memorandum was submitted by the Moroc-
can Minister of the Interior, Driss Basri, stating that, following the creation of
the Schengen space, »the main objective for Morocco is to be involved in the
European immigration policy«.29 In 2001, Morocco, stressing the lack of ade-
quate resources and technical means to carry out effectively border control,
requested 80 million euro for equipment purchase.30 Both parties seem to
benefit from the increased cooperation on migration: The EU by delegating a
substantial part of border control to neighboring countries and the Moroccan
government, expecting financial and political rewards in return for its coop-
eration.
The security-oriented approach of the EU in its cooperation with South-
ern countries appears clearly in the programs that were implemented in
Morocco in 2009 in the migration realm. Out of 79 million euro, 69 million
(88%) were dedicated to the reinforcement of border control. This ties up
with Christina Boswell’s conclusion that despite the big talk on ›migration
and development‹ at the European level, the actual emphasis is put on the
externalization of border control.31
The new Moroccan immigration law no°02/03 that was passed in 2003
offers one of the most striking examples of the EU’s strategy of externaliza-
tion and exterritorialization. The law, introduced hurriedly as a response to
political pressures, institutes severe punishments for irregular immigration
and offers little protection for migrants and asylum seekers. Although the
law makes reference to relevant international conventions, migrants’ and
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refugees’ rights are often ignored in practice. Unlawful deportations of mi-
grants, including pregnant women and children, to the Algerian border, still
take place and are regularly denounced by local associations and human
rights organizations.32 The adoption of the law, which was part of Morocco’s
commitments in return for the MEDA program financial support, suggests
that Morocco integrated in its internal policy scheme the concerns of the EU
immigration policy.
The conclusion of a bilateral (EU Commission and Morocco) readmis-
sion agreement, that would facilitate the return of irregular migrants from
Europe, is a key point in the negotiations between Morocco, the EU and
European states. Despite repeated political pressures and discussions, the Mo-
roccan government has so far refused to sign such an agreement with the EU.
At the bilateral level, however, Morocco has readmission agreements with
both Spain and Italy. Since 2004, Morocco accepts the return of sub-Saharan
illegal migrants from Spain.33 The security approach adopted by Morocco,
and that is encouraged by the EU and European states, is a source of concern
given the reports of bad treatment of migrants in the country. The organiza-
tion Médecins Sans Frontières noted that between 2003 and 2005, out of 2,193
cases of sub-Saharan nationals being treated for medical conditions caused
by physical violence, 52% were caused by Moroccan security services.34
The IOM as a Tool for the Externalization
of the EU’s Migration Regime
New Actors in Migration Control
Liberalism and neoliberal institutionalism emphasize the role of non-state
actors, such as international organizations, in international relations, as well
as the importance of economic and social issues for regional and global poli-
tics. International institutions and regimes help to overcome dilemmas of de-
cision-making and facilitate coordination between countries. Authors who
have examined the relevance of these models to migration issues generally
found that supranational organizations have had little impact on the immi-
gration policies.35 Immigration and asylum issues remain principally gov-
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erned by national governments. As we saw above, the EU constitutes a par-
tial exception to this rule, as a process of communitarization and harmoniza-
tion took place in the realm of migration policies. Some researchers have also
noted the emergence of new types of actors in the migration regime, that is,
companies, NGOs, IOs and IGOs. By participating in or organizing forums
and consultations, lobbying, and implementing projects with a migration
component, these actors participate in the definition and the implementation
of a new regional migration regime. If IOs and IGOs, such as the UNHCR or
the IOM, do not make immigration policies on their own, they at least act as
forum organizations, enabling important policy dialogues and consultative
processes. They also act as a more technically oriented service organization,
providing expertise and technical knowledge to their member states.36 In
doing so, they participate in the shaping of new discourses and worldviews
on migration37, such as the migration management paradigm of the IOM. For
their member states, organizations such as IOM are advantageous in that
they are officially not bound to the EU framework but allow, due to the
membership of both receiving and sending countries, for informal and formal
consultations without the need for official bilateral or multilateral talks. This
is especially true with the IOM, whose structures and decision-making proc-
esses at the national level are quite reactive and flexible.38
The IOM, founded in 1951, with its 127 member states is the leading
organization in the field of migration at the international level. Its annual
budget reached one billion US-dollars in 2009, and served to finance 2,360
programs in more than 100 countries. IOM is »committed to the principle
that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society.«39 It is
worth pointing out that IOM, or as it was first known, the Provisional Inter-
governmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe
(PICMME), was created in a very particular historical context, the chaos and
displacement that followed the Second World War in Western Europe.40 In
the height of the Cold War, the organization was mandated to assist Euro-
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pean governments to identify resettlement countries for the 11 million people
displaced during the war. During the 1950s, it arranged transport for nearly
one million migrants. Already at that time, the organization was heavily
criticized by some European states. They were denouncing the organization
as working primarily in favor of the United States. Today, this technical and
logistical area of activities still exists, notably through the so-called voluntary
return programs; however, new themes and concerns have been gradually
added to the discourse and programs of the organization.
Since its creation, the mission, objectives and activities of the IOM
evolved along with the emergence of new migration patterns, policies and
discourses. The main shift that can be noted with an eye to the discourses of
the IOM is the adoption of the migration management paradigm. This dis-
course is based on the flawed assumption that migration is a problem that
can be managed rationally.41 As we will see later, this apparently new dis-
course does not reflect a new approach to migration but rather a new way of
presenting the old migration control paradigm. In recent years, the organiza-
tion expanded at an impressive rate, offering its services to more and more
sending and transit countries. It also intervenes in new areas, such as migra-
tion and development and migrants’ rights, a trend that can be interpreted as
a way of addressing the critics it has been subjected to.42 In the last decade,
international human rights groups have heavily criticized the IOM (e.g. Hu-
man Rights Watch and Amnesty International) and regularly expressed their
concerns and their critique towards some of the activities of the IOM, espe-
cially concerning refugee rights in relation to the so-called voluntary return
programs of IOM:
»As organizations committed to the promotion and protection of human rights,
however, we also come to this meeting with concerns about the human rights
impact of certain IOM operations. […] We are concerned that IOM’s work in
certain contexts is adversely impacting upon basic human rights of migrants,
refugees and asylum seekers, including for example the right to be free from
arbitrary detention and the fundamental right to seek asylum.«43
These organizations often denounce the negative impact of IOM programs on
migrants’ rights, the participation of the organization in the creation of a
›Fortress Europe‹44, or in the Australian ›Pacific Solution‹.45
                                                
41 As regards to this see the contribution of Bimal Ghosh in this volume.
42 See the contribution of Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud in this volume.
43 Human Rights Watch (HRW), IOM and Human Rights Protection in the Field. Cur-
rent Concerns (IOM Governing Council Meeting), Geneva 2003.
44 HRW, Ukraine. On the Margins. Rights Violations against Migrants and Asylum
Seekers at the New Eastern Border of the European Union, London 2005.
Coherent Migration Management through IOM Programs in Morocco
143
In Morocco, the IOM started its activities in 2001 but considerably ex-
panded since the opening of a mission in Rabat in January 2007. Since 2001,
the IOM has spent more than 15 million euro in Morocco.46 The growing
involvement of the IOM in Morocco is to be understood in the context of the
externalization and exterritorialization of European immigration policies.
When the agreement on the opening of a IOM representation in Morocco was
signed, the acting Director General of IOM, Brunson McKinley, pointed out
the importance of Morocco within the context of the IOM’s own policies by
referring to Morocco as the »jewelry on the crown of our Mediterranean pol-
icy.«47 He continued by promising financial and technical assistance to fund
programs and projects to deal with migration issues in Morocco and the
Mediterranean region.
The IOM in Morocco: A Service Provider for European States
In order to understand the role of the IOM in migration management, it is
essential to examine the structure of the organization, and the way in which
its programs are designed, funded and implemented. On the ground, in
countries like Morocco, IOM operates as a service provider, dedicated to his
financial contributors’ priorities, rather than as an organization pursuing its
own defined strategy. The IOM, unlike other IGOs and IOs, does not work on
a stable annual operating budget, but instead uses project-related budgets
that are allocated to individual activities by donor states: »Staff and office
costs associated with implementing a project are charged to projects through
a time-allocating concept referred as projectization.«48 This allocation-related
structure enables the organization to display very low organizational costs, in
comparison to other international agencies. However, it also means that the
existence of the organization itself depends upon the funds it manages to
generate. The organization can therefore be seen as a competitor to other
IGOs, IOs, INGOs or local NGOs. This point is essential to understand the
nature and the strategic orientation of the IOM.
When the organization of IOM designs a project, it has to pay close at-
tention to the requirements and interests of its potential contributors, the
European member states. The organization does hard prospecting work,
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looking for opportunities, trends and themes appreciated by its potential fi-
nancial contributors. In Morocco, on a total budget of more than 15 million
euro since 2001, merely 200,000 euro came from regular contributions of IOM
members; the rest consists mostly of project-specific European funds ear-
marked for specific activities. The main donors for IOM’s projects in Morocco
are the governments of Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Spain. The
example of Italy is especially striking since the migration-related strategy and
activities of the Italian Development Cooperation Agency are entirely dele-
gated to the IOM. All projects of this Italian government agency are designed
and directly implemented by the IOM with a budget of 5.5 million euro.49
But why is it of interest for European agencies to delegate to an organi-
zation like the IOM? The answer is simple. For them, it often means lower
costs. IOM is indeed less bureaucratic and more cost-effective than state
agencies and other international agencies. Furthermore, these organizations
can more easily implement sensitive projects, such as campaigns against ir-
regular migration50, rather than negotiate these projects directly with the
Moroccan government. The IOM offers a guise of multilateralism, which is
better able to generate trust with local stakeholders. Against the background
of close donor-agent-relations, Martin Geiger points out that IOM and other
organizations are more likely to support traditional (control-oriented) than
more liberal (regulated openness-oriented) approaches to cross-border mo-
bility:
»The most important financial contributors to these organizations (the G7
countries) link their payments to the implementation of specific programs and
measures, the prevention of illegal movements and border enforcement. Instead of
contributing to the setup of a more adequate regime, based on realization of the
benefits of migration, IGOs are more likely to support the further existence of
traditional patterns of control.«51
Unequal Balance of Power and Limited Partnership
with Local Stakeholders
While European development agencies and in some cases also other interna-
tional organizations use the IOM as a subcontractor, or a service provider to
implement specific programs or measures, local organizations and national
institutions rarely take part in the design of IOM projects. Nevertheless, they
                                                
49 Personal interview: Program manager of the Italian cooperation (June 2010).
50 Antoine Pécoud, Informing Migrants to Manage Migration? An Analysis of IOM's
Information Campaigns, in: Geiger/Pécoud (eds.), The Politics of International Mi-
gration Management, pp. 184–201.
51 Geiger, Managing Migration for an Enlarging Europe, p. 27.
Coherent Migration Management through IOM Programs in Morocco
145
typically play a role in the following implementation phase when they be-
come admitted and involved as so-called ›implementing partners‹ of IOM.
In Morocco, the IOM works very often in collaboration with national
institutions such as the Entraide Nationale52 or ministries. But since these in-
stitutions do not contribute financially to the projects of IOM, their negotiat-
ing power vis-à-vis IOM and the project donors is very limited. The Moroc-
can government seems, however, to be very satisfied with the work accom-
plished by the IOM in the country, as it publicly expresses this regularly. Is
this voiced enthusiasm a real shared interest on their part or is it rather the
reflection of vested interests?
A structural problem relates to the fact that receiving countries in
Europe and sending countries in Africa have obviously unequal negotiating
power when it comes to defining migration policies. Whereas the EU has de-
fined an embryonic common migration policy, countries in North African
countries are merely following the policies of their main financial contribu-
tors in exchange for substantial financial support. As they are sensitive to
development aid pressure, they are less likely to define a strong independent
position that might possibly undermine European interests. The IOM inevi-
tably reflects this imbalance of power.
Although the Moroccan government has clearly adopted dominant
European public discourses on the surface, there seem to remain some con-
flicting interests. Until now, Morocco has for example been quite reluctant to
readmit large numbers of irregular sub-Saharan migrants, and has objected
to proposals by some EU member states to establish offshore ›processing cen-
ters‹ for immigrants and asylum seekers in North Africa. Another source of
contradiction is related to the negative consequences that Moroccan restric-
tive immigration policies can have on relations with sub-Saharan states.
Moreover, as Hein de Haas rightly points it out, Morocco has very little
interest in stopping emigration, as it brings substantial financial resources to
the country.53 The cooperation with the IOM and development agencies in
the field of migration control, indeed, induces important political and finan-
cial advantages for Morocco. For Moroccan institutions, such as the Entraide
Nationale, which is constantly searching for funds, the IOM is certainly a
valuable source of income. IOM projects provide the Entraide Nationale with
equipment, educational material, and substantial financial support for youth
projects. According to an executive from the institution54, the Entraide Na-
tionale cannot afford to refuse an offer with financial benefits even if it im-
plies a loss of autonomy or a reorientation of their activities. It ties up with
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the idea that North African States, especially Morocco, have successfully
capitalized their position as a transit country to strengthen their negotiating
power with the EU and its member states for support and collaboration.55
The IOM has also brought solutions to a somewhat ›embarrassing‹
situation for the Moroccan government: the presence of many sub-Saharan
migrants in the country. The so-called voluntary return programs of IOM
were received as a welcoming alternative to the violent and much criticized
initial response of the Moroccan government after the Ceuta and Melilla
events, it was also positively received by sub-Saharan states.56
Contrary to IOM assertions, we found that civil society organizations,
NGOs or community-based associations do not get the chance to participate
in the process of defining the programs at all. Their participation is often
limited to informative meetings. In most meetings and seminars, these
stakeholders are always and typically under-represented compared to Euro-
pean participants and state institutions. The same concerns the implementa-
tion phase of the various projects: From time to time, the IOM calls on a local
organization to perform a specific task (typically training or an awareness
campaign) but more in the sense of the NGO as a service provider for IOM
rather than as a genuine and equal partner of IOM. Even though this partici-
pation is very limited, the IOM does not hesitate to advertise NGO participa-
tion in its newsletter. For the local organizations, the IOM is perceived as a
potential source of funds. Even though they might have common interests,
unequal negotiating power and one-way dependency mark fundamental
problems and obstacles.
Migration Management or Migration Reduction Strategies?
Healing the Consequences of European Immigration Policies
The implementation of the IOM programs in Morocco should be analyzed in
the broader context of the increased restrictivism and tightening of European
migration policies. A substantial part of the programs implemented by the
IOM and financed by the EU or single European countries can be interpreted
as a convenient remedy meant to ›heal‹ the consequences of the European
migration policies, such as the presence of many sub-Saharan transit mi-
grants in Morocco, or the migrants deported from Europe and North Africa.
Right after the Ceuta and Melilla traumatic events, the initial reaction of the
Moroccan government was outspokenly violent. Criticized by migrants’
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groups, NGOs and the international community, the Moroccan government
sought alternatives to get out of this embarrassing situation. The IOM and its
voluntary return program were thus very welcome. The General Director of
the organization stated »I cannot accept that the governments of Maghreb, to
begin with Morocco, assume alone, on their territory, this task and that
Europe does not care. It is, so-to-speak, outrageous.«57 The interest of the
IOM in helping Morocco to share the burden of transit migration is clear. The
voluntary return programs of IOM consequently evolved very quickly in
Morocco, the necessary financial support was granted by seven European
countries58 and the European Commission. Since the end of 2005, more than
3,000 migrants in an irregular situation have been assisted by IOM and
mainly moved back to Mali and Senegal.
In an evaluation of the voluntary assisted return programs commis-
sioned by the IOM, 41 interviewees were asked the following questions: »Are
you prepared to leave the country without any legal document?«; »Was your
rehabilitation stipend (485 euro) a key element in your decision of return?« –
It is no great surprise that 100% of the interviewees answered yes to the sec-
ond question59; clearly this money was considered insufficient to start up a
business but it was certainly a way of buying the ›voluntariness‹ of migrants
to be returned to their home countries. Even though the quality of the study
is debatable, it provides some useful information. Some figures presented in
the study (tellingly none of them mentioned in the statements of IOM) seem
to question the efficiency and the appropriateness of the IOM program. For
example, 49% of the sample had never attempted to cross towards Europe;
which questions the assumption on which the program is based, i.e.: Sub-
Saharan migrants are all ›stuck‹ in Morocco. It is, however, consistent with
the current denial of Moroccan authorities that, besides emigration and tran-
sit migration, immigration to Morocco is taking place, too. The data collected
by the Moroccan NGO ›GADEM‹ and other studies suggests that there are
many migrants coming to Morocco, explicitly (and solely) on the look-out for
economic opportunities in Morocco.60 Interviews with associations and mi-
grants even indicate that many migrants, who have participated in the IOM
return program after being returned to their home country, came back to Mo-
rocco again a few months later. In this case, IOM paradoxically operates in
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some way as a ›free travel agency‹. This example stresses the role of mi-
grants’ agency and autonomy: Migrants are not the mere recipients and ob-
jects of immigration policies but autonomous »social beings who seek to
achieve better outcomes for themselves, their family and their communities
through actively shaping the migratory process.«61 Migrants can divert pol-
icy goals and use programs and projects to achieve their own ends.
While IOM emphasizes the rehabilitation aspect of its programs, one
can easily question this aspect and the overall sustainability of the rehabilita-
tion projects. The IOM newsletter indicates that 76% of the projects were op-
erational at the time of the evaluation (only a few months after they received
the money). Yet, another figure can be found in the evaluation report: only 5
migrants consider their project a success, while 86% think that it is not sus-
tainable in the long term. When they were asked if they were planning to
leave again, 88% answered that »no, as long as [my] activity continues to
provide sufficient income«. This answer, together with the former one, brings
serious doubt about the impact of the IOM programs on migration manage-
ment.
The voluntary nature of the participation of the migrants is also debat-
able, especially when the migrants are detained by Moroccan authorities and
have the choice between a so-called voluntary return and forced deportation
to the Algerian border.62 It cannot be denied, however, that the IOM-
administered voluntary program seems to please everyone, from the Moroc-
can government, which wants to get rid of unwelcome sub-Saharan mi-
grants, to the migrants who benefit from getting some little money and a free
return ticket to their home countries, to the European Union and its mem-
bers, who want to stop the flow of migrants to European countries.
Border Control, Capacity Building and Addressing
the Root Causes of Migration
Pursuing closely the objectives of its European donors, the IOM takes an ac-
tive part in the process of shifting the European migration regime to non-
European countries. On the one hand, IOM programs seek to alleviate the
negative consequences of European restrictive immigration policies, on the
other, some IOM activities directly attempt to stop migration flows. The IOM,
for example, supports the capacity building efforts of the Moroccan govern-
ment, by providing trainings to the Moroccan border enforcement body and
other governmental agencies, expertise, financing research and organizing
forums and conferences. In doing so, the organization promotes the emer-
gence of shared standpoints on migration policies among actors whose inter-
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ests are often conflicting.63 But the preferred strategy used by the IOM to
fight illegal migration is the containment of migrants, or stay-at-home devel-
opment-activities64, elements of a strategy that complements the repressive
policies of the EU.
A rather optimistic discourse on the relation between migration and
development has been adopted in the past few years by many international
agencies, (I)NGOs and donor institutions. This discourse is based on the
rapidly growing financial importance of remittances (remittances reached 6.9
billion US-dollars in 2008 for Morocco alone65) and their potential impact on
the development of countries of origin. From this perspective, the migrant is
perceived as a key agent of development, a potential investor and entrepre-
neur, and also a modernizing agent, bringing new ideas and new values.
According to this view, the root causes of migration are to be found in the
economic differentials between developing and developed countries. From
this, it follows that development aid and local development projects can be
used as migration management tools, while contributing to poverty allevia-
tion.66 Development policies based on migration management concerns nev-
ertheless raise a number of issues: Firstly, programs designed to address the
root causes of migration can generate or accentuate inequalities between
places, by choosing areas of intervention with high migration propensities,
which are often not the neediest ones, and selecting certain individuals or
groups, by targeting those groups most able and willing to move, rather than
the most vulnerable.67 Secondly, there are concerns that preventive measures
might imply reorienting the substance of development policies.68 This rela-
tively new trend should indeed be understood within the broader context of
the political instrumentalization of development aid by European States,
which are trying, on the one hand, to orientate their development policies
with their migration control objectives, and on the other to condition their
financial support on good migration management practices of the recipi-
ents.69 Empirical and theoretical evidence, however, strongly suggests that
economic development does not slow down migration flows; on the contrary,
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it often tends to encourage them, by increasing people’s aspirations and
resources.70 Although these projects refer to the socio-economic aspects of
migration, and seem to differ from strictly control-oriented policies, they
actually pursue the same goal, i.e., to reduce migration and keep asylum
seekers and migrants outside Europe. While these preventive measures may
be seen as a more adapted way of dealing with migration, a more human and
long-term approach, this is not necessarily the case. According to critics, pre-
ventive measures and discourses on the root causes of migration are merely a
way of paying lip service to the fundamental problems faced by African
countries, while ensuring that they cooperate on policies that remain funda-
mentally control oriented.71
In Morocco, a major part of IOM programs concerns this area. Euro-
pean countries’ development agencies have financed numerous projects
targeting the youth in regions with high migration ›propensities‹; in these
regions, small projects focusing on youth groups – social and cultural activi-
ties, training, and awareness campaigns – have flourished recently and there
are currently attempts to have them adopted by the Moroccan educational
system.72 Spanish and Italian organizations and development agencies are
particularly active in this field and choose areas of involvement according to
the migration trends of their own territories. In Beni Mellal, the Spanish
development agency is for example financing an IOM project for the creation
of a social and educational center for the youth. When Morocco was signing
an agreement with Spain on the return of Moroccan unaccompanied minors,
a shelter for children was also built for the same project, raising the concerns
of local organizations. The Italian development agency, also very keen on this
type of projects, has first financed a study on the emigration of young Moroc-
cans to Italy, and is now financing a project called ›Salem‹, that through edu-
cational, social and cultural activities, in the words of the project manager,
aims to »rise awareness on the risks associated with irregular migration,
without talking about irregular migration.«73 In all these projects, migration
is considered as a ›disease‹ or a ›curse‹, presented as a problem that needs to
be solved. Here is an extract of a tool-kit designed by the IOM for parents for
a project implemented by the UN Population Fund (UNFPA):
»Total maturity of the brain is attained – it seems, only around the age of 20 or 25
years! We can therefore understand the reason why teenagers and young adults
                                                
70 Hein de Haas, Turning the Tide?, Why Development Will Not Stop Migration, in:
Development and Change, 38. 2007, no. 5, pp. 819–841.
71 De Haas, The Myth of Invasion.
72 Personal interviews conducted in Khourigba, Beni Melal, and Tanger (June and July
2010).
73 Personal interview with the project manager (July 2010).
Coherent Migration Management through IOM Programs in Morocco
151
often have immature behavior! They simply cannot act otherwise! They can behave
in dangerous ways, be it reckless driving, drug use, or risky sexual practices.«74
It is quite clear that migration of teenagers could be included in this enu-
meration. Examples of individual failures of migrants, describing their ex-
ploitation in the receiving country and their sordid living conditions, are
given to the youth prior to the debate. Then at the end of each session, the
predefined conclusions are given. The toolkit gave rise to some interesting
discussions among the organizations involved. According to a UNFPA staff
member, while the UNFPA required that human rights should be integrated
in the tool-kit, the IOM simply refused to include this aspect, arguing that it
might encourage migration.75 Eventually, the UNFPA accepted the IOM ver-
sion, which is quite surprising since the IOM was in this case acting as a
service provider for UNFPA.
A similar strategy is pursued by the European Commission, its country
strategy paper for Morocco for 2002–2004 included measures that aimed to
reduce migration pressure in Morocco’s Northern provinces, the main
sources of Moroccan emigration to the EU. Projects designed to keep the
population in its place of residence through creating employment in the main
emigration sending regions were provided with a budget of 70 million euros
in total.76
The efficiency of these programs, measured to the achievement of their
explicit goals, is, however, highly debatable. Our study revealed that project
staff is often skeptical towards the effectiveness of these methods. For the
president of a local association called Emergence that is working on this is-
sue, »awareness campaigns can help but it is not enough. There has been
some change, but it is mainly due to the impact of the crisis.«77 Some NGOs
have even argued that these projects, instead of discouraging migration, can
generate unintended effects and create (stronger) desires for emigration. In-
deed, when all sorts of projects are addressed to young potential migrants,
some youth might just be tempted to pretend they want to migrate in order
to participate in the activities offered and only then, maybe, seriously think
about migrating. The main problem is that these kinds of projects do not offer
any credible alternative to emigration, and they certainly do not solve the
real problems these young people are facing in Morocco. They are simply
convenient cosmetic policies by which the Moroccan government can pre-
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tend, at minimal cost, to be doing something for its youth. One can thus
wonder why the rhetoric on migration and development has become so
prominent. Looking at the considerable costs of these projects (representing
66% of the overall IOM budget in Morocco78) can help in understanding the
European financial resources that are at stake, and therefore the interest of
NGOs and organizations such as the IOM in adopting such a discourse. In
the same way, projects related to the Moroccan diaspora, the Moroccan resi-
dents abroad, can be interpreted as a political currency, given by European
countries to sending and transit countries in exchange for their cooperation in
the implementation of migration control policies.79
Human Rights: A Forgotten Issue
Human rights issues have been gradually included in the discourse and the
agenda of the IOM. A document entitled ›Human Rights and Migrants: IOM
Policy and Activities‹ represents the official strategy of the IOM in this field:
»IOM Member States have determined that a prime objective of the Organization
is to enhance the humane and orderly management of migration and the effective
respect for the human rights of migrants in accordance with international law.«80
This apparent commitment to human rights concerns needs, however, to be
analyzed in the light of the other IOM strategic documents and the programs
implemented on the ground. It is here important to underline the fact that the
IOM, contrary to other IGOs, has no official protection mandate to protect
migrants’ rights, even though millions of persons participate in their pro-
gram. For human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International, IOM programs appear, in some cases, to constitute a
real threat to migrants’ rights. In the framework of IOM’s return programs,
for example, when voluntary participants are detained or when dealing with
human trafficking issues, the IOM opts for a security-oriented approach,
which often associates these issues with migration control concerns or coun-
ter-terrorism policies.
The IOM, as many state actors and other international agencies, is also
taking part in the discourse on human trafficking. In Morocco, the organiza-
tion has even funded research activities on this topic.81 While this approach
could be interpreted as an effort to protect migrants, the absence of concrete
protection measures (since 2007, five victims have been identified but no
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adequate measure has been taken) and the use of this discourse to justify
measures against irregular migration cast doubts as to the actual objectives
underlying this approach. For Bridget Anderson, the language of trafficking
is anti-political and is a way of legitimizing restrictive policies under an
apparently humanitarian agenda.82
When the IOM chose to collaborate actively with the Moroccan gov-
ernment on migration management issues without saying anything about
how migrants are treated in Morocco, they implicitly closed their eyes to
human rights violations. NGOs have repeatedly denounced the alarming
situation of migrants in Morocco, and the discrimination and violence they
are confronted with – notably by the Moroccan authorities. But of course the
IOM cannot afford to openly criticize the government if it wants to operate in
the country. Remaining silent seems to be a flagrant contradiction to the IOM
official discourse on human rights. Again, this gap can be largely explained
by the structure of the organization, which, contrary to other international
organizations, only operates for its financial contributors and not for the
migrants themselves. The approach of the IOM dictated focuses on economic
and security concerns, to the detriment of the migrants who are also direct
beneficiaries of the IOM.
When looking at the programs implemented in Morocco, one has to
admit that little has been done in the area of migrants’ rights despite the
commitment of the IOM. According to the IOM in Rabat83, there is currently
no IOM program in Morocco that deals with migrants’ rights. The only proj-
ect that tackled directly the issue of human rights was the creation in 2002 of
the Center for Migrants’ Rights in Rabat. However, this project, which cost
500,000 euros, turned out to be a painful failure for both the donor (European
Commission) and the implementing agency (IOM). When I tried to visit the
center, which officially still exists, I was told by the person in charge that the
center had never existed. Nevertheless, the project is still advertised on the
IOM website as evidence of the organization’s involvement on human rights
issues.
Conclusions
In Morocco, the IOM operates as a service provider and provides short-term
responses to migration. Its activities mainly cover irregular migration and
border control. The IOM strategy and activities in Morocco closely resemble
the interests of EU immigration policy. The securitization of migration, and
                                                
82 Bridget Anderson, Illegal Immigrant. Victim or Villain? (COMPAS Working Paper
64), Oxford 2008, p. 7.
83 Personal interviews conducted in Rabat with IOM staff members (June 2010).
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thus the focus on migration control, is promoted by IOM programs under a
discourse on migration management. By providing expertise, training, and
venues for discussions, the IOM also contributes to the shaping of standard
conceptions on migration policy. Within a very complex constellation of con-
flicting and vested interests, the IOM offers a convenient policy response for
European states and Moroccan institutions. For European states, it is an inex-
pensive way of externalizing their migration policy under the appearance of
multilateralism and North-South cooperation. Through their collaboration
with the IOM, Moroccan authorities and institutions can pay a lip service to
some of their socio-economic development policy as well as to the fight
against irregular migration, while benefiting from substantial financial re-
sources. In this policy context, the voices of migrants remain unheard and
their rights ignored. The IOM deals with migration from a very security-
oriented angle, which neglects migrants’ rights and supports European
states’ concerns and interests rather than those of Morocco and migrants. The
organization, in fact, operates as a complement to the European externaliza-






9 Towards a New Migration Management:
Care Immigration Policy in Japan
Hideki Tarumoto
Under globalization, most of the countries in the world have become diverse,
multi-ethnic societies. Cross-border mobility has become a normal feature of
contemporary society. The more globalization is accelerated, however, the
more the state struggles to maintain border control. In particular, unprece-
dented movement of human beings poses the dilemma of immigration policy
between opening and closing the national border. This border control di-
lemma reflects one aspect of the assumed challenge to the nation-state posed
by international migration.1 Globalization and its subsequent transnational-
ism of migrants may induce state sovereignty to decline. State sovereignty
seems to be challenged by the influx of international migrants. At present,
most states struggle to manage migration in keeping state sovereignty more
than before.
Despite being a relatively ethnic homogeneous country, Japan is not an
exception here, although it has kept a strictly selective immigration policy.
Due to its depopulation and aging, Japan decided to recruit nurses and care
workers from Indonesia and the Philippines. The introduction of new migra-
tion channels marks a profound shift of Japanese policy and regional migra-
tion management since the care immigration policy of Japan is implemented
within the bi-national framework of the Economic Partnership Agreements
(EPA) Japan initiated with several sending countries. Within this process, the
governments of the sending countries on their own elaborate institutions to
nurture, select and send out care migrants in accordance with global stan-
dards in the field of care migration. On the receiving side, Japan created a
new special body, the Japan International Corporation of Welfare Services
(JICWELS), in order to receive care migrants and allocate them among hospi-
tals and care homes. The Japanese government furthermore imposed strict
requirements for care migrants as concerns education and job careers. The
regulatory mechanisms between Japan and sending countries indeed seem to
create a triple-win for the sending countries, the receiving country of Japan
and the recruited care migrants alike. However, this win-win-win objective is
                                                
1 Christian Joppke (ed.), Challenge to the Nation-State. Immigration in Western
Europe and the United States, Oxford 1998.
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far from being completely achieved. Without resolving fundamental dilem-
mas concerning migration, the new approach to migration management will
result in smaller liberalism within the framework of bigger restrictiveness.
Seriousness in the border control dilemma is fundamentally due to a
trade-off structure of benefits and costs in migration. In the Western world,
the trade-off structure has been apparent and familiar among the bureaucrats
and the public. For a long period, the Western states experienced influx of
unskilled immigrants who have settled in after strengthening border control
in the 1970s. Once they receive immigrants, they face much difficulty in de-
porting and/or treating immigrants against humanitarian concern. On the
other hand, immigrants are often dissatisfied with their own situation in re-
ceiving countries in terms of labor conditions, residential condition, and so
on. By contrast, the non-Western world does not seem to consider the trade-
off structure as a serious issue and seems to suppose that the state can man-
age the border dilemma with adopting the closing-door strategy and/or
emigration policy without any hesitation. For example, Singapore takes strict
policy to retain foreign workers as temporary stayers, whilst Taiwan imple-
mented mandatory pregnancy tests to prevent female foreign workers from
settling in Taiwan. The Philippines is one of the world’s most active countries
in exporting own nationals as foreign workers to other countries. Surely,
some sending countries willingly send abroad their own nationals as a com-
modity to expect remittances from them, whilst others worry to lose useful
labor power to sustain their economies and societies by emigration; the
extreme case of a substantial loss of qualified workers is often labeled as a
›brain drain‹. Accordingly, the closing-door strategy and an active emigra-
tion policy are major Asian responses to the trade-off structure of benefits
and costs, yet they are only cosmetic solutions.
Another characteristic of the non-Western world is the dominance of
the state’s function. The notion of migration management often supposes dif-
ferent intergovernmental organizations such as IOM, ICMPD and UNHCR,
which are main actors to govern migration. For example, the policy against
irregular migration in Albania has been considerably strengthened by the In-
ternational Organization for Migration (IOM) and the European Union (EU).2
A large part of the non-Western states, the Asian states in particular, however
face only weak pressure from international agencies. Asian states tend to co-
operate bilaterally and multilaterally with each other, too. Even states in the
Western world, as main actors, often seek bi-national or multi-governmental
collaboration to realize a type of regional migration management. The col-
                                                
2 Martin Geiger, Mobility, Development, Protection, EU-Integration! The IOM’s Na-
tional Migration Strategy for Albania, in: idem/Antoine Pécoud (eds.), The Politics
of International Migration Management, Basingstoke 2010, pp. 141–159.
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laboration between the United States and Mexico is a typical example.3 Con-
sequently, states should not be dismissed as major actors to deal with migra-
tion – yet, in rapidly changing global and national circumstances, is it possi-
ble for the state to handle the trade-off structure in a more fundamental and
sustainable way? How can state agencies and other actors modify the trade-
off structure into a triple-win? In other words, how can the actors realize
international migration management?4 As regards the three dimensions of
migration management, actors, practices and discourses5 this chapter focuses
on the two dimensions of actors and practices. In order to portray a story of
the non-Western world, it will, firstly, take up a seemingly successful case in
closing its national borders: Japan. Then, it will focus on a recent issue in
Japan, the introduction of health care immigrants from abroad, which
induces Japan to seek benefits from immigration not passively but actively.
Today most states seek new strategies to manage migration with the aim not
solely excluding but also receiving migrants and encouraging migration. The
recent Japanese experience gives thoughtful suggestions on it. Finally, how-
ever, given the case of Japan, the contribution will explore why this care
immigration policy fails to realize a complete triple-win.
Japan as a Non-Immigration Country –
Clearing up the Myths
For a long period, Japan has been surrounded by two myths: (1) Japan was
said to be a single race country and the idea was also (2) that there are no
immigrants in Japan at all.6 Although some right-wing Japanese exaggerate
the myths even at the present time, it cannot be denied, however, that there
has been a considerable number of so-called old-comers who came to Japan
mainly from the Korean Peninsula, China and Taiwan in the pre-war era. In
addition, since the mid-1980s there has been an increasing number of so-
called newcomers from all over the world.7 It is nevertheless a fact that Japan
                                                
3 Matt Bakker, From The Whole Enchilada to Financialization: Shifting Discourses of
Migration Management in North America, in: Geiger/Pécoud (eds.), The Politics of
International Migration Management, pp. 271–294.
4 Geiger/Pécoud, The Politics of International Migration Management, in: idem (eds.),
The Politics of International Migration Management, pp. 1–20.
5 See the contribution of Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud in this volume.
6 Keiko Yamanaka, Commentary. Theory Versus Reality in Japanese Immigration
Policy, in: Wayne A. Cornelius et al. (eds.), Controlling Immigration. A Global Per-
spective, Stanford 1994, pp. 411–414.
7 Hideki Tarumoto, Multiculturalism in Japan. Citizenship Policy for Immigrants, in:




has received only a minimum amount of immigrants compared to other
highly industrialized countries.8 The most persuasive factor to inhibit immi-
grants from entering Japan are the policies and regulations that have been
implemented by the Japanese Ministry of Justice that is in charge of immigra-
tion control. This Ministry indeed holds the singular bureaucratic sover-
eignty in Japanese immigration policy and keeps away most political influ-
ence of the parliament, other ministries, business bodies, and social groups.9
Consequently, the Ministry of Justice has long enshrined the strategy to keep
Japan’s border strictly closed, which has contributed to the perception that
Japanese society is a closed national community exclusive to Japanese na-
tionals. International migration management supposes that a multiplicity of
agents (including intergovernmental organizations, IGOs, and other actors
beyond the state) in order to manage migration takes part in a multi-level
game.10 The case of Japan shows, in contrast, that Asian states still stick to
their sovereignty and refuse to share competencies with non-state and inter-
national actors. The Japanese state in particular has been quite successful in
closing its national border towards international movements of people. Fac-
ing the challenge of international migration, most advanced countries in or-
der to protect and keep their sovereignty develop multi-layered citizenship
institutions. Although these institutions vary across different countries, the
Hammar-Koido-Tarumoto Model (HKT; see figure 1) illustrates the main idea:
States are establishing five boundaries to regulate international migrants,
thereby categorizing them into irregular immigrants, temporary legal stayers,
denizens, second-class citizens and first-class citizens.11 With reference to the
model, the closing-door strategy of border control can be conceptualized as
the fortification of the boundaries 1 and 2 with the aim to prevent migrants
from entering and/or stay in the society12 – the main characteristics of Ja-
pan’s explicit non-immigration policy.
                                                
  8 David Bartram, Japan and Labor Migration. Theoretical and Methodological Impli-
cations of Negative Cases, in: International Migration Review, 34. 2000, no. 1, pp. 5–
32.
  9 Hideki Tarumoto explores the effects of singular bureaucratic sovereignty on tight-
ening asylum policy in Japan, see: Hideki Tarumoto, Is State Sovereignty Declining?
An Exploration of Asylum Policy in Japan, in: International Journal on Multicultural
Societies, 6. 2004, no. 2, pp. 133–151.
10 Geiger/Pécoud, The Politics of International Migration Management.
11 Hideki Tarumoto, Multiculturalism in Japan; idem, Un Nouveau Modèle de Politi-
que d’Immigration et de Citoyenneté? Approche Comparative à Partir de
l’Expérience Japonaise (traduit de l’anglais par Catherine Wihtol de Wenden), in:
Migration Société, 102. 2005, no. 17, pp. 305–337.
12 The HKT model can be applied to supranational as well as national political entities.
For example, the European Union (EU) undertakes plural bordering within the con-
text of its anti-illegal immigration policy, which fits well with the idea of the HKT
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Figure 1: The Hammar-Koido-Tarumoto (HKT) Model
Care Migration to Japan
After enjoying a long lull of immigration, Japan now faces critical issues of
immigration such as a considerable number of illegal stayers, unemployment
among ethnic Japanese descendants from Latin America (Nikkeijin) and harsh
working conditions of foreign trainees (Kenshusei). The most recent high-
lighted issue is care immigrants. According to the HKT Model above, Japan
partially opened boundary 2, starting to introduce nurses and care workers
as trainees from Indonesia in August 2008 and from the Philippines in May
2009. In this article, such foreign nurses and care workers are collectively
labeled care immigrants. The introduction of care immigrants poses a big
challenge to Japan. Generally, Japan tends to consider itself not benefiting
from immigration and is fearing the social costs of it. In this line, the Ministry
of Justice categorizes foreign workers into the two exclusive categories of
professional and skilled workers and unskilled workers; the Ministry only gives
permission of entry and stay to the former mentioned, not to the latter. Con-
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Imagined Migration World: The European Union’s Anti-Illegal Immigration Dis-




Table 1: Foreigners that can be granted a status of residence
Annex 1
1 Diplomat, Official, Professor, Artist, Religious activities, Journalist
2 Investor, Business manager, Legal/Accounting services*, Medical services*,
   Researcher*, Instructor*, Engineer, Specialist in humanities/International Services,
   Intra-company transferee*, Entertainer, Skilled labor
3 Cultural activities*, Temporary visitor
4 College student, Pre-college student*, Trainee, Dependent
5 Designated activities
Annex 2
Permanent resident, Spouse or child of a Japanese national, Spouse of child of a perma-
nent resident*, Long-term resident*
* The categories are created by the 1990 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act.
Source: The Ministry of Justice (http://www.moj.go.jp/ NYUKAN/NYUKANHO/ho12.
html; accessed 22 Dec 2009)
sequently, only professional and skilled foreign workers as well as foreigners
with special reasons to enter and stay can be granted status of residence (see
table 1).
This sharp differentiation between professional and skilled workers and
unskilled workers is somewhat arbitrary and can be regarded as an excuse to
prohibit a large part of foreigners from entering. A typical example of arbi-
trariness is care immigrants such as nurses and care workers. Despite of
having medical and/or caring skill and knowledge, nurses and care workers
are put in the category of unskilled workers and are left without permission to
stay and work in Japan. Thus, since care immigrants are considered as un-
skilled workers, their recruitment runs counter to the Japanese traditional
dogma not to allow entry and stay to unskilled workers. Moreover, the intro-
duction basically contravenes the closing-door strategy and Japanese cau-
tiousness about immigration. Consequently, receiving care immigrants poses
a big political challenge.
Japan has kept its strictly selective and highly restrictive immigration
policy for a long time. Why does Japan receive care immigrants nowadays?
The first reason is a domestic one: Japan has become an aged society where
the proportion of the aged over 65 to the whole population increased from
7.1% in 1970 to 20.2% in 2005. It is expected that the proportion of citizens
aged 65+ will be 31.8% in 2030, which will subsequently produce heavy care
labor shortage.13 This has become a major concern among the public as well
                                                
13 Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), White Paper on Health, Labour
and Welfare: The Year Heisei 21 Version, Tokyo 2009, http://www.mhlw.go.jp
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as among bureaucrats. In other words, Japan changed its preference a bit
towards benefiting from a ›win‹ by receiving care immigrants. Due to its
depopulating and aging as one major reason, it decided to begin with the
introduction of foreign nurses and care workers. The second reason carries an
international character: In 2006 and 2007, Japan concluded the Economic
Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the Philippines (September 9, 2006) and
Indonesia (August 10, 2007).14 In the process of negotiating these agreements,
the partner countries reached an agreement to abolish duty tariffs for some
goods in order to promote free trade; Japan at the same time accepted the
demands of the Philippines and Indonesia to allow care immigrants to enter
and stay in Japan. In this sense, the sending countries created a tactical issue
linkage between the issue of trade and the issue of migration and were suc-
cessful in getting this through15 while Japan, highly interested in the conclu-
sion of the Economic Partner Agreements, accepted a partial circumvention
of its strict immigration policy.
Sticking to the Closing Door Strategy
The introduction of care immigrants could be a sign that Japan is giving up –
at least partially – its closing-door strategy and wants to benefit from so-
called unskilled care migration. This interpretation is unfortunately far too
simple and does not reflect reality: Japan continues to impose strict require-
ments for care migration regarding access, stay and employment to/in Japan.
A first restrictive requirement lies in the qualification and experience care
                                                
/za/0825/c04/c04.html (29 Dec 2009); Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW),
White Paper on Health and Welfare: The Year Heisei 12 Version, Tokyo 2010,
http://www1.mhlw.go.jp/wp/index.html (29 Dec 2009).
14 The then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and the Philippine President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo attached their signatures to the EPA in Helsinki, Finland
on 9 September, 2011. For Japan, this EPA with the Philippines is the fourth one, fol-
lowing the agreements concluded with Singapore, Mexico and Malaysia. See Wako
Asato, Nippi keizairenkeikyoutei to gaikokujin kangosi kaigoroudousha no ukeire
(The Japan-Filipino Economic Partnership Agreement and Receiving Foreign Nurses
and Care Workers), in: Kuba Yoshiko (ed.), Kaigo kaji roudousha no kokusai idou:
esunisithi jenda kea roudou no kousa (International Migration of Care Workers and
Domestic Workers: Crossover of Ethnicity, Gender and Care Work), Tokyo 2007, pp.
27–50. It is reported that Japan signed the EPA with India in February 2011, but a re-
quest of India to send care migrants to Japan has been left as an issue to be discussed
later. See: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), External Economic
Policy Site, Tokyo 2011, http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/html2/
2-torikumi3-india.html (7 Apr 2011).
15 Lisa Martin, The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism, in: John Gerard Ruggie
(ed.), Multilateralism Matters. The Theory and Practice of an Institutional Forum,
New York 1993, pp. 91–121.
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immigrants are required to have: Nurses should possess a nursing qualifica-
tion based on the law of their own countries and have enough work experi-
ence (three-year experience for Filipino candidates and two-year experience
for Indonesian candidates).16 Care workers from the Philippines should be
graduates who studied at higher educational institutions for at least four
years and are certified as care workers by law of the Philippines. Otherwise,
they are regarded only as nursing college graduates. Indonesian candidates
are required to be in possession of a so-called level 3 certificate from universi-
ties or higher educational institutions in Indonesia, thereby being certified as
care workers by the Indonesian government after being trained as care work-
ers.17 The selection of care workers furthermore takes place in the respective
home countries, not in Japan. A fundamental problem lies in the fact that Ja-
pan actually plans to receive 1,000 care immigrants for two years. In the two
countries targeted by Japan, however, there are not enough candidates that
fulfill the Japanese requirements, e.g. what concerns the demand for rela-
tively high education levels. As a result, in August 2008 not more than 208
candidates from Indonesia were allowed access to Japan; in May 2009 a
similar small number (283) came from the Philippines.18 As a second re-
quirement, care workers and nurses are asked to conclude a formal employ-
ment contract with hospitals or care homes administered by the Japan Inter-
national Corporation of Welfare Services (JICWELS). There is no legal way
for foreign care workers or nurses to work at facilities that JICWELS has no
relation with.19 The third strict requirement is most politically elaborated:
Even in the case that care immigrants have acquired enough education,
qualification and skills for nursing or caring in their countries, they are
treated only as candidates for formal work; in order to work formally in Japan,
they have to pass Japanese national examinations after passing through addi-
tional trainings in Japanese hospitals and care homes. If they fail these exams,
they are not allowed to stay and work in Japan anymore and are required to
return to their own countries. This requirement is especially hard to fulfil
since the exams are written and are to be answered in Japanese language.
                                                
16 Japan International Corporation of Welfare Services, the (JICWELS), Heisei 22 nendo
ban firipinjin indonesiajin kangosi kaigofukushishi ukeirewakugumi (The Receiving
Framework of Filipino and Indonesian Nurses and Care Workers: The Year Heisei
22 Version), Tokyo 2009, http://www.jicwels.or.jp/html/h22_epa_images/h22_
brochures.pdf (2 Jan 2010).
17 Ibid, p. 22.
18 Kyodo News (News Agency), The Second Group of Filipino Care Workers attended
an Opening Ceremony of Training. Ten Workers Went to Nine Facilities in Five Pre-
fectures, Tokyo 2009, http://www.47news.jp/CN/200906/CN2009060101000646.
html (5 Jun 2009).
19 JICWELS, The Receiving Framework, pp. 6f., 19, 22.
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Though some of the care immigrants might have learnt Japanese in their own
country or in Japan, they are likely to face extreme difficulties in under-
standing Japanese technical terms of nursing or caring that are used in these
exams. Another constraint is the strict time limit: All foreign nurse candidates
are required to pass the exams within three years following their arrival,
while care worker candidates should do so within four years.
The Benefit-Cost Structure of Japan’s Recent
Care Immigration Policy
As described above, the Japanese state is still sticking to the closing-door
strategy though at the same time clearly seeking a win from care immigra-
tion. Can such elaborated statecraft as in the case of Japan really create a
triple-win? If it fails: for whom does the existing structure produce a win-
situation and who loses? To clarify this it is necessary to analyze the benefit-
cost structure of the actors involved in care immigration: the state, the
receiving facilities and the society in the case of the receiving country Japan
and the care immigrants and the sending countries (see figure 2).
The introduction of care immigrants is likely to function as a magnet at-
tracting not exclusively care immigrants but also other types of immigrants
and immigrant workers to Japan, i.e. the spouses, relatives, friends and
neighbors of care immigrants. Even would-be immigrants, who are not di-
rectly related to care immigrants, are likely to gain the information that Japan
is a country now ready to receive immigrants. Concerning this, information
campaigns to deliver appropriate information regarding migration could
become quite crucial for migration management in the case of Japan.20 Dis-
torted information and its resulting influx of immigrants would give the
Japanese state reasons to reconsider its care immigration policy. A second
issue is related to the first one: Care immigration may cast doubts on the
practice to differentiate dichotomously between professional and skilled
foreign workers and unskilled foreign workers – one of the long standing pillars
of Japan’s (non-)immigration policy. Care immigrants, despite having medi-
cal and/or caring skills in practice, are treated as unskilled workers, but never-
theless are permitted to stay in Japan as candidates for formal workers. Thus,
the prevailing dichotomy is somewhat blurred. Another, third issue is that
care immigration policy is likely to invoke a general debate on whether a
new category for residential stay in Japan for foreigners (care) needs to be
created or not. This category may enable a stable supply of care labor force
                                                
20 Antoine Pécoud, Informing Migrants to Manage Migration? An Analysis of IOM’s
Information Campaigns, in: Geiger/Pécoud (eds.), The Politics of International Mi-
gration Management, pp. 184–201.
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Figure 2: Flow of Care Immigrants
from abroad. It is recently reported that the Ministry of Justice is now indeed
considering an enlargement of the category of medical profession and the crea-
tion of the category care. Care immigration policy finally may trigger the
transformation (or decay) of the previous singular bureaucratic sovereignty
exercised solely by the Ministry of Justice. Prior to the negotiations of the
EPA, the Council of Regulatory Reform in the Cabinet Office created a group
within itself that is now responsible to discuss all foreigners’ issues led. Sho-
saku Yasui, a business leader who has designed the plan to receive care im-
migrants from the Philippines and Indonesia, leads this group.21 As a result,
it is no longer only the Ministry of Justice but also the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs and the Ministry of Welfare and Labor that are involved in planning
and implementing the introduction of care immigrants. This is a strong hint
for a more open and multiple bureaucratic sovereignty. Obviously this also
results in increased costs for the state bureaucracy that may undermine a
win-situation on the side of the Japanese state.
Institutionally, the Japanese state takes a mediating role between care
immigrants and receiving facilities through JICWELS. Why do receiving fa-
cilities such as hospitals and nursing care homes receive care immigrants?
The Japanese care immigration policy lobbies for itself with the slogan of
promoting international contribution and friendship. Consequently, also the
individual receiving facilities formally accept foreign nurses and care work-
ers on the basis of promoting international contribution and friendship. In-
ternational contribution and friendship are, however, only ostensible motiva-
                                                
21 Shosaku Yasui, Watashi no rirekisho (My Personal History), in: Nihon Keizai Shim-
bun (The Nikkei; Newspaper), 31 Oct 2009.
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tions; there is no doubt that Japanese receiving facilities seek to alleviate seri-
ous care labor shortage by using care immigrants. A similar case is the Japa-
nese foreign trainee scheme: Formally, the foreign trainee scheme was estab-
lished with the purpose of transferring skills to developing countries and was
seen as Japan’s contribution to international development cooperation. Yet,
on the practical level, Japanese companies employed foreign trainees first
and foremost to bring a cheap and quick solution to labor shortage in the sec-
tor of unskilled workers. Thus, both cases reflect double standards and sym-
bolize the difference between policy propaganda and economic and political
realities. However, it is important to stress that receiving facilities in the case
of care immigrants are legally regulated to pay immigrant salaries that are
equivalent to those of Japanese employees. In this sense, receiving facilities
cannot employ them as cheap labor force. Foreign care immigrants never-
theless are often practically engaged in secondary, menial work in the facili-
ties. In addition, they serve for a long time as candidate workers. Receiving
facilities face pressure for helping care immigrants pass national exams, even
if the exams are quite tough for care migrants.
For the Japanese society, care immigration policy in the short-term per-
spective produces a win-situation. In the longer run, however, it also creates
imminent effects on Japanese society as a whole: Japan’s society starts to be-
come diverse. Unskilled immigrants are often considered a source of social
problems. In the past, Japan officially has banned unskilled immigrants to
enter and work, but in reality, in spite of the dogma of the non-introduction
of unskilled immigrants, some categories of immigrants such as Nikkeijin
(Japanese descendants from Latin America), Kenshusei (foreign trainees) and
irregular immigrants have been tolerated and been used to fill labor shortage
in the sector of unskilled work. Nevertheless, the new care immigrants differ
from these traditional unskilled foreign workers that worked mostly in the
manufacturing and construction sector or in agriculture and seafood proc-
essing. Care immigrants are more visible since they are in engaged in activi-
ties that inhere person-to-person services and concern mostly Japanese citi-
zens. On the spot, Japanese clients notice without any difficulty that care
immigrants are foreigners with different appearance, culture and language.
In addition, care immigrants will be widely dispersed to hospitals and nurs-
ing homes throughout Japan. Accordingly, they are much more visible than
traditional foreign workers that lived mostly concentrated in industrial areas.
In other words, receiving care immigrants will enforce the perception that
Japan has already really become a multicultural society.
Another major impact of care immigration on Japanese society concerns
the traditional dichotomy between the public and the private spheres of hu-
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man lives. Generally, there are three types of foreign caregivers22: Firstly,
foreign nurses and care workers who work at facilities such as hospitals and
nursing homes. Most care immigrants in Japan belong to this type. Foreign
domestic servants are engaged in housework and/or in taking care of chil-
dren and elderly people at private houses. Finally, there are foreign brides
who migrate to marry Japanese men. This is mostly prevalent in rural areas
of Japan such as Yamagata prefecture. These types of foreign caregivers in-
cluding care immigrants globalize the private sphere of Japanese and one
could speak of a trend to global householding.23 These trends in Japan result in
the trend that traditional foreign workers globalize mostly the public sphere
(economic production) while foreign caregivers bring about profound social
changes in the private sphere. The Japanese society thus significantly de-
pends on transnational activities to maintain its social and economic repro-
duction.
With an eye to the sending countries it is often argued that these coun-
tries benefit from a win-situation because they can expect remittances from
their emigrants. However, the real benefit-cost situation in reality is more
complicated than one can expect: Sending countries lose nurses and care
workers and struggle to keep their own social facilities and reproduction
working. This care drain consists of two aspects: A first aspect is the loss of
skilled, professional health labor force. As part of brain drain, the care drain
engenders shortage of skilled health workers and loss or waste of national
budget and educational efforts in sending countries. The second aspect of
care drain directly affects the private sphere rather than the public sphere.
Surely, remittances from care migrants help in alleviating the poverty of
family members left behind. But emigration entails social and emotional cost,
too. Through the process of emigration, in many cases the main caregivers
(mothers of dependent children) leave. By losing them, families have to rely
on grandmothers, sisters or female relatives to take care of children. Thus,
care drain heavily affects the private domain as well. Substitute caregivers
furthermore often stay economically and socially disadvantaged. Within this
context global care chains become relevant: Care immigrants provide care
services for women in advanced countries, while as a result of emigration
substitute caregivers are needed to take care of children, parents and grand-
parents of care emigrants. The consequence: the active recruitment of foreign
                                                
22 Wako Asato, Kea no kakuho wo megutte hikiokosareru hito no kokusai ido: id-
ousuru hitobito ha tayousei no ichibuka (International Migration Caused by Secur-
ing Care), in: Gendai shiso (Contemporary Thoughts), 37. 2009, no. 2, pp. 91–105.
23 Ken Endo, Ekkyou suru sinmitsuken?: gorobaru hausuhorudo no jidai (Transcend-
ing the Intimate Sphere Across Boders: the Era of Global Household), in: idem (ed.),
Grobaru gabanansu no saizensen (The Frontier of Global Governance), Tokyo 2008,
pp. 121–142.
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care-takers and care emigration result in inducing care chains across na-
tional.24 Nicola Yeates argues that transnational care is more diverse than the
original concept of global care chain in terms of skill and occupation, family
status, obligation and expectations, types of care, domestic and institutional
care settings, and historical commonality and difference.25 She insists that
care immigrants are not only mothers with dependent children leaving their
childcare to other women in their own countries. Many care emigrants are
also singles, wives without children or mothers bringing their spouses and
children to destination countries to live together. In this sense, the concept of
global care chains needs to be extended in order to capture the diverse nature
of transnationalizing care. But, despite of the extension, the concept of global
care chains retains the implication that developed countries transfer repro-
duction cost to developing countries. Another, third effect can be found in
the process that care immigration policy induces social hierarchies not only
within a country but also between countries. It is apparent that there is a hi-
erarchy of countries from core countries to peripheral countries in terms of
economic production and management. The global care chains signify that,
accompanied by the hierarchy of economic production, another hierarchy be-
tween countries is emerging as regards nursing and caring. In other words:
Global care chains are an expression of the international status of certain
countries. Care immigration policy not only helps in creating but also in
keeping hierarchies. Whilst women within the core countries previously pro-
vided reproductive labor, women who have immigrated from peripheral
countries now increasingly provide it. A gap has emerged between care-
receiving countries and care-producing countries. Thus, reproductive labor is
globally restructured through a New international division of reproductive la-
bor.26 As a consequence, care immigration policy maintains and enforces this
division worldwide, with enforcing or at least keeping the dominance of
care-consuming countries over care-producing countries. Fourthly, care im-
migration policy impacts on sending countries with respect to their own na-
tional emigration policy. Some receiving countries require sending countries
to develop and raise the skill level of care immigrants while the sending
countries on their own want to keep their position as sources of migrants and
therefore tend to promote an active emigration policy that values migrants in
terms of reproductive labor. One of the leading exporter of care immigrants
in the world, the Philippines, started to adopt a policy of establishing educa-
                                                
24 Arlie Russel Hochschild, Global Care Chains and Emotional Surplus Value, in: Will
Hutton/Anthony Giddens (eds.), On the Edge: Living with Global Capitalism, Lon-
don 2000, pp. 130–146.
25 Nicola Yeates, Globalizing Care Economies and Migrant Workers. Explorations in
Global Care Chains, Basingstoke 2009, pp. 48–55.
26 Yeates, Globalizing Care Economies and Migrant Workers.
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tional arrangements to provide higher skills for its nurses and care workers.
On the surface, this skill-enhancing policy seems to protect migrant women
from infringement of their rights in receiving countries and can be seen as a
response to the criticism of human rights advocates. Yet, in reality individual
care migrants still have to bear the costs of acquiring skills. By commercial-
izing nurses and care workers as valued export goods, the skill-enhancing
policy on reproductive labor of some sending states enforces a neo-liberal
tendency of individual responsibility and self-help of migrants rather than se-
curing rights for them.27 For sending countries, the regulation of product
quality is quite crucial. Thus, while sending countries gain benefits through
sending care migrants, they bear also significant losses. A win-situation can-
not be realized in a complete way.
Finally, what happens to care immigrants? Do these migrants at least
benefit from a complete win-situation? After entering Japan, care immigrant
candidates take classes in Japanese language and culture. Then they start with
on-the-job training in hospitals and nursing homes to become formal nurses
or formal care workers in Japan. In reality, most of the so-called on-the-job
training is de facto unskilled work with the effect that care immigrants are not
able to really enhance their level of nursing or caring skill at this stage. In
case they fail their Japanese national exams, care immigrants furthermore
have to return to their own country. In April 2011, only 16 nurse candidates
successfully passed the national exam, these 16 cases represented only 4% of
the total candidates that took part in the exams.28 There is much criticism
that care migrants are treated as disposal menial workers, without little hope
to become formal workers. To fend off this criticism, government, hospitals
and care homes keep their rhetoric that they welcome care migrants for pro-
moting international friendship. Even if they become formal workers, they
would be likely to be paid low wages. This is a peculiar characteristic of
nurses and care workers in working condition. They are an imperfectly com-
modified labor force in a quasi-labor market in which the governments regulate
wages and put aside economic market mechanisms. Wages of nurses and
care workers are inflexible and kept from rising. As a result, care immigrants
run a risk of being treated as workers that can be more or less easily ›dis-
posed of‹.29 In addition, there is another concern that care immigrants would
                                                
27 Chiho Ogaya, Saiseisan roudou no guroubaruka no aratana tenkai: firipin kara miru
ginouka keikou karano kousatsu (New Dimensions of Globalization of Reproductive
Labor: The Implications of Skill in the Philippine Context), in: Shakaigaku hyoron
(Japanese Sociological Review), 60. 2009, no. 3, pp. 364–378.
28 Asahi Shinbun (Newspaper), 26 Mar 2011.
29 It should be noted that, according to the governmental rule, care immigrants can
receive equivalent amount of salary to Japanese co-workers as long as they stay as
candidates. Once they become formal workers, it is ambiguous as to whether they can
receive such amount of salary or not.
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suffer from discrimination and gender bias. Care immigration policy may in-
duce the stereotyped image that nursing and caring are jobs for foreigners
and foreign women. As a consequence, foreign nurses and foreign female
caregivers are expected to experience double-layered discrimination, due to
gender and foreignness.30 Japanese care immigration in consequence thus
resembles the practice of circular migration, one of the pillar concepts and
techniques enshrining the concept of international migration management.
Based on political and pure economic rationality, the Japanese practice does
not yield the benefits care immigrants are expecting.31 A reform of Japan’s
care immigration policy is recommended.
Towards a Triple-Win Situation –
The Unclear Future of Care Immigration to Japan
Globalization and the international movement of people motivate states to
rethink their migration policy and to adopt new strategies to manage migra-
tion.32 Japan is not an exception; its new care immigration policy is kind of a
new migration management previously unknown in Japan: The policy is im-
plemented within the bi-national framework of Economic Partnership
Agreements (EPA) between Japan and Indonesia, and between Japan and the
Philippines, respectively. The governments of the sending countries elaborate
institutions to nurture, select and send out care migrants in accordance with
the requirements imposed by Japan. In order to manage care migration, Ja-
pan created a special body, the Japan International Corporation of Welfare
Services (JICWELS).
The collaboration between Japan, the Philippines or Indonesia, respec-
tively, allows to come closer to a triple-win situation: Japan’s partner coun-
tries can send their nationals as care migrants to Japan and can expect remit-
tances from them; the Japanese state institutions, hospitals and care homes
can alleviate care labor shortage by importing these care migrants; and care
migrants from the sending countries Indonesia and the Philippines can ex-
pect higher earnings whilst working in Japan. This triple-win is, however, far
from being realized and from being complete. Care immigrants face severe
difficulties to get access to Japan and be allowed to stay and work there; fur-
thermore, the Japanese society experiences significant qualitative changes.
                                                
30 Ruri Ito, Saiseisan roudou no kokusai iten de towareru nihon no jenda baransu (In-
ternational Relocation of Reproductive Labour Brings Gender Balance in Japan into
a Question), in: Toshi Mondai (Urban Issues), 100. 2009, no. 3, pp. 75–82.
31 Sara Kalm, Liberalizing Movements? The Political Rationality of Global Migration
Management, in: Geiger/Pécoud (eds.), The Politics of International Migration Man-
agement, pp. 21–44.
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The rhetoric of promoting international friendship completely disregards the
reality of harsh restrictions and exploitation care immigrants are facing al-
though there is undoubtedly a great need for care migrants in Japan.
In sum, there are great difficulties and fundament dilemmas as regards
the idea of triple-win and the philosophy of a regulated openness. Firstly,
there is a system maintenance / social integration dilemma: The more the state
seeks to maintain the care system with the help of foreign workers, the more
it creates inequalities between native workers (Japanese nurses and care tak-
ers) and foreign workers. Consequently, once introducing care immigrants,
the state is faced with the challenge to integrate them into the society. Sec-
ondly, one can speak about a national-global dilemma: While the Japanese state
seeks to pursue national interests, it simultaneously produces global ine-
quality. In the case of care immigrants a typical example are global care
chains resulting from the care drain induced by the recruitment of care mi-
grants. In addition, thirdly, there is a public-private sphere dilemma: Once the
state decides to open the border for nurses and care workers, this inevitably
leads to an internationalization or globalization of the private sphere of the
society. This furthers more transnationalization with the effect that Japan in-
evitably becomes a multicultural society in a much more visible way, which
can fuel social tensions in the society. Since Bimal Ghosh first elaborated the
notion of migration management in 199333, there has been the idea that mi-
gration in the future should become managed in a new way that enables all
parties (receiving and sending societies/countries and migrants) to benefit
from migration. The explicit goal of migration management is thought of to
consist in a triple-win.34 The new approach to migration management in Ja-
pan and what regards care immigration to Japan suffers from several weak-
nesses. Without resolving the observed fundamental dilemmas, this kind of
migration management will fail or is likely to result in smaller liberalism
within the framework of bigger restrictiveness. It is already rather unclear
whether Japan’s new care migration policy will stand the test due to new cir-
cumstances: In April 2010, not less than 43 care immigrant candidates (15% of
all care workers that were selected) refused to come to Japan because of
anxieties with regard to the big earthquake in North-East Japan on March 11,
2011, the subsequent nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima and the uncertain
economic and social situation.35
                                                
33 See the contribution of Bimal Ghosh in this volume.
34 Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood. The Report of the
Commission on Global Governance, Oxford 1995.
35 Among the candidates who declined to come to Japan were 28 nurses and 7 care
workers from the Philippines and 8 nurses and 8 care workers from Indonesia. See
Hokkaido Shinbun (Newspaper), 17 Apr 2011; Mainichi Shinbun (Newspaper), 17
Apr 2011.
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10 Local Border Regimes
or a Homogeneous External Border?
The Case of the European Union’s
Border Agency Frontex
Bernd Kasparek and Fabian Wagner
During the Italian-Maltese summit on ›Strategic Mediterranean Themes‹ that
took place in June 2010, both Italy and Malta questioned the need for a con-
tinuation of EU Frontex operations. Already well before that time, the Euro-
pean Union’s border agency Frontex had become one of the key players of
migration management at the external borders of the EU. While Malta’s criti-
cism was largely motivated by the country’s discontent with the newly
adopted guidelines regulating Frontex operations, Italy feared that continued
Frontex operations might »upset« the Libyan-Italian agreement. The two
countries’ governments both suggested that the EU agency might be better
suited to carry out joint deportations rather than sea patrols.1 Yet, Frontex
and its activities in recent years repeatedly have been described as a success
story, and with dramatically reduced numbers of interceptions of irregular
migrants at the maritime external borders of the European Union, the Mal-
tese-Italian statement seemed like an unexpected comment on this pro-
claimed best practice of harmonizing a European field of policy and practice,
namely the management of the EU external border. In the following we will
start from the mentioned discursive incident to examine the current state of
Frontex with particular attention to its operational activities. We argue that
far from constituting a homogeneous EU border management practice or a
Europeanized control-space at the southern borders, the operations of Fron-
tex are part of a localized border regime that is formed by local conceptuali-
ties, characterized by its own individual spatiality and configurations of
stakeholders, conflicts and relations. The backbone of this border regime is
formed by bilateral agreements, respectively their absence.
William Walters has described in great detail the EU’s »anti-illegal im-
migration discourse« as an elementary part of its migration management
project, and has explained how this discourse is mainly enacted as tightened
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border control.2 Or, to quote the European Commission: »Dealing firmly and
effectively with irregular migration is a precondition for a credible migration
and mobility policy.«3 Given this political as well as practical connection be-
tween the European border and migration regime, our insights into the cur-
rent state of the politics of border management in the European Union also
sheds light on this particular aspect of the European Union’s migration man-
agement efforts. We are especially interested in the notion of (migration)
›management‹. As Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud have pointed out, mi-
gration management is not only a (technical) term, but also a particular set of
discourses and practices, carried out by a multitude of actors, who are inter-
twined in a complex, heterogeneous and often conflictive manner.4 The no-
tion of management goes hand in hand with the – at least gradual – aban-
donment of an idea of control. It is this hint that inspires us to investigate the
actual practices of the border management agency Frontex in different geo-
graphical settings. One might easily argue that the border is the paradigmatic
example of control. However, while our empirical data suggest that the idea
of exercising sovereignty at the border is still driving the actual operations of
Frontex, the agency has been forced to abandon the idea of a ›pan-European‹
practice of actual border policing. The effect is what we describe as a local
border regime, driven by different forces, actors, discourses and external
policy goals. We will start our analysis with a short description of the agency,
to be followed by a discussion of the three main operations: Hera in the West-
ern Atlantic, Nautilus in the Central Mediterranean and Poseidon in the
Aegean Sea.
The Agency: Its Structure and Its Tasks
Frontex was founded in 2004 by European Council Regulation 2007/2004. In
2007 it was amended by the Rapid Border Intervention Teams Regulation
536/2007 regarding migration-related exceptional circumstances. Both consti-
tute the legal framework of the agency that started with 20 employees in
2005; but four years later, in 2009, it already employed 226 staff at the head-
quarters in Warsaw. The personnel backbone of the employees are temporary
                                                
2 William Walters, Imagined Migration World: The European Union’s Anti-Illegal
Immigration Discourse, in: Martin Geiger/Antoine Pécoud, The Politics of Interna-
tional Migration Management, Basingstoke 2010, pp. 71–95.
3 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission
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4 May 2011, Brussels 2011.
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ment, in: idem (eds.), The Politics of International Migration Management, pp. 1–20.
The Case of the European Union‘s Border Agency Frontex
175
agents5 who are working mostly less than a year at the headquarters, fol-
lowed by seconded national experts6, highly qualified experts of the member
states’ border guards employed for two to three years. Furthermore, the
agency employed 60 contract agents in its administration section in 2009.7
The same rapid increase holds for the budget: it rose from 6 million euros in
2005 to 88.8 million euros in 2009, representing an increase of 360% in four
years. The Commission of the European Communities is the most important
donor at present, funding more than 95% of the agency’s budget, the rest is
provided by voluntary contributions of individual member states, third-party
funds, and donations of European (EU) countries not being parties to the
Schengen Agreement (opt-out countries). In 2009, nearly one third of the
Frontex budget was allocated for administration (11%) and staff (18%), while
71% were spent on operational activities.8 The most of the operational budget
was allocated for long-term sea surveillance operations (55%), followed by
training (11%) and joint deportations and land borders (each 9%), risk analy-
ses and air borders (each 4%).9
Frontex is headed by an executive director (currently Ilkka Laitinen, a
Finish brigadier general). His role is to prepare and implement decisions,
programs and activities previously adopted by the management board of
Frontex. He is also tasked with budgetary activities and he finally is the exer-
cising authority over all Frontex staff members. In the future the executive
director will be appointed by the management board, which is the decision-
making body of the agency. The board discusses and takes every important
decision relating to the work, function and organization of the agency and it
also exercises disciplinary authority over the executive director10; it is com-
posed of one representative for each EU member state, one for each Schen-
gen-associated country, and two members of the European Commission. A
very unique feature of Frontex (that is actually a supranational agency or
body) and its management board: Each board member holds one vote, which
implies a predominance of the member states over the European Commis-
sion, thus the national predominates the supranational level. Frontex as an
organizational entity is structured in three divisions, all of them being subdi-
vided in three sub-units. The ›Operation Division‹ and its ›Operations‹, ›Risk
                                                
  5 Frontex, Frontex Annual Report 2009, Warsaw 2009, p. 100.
  6 Ibid., p. 66.
  7 Ibid., p. 49.
  8 Ibid., p. 23.
  9 Ibid., p. 24.
10 See Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 of 26 Oct 2004: Establishing a European
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of
the Member States of the European Union, in: Official Journal of the European Un-
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Analyses‹ and ›Situation Center Units‹ and the ›Capacity Building Division‹
and its ›Trainings‹, ›Research and Development‹ and ›Pooled Resources
Units‹ illustrate the tasks the agency is supposed to fulfil very well, in accor-
dance to what is laid down in its founding regulation. Albeit the operational
activities are the most noticeable ones of Frontex, one major task of the
agency is to conduct risk analyses. Frontex is tasked to prepare an annual
general risk analysis and an extra number of tailored risk analyses. The for-
mer forecasts the situation for the whole European external borders, while
the tailored risk analyses are either commissioned by individual contractors
(i.e. EU member states), are carried out in response to specific phenomena, or
done in preparation for joint operations in specific geographic locations.
The Risk Analysis Unit of Frontex sends so-called risk analyses formu-
las to all member states and third countries organized in the Frontex’ own
Risk Analyses Network. The members of this network are asked to conduct
their own individual/national risk analyses, giving an overview on the cur-
rent situation what regards six indicators (detection of irregular border
crossings, of facilitators, of irregular stay, falsified documents, refusal of
entry and asylum applications11). Furthermore, Frontex uses information
gathered during its own coordinated joint operations with the help of inter-
rogating intercepted migrants and facilitators of irregular border crossings.
Frontex also exchanges data and information with several EU institutions like
EUROPOL, the anti-fraud agency of the EU OLAF, the EU’s juridical coop-
eration agency EUROJUST, the Unions Satellite Centre EUSC and the EU’s
intelligence body Joint Situation Centre. Third countries (non-EU member
states) are also involved in these activities; the current head of the Risk
Analysis Unit, Javier Quesada, made this clear in the following statement:
»[W]e started creating intelligence communities in third countries in the Western
Balkans, at the eastern borders of the EU member states and now in Africa. And we
intend to continue developing those communities.«12
The operational plans of Frontex usually include general description of the
preparations, schedule, way of action, technical means and manpower avail-
able, detailed budget for the operation, communication plan implementation
costs, risks connected with implementation.13 Following certain operations,
there is an evaluation that considers the spending of contributions provided
and shortcomings and problems that occurred during the operation. The re-
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2010, Warsaw 2010, p. 6.
12 Frontex, Beyond Frontiers. Frontex: The First Five Years, Warsaw 2010, p. 65.
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sults of these evaluations are used to identify so-called best practices, apart
from the normal joint operation procedure.
The Frontex-Regulation in 2007 was amended through the creating of a
mechanism for migration-related ›exceptional circumstances‹: The Frontex
Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) comprise »specially trained
experts from member states […] to assist its national border guards on a tem-
porary basis«14; what is notable concerning the RABITs is that these teams
possess executive powers during the time when they are carrying out certain
activities. RABITs were deployed in November 2010 for the first time to
thwart illegal migration in the Evros region (Greek-Turkish land border).
Another Frontex task consists in the training of border guards and the
development (and communication) of common training standards; the
training and the common training standards are based on a so-called com-
mon core curriculum – a standardized and harmonized training course sys-
tem of Frontex. Because of the limited capacities of the Frontex Training
Department, most of the training activities are outsourced and are carried out
by one of eleven partner academies throughout the European Union. Com-
mon trainings comprise workshops to identify falsified documents and
license plates. In its training activities, Frontex, among others, cooperates
with the EU institutions EUROPOL and the EU’s Police College CEPOL.
The Frontex regulation actually only asks for the incorporation of ex-
isting research as concerns border surveillance15, nevertheless the agency
over the last years started to initiate own research programs, among them
several feasibility studies regarding technical and organizational aspects of
border surveillance. Moreover, Frontex’ Research and Development Unit has
become
»the crucial link between industry and the research community on the one hand
and the end-users within the European Commission and the member states, in
particular border guards, on the other.«16
One of these studies – the so-called BORTEC (border technology) study –
even helped in initiating the dialogue on the projected new common Euro-
pean surveillance system EUROSUR.17 The aim of this system lies in fusing
                                                
14 See Council Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of 11 July 2007: Establishing a mechanism
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the various individual member states surveillance systems into one system.
Whether Frontex »could take on the role as a ›hub‹ for an improved system
of exchange of real-time, operational information’s between member states«
like the European Commission18 stated or not remains unclear.
Yet another example of Frontex’ research activities is the feasibility
study ›MEDSEA‹ of 2006, which lead to the creation of the European Patrol
Network (operational since 2009) and incorporated all joint Frontex opera-
tions in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean into a larger regional framework.
The European Patrol Network on its own is working through a network of
national contact points carrying out the planning, coordination and imple-
mentation of joint patrol and surveillance activities. It aims at avoiding
overlapping patrols in certain areas of neighboring member states and tries
to establish effective sharing of operational information. In addition, it sup-
ports and facilitates permanent surveillance activity along and across the ex-
ternal sea borders of the EU.
The ›BIOPASS‹ study, yet another outcome of Frontex, evaluated the
concept of automated biometric border crossing. The study later formed the
ground for the respective European Commission Communication lobbying
for the creation of a common entry-exit-system19 (linked to the future EU’s
Visa Information System, VIS). Another, at present not well researched,
aspect is Frontex’ involvement in the European Union’s military-industrial-
complex: Frontex, for instance, cooperates with the Commission’s Joint
Research Centre and the European Defence Agency (EDA), and in conjunc-
tion with Frontex, the latter is testing unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) for
maritime border surveillance.20
Frontex, furthermore, has been involved in so-called joint return opera-
tions of EU member states: Frontex is asked to provide the »necessary assis-
tance« for these operations, to identify the best practices in relation to »re-
moval«, the acquisition of travel documents, and the training of executives
carrying out deportations. Albeit Frontex’ executive director Ilkka Laitinen
has repeatedly stated that this is a »very sensitive« area of work for his
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ment of the Frontex Agency, COM (2008) 67 final, 13 Feb 2008, Brussels 2008, p. 9.
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20 EDA (European Defence Agency), Working Program 2007, Brussels 2007, p. 2.
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agency, and although the mandate of Frontex to deport migrants was a
highly contested topic during the establishment of the agency, in 2009 Fron-
tex has co-organized 31 deportation flights that involved more than 1,500 de-
portees. Laitinen also stated that the increased role of the European Union
(consequently involving his own agency) in the area of deportation »will
come as a relief to national governments who will no longer have to ›carry
the burden‹ of negative public opinion, embarrassment and disapproval
prompted by collective repatriation procedures.«21 For 2010, the part of Fron-
tex’ budget dealing with such deportation flights has nearly doubled, and the
latest communication of the European Commission on the future of Frontex
has recommended that the agency should best acquire own airplanes for this
specific task.22 In September 2010, in one of the first deportation flight solely
organized by Frontex, 56 Georgian nationals were deported to Tbilisi. There
are plans for between 30 and 40 such deportation flights to be organized in
2011. One can therefore assume, that this specific (»very sensitive«) area of
activity will become even more important in the coming years, since Frontex’
justification of existence has been tied to the issue of deportation.
Frontex and the Process of Local Bordering
Frontex is lobbying for a four tier border security concept that transcends and
goes beyond any traditional approach on border control/surveillance since it
is no longer focusing on fix territorial borders: The first most-out area of en-
gagement is labeled »beyond the border« and consists in areas of departure.
In this zone, the concept stipulates cooperation between consulates (issuing
visa), private transport companies (especially airlines) and other institutions
within Europe. The function of this zone is a first filtration, granting the right
to legal entry to those fitting to certain specifications. The second area is re-
ferred to as »across the border«, it concerns the geographical zones sur-
rounding the territorial border line, relevant authorities from both sides of
the border are called for intensive cooperation. It is only the third area then
that is labeled »at the border« and that is representing the actual, one-
dimensional (traditional) geographically fixed borderline: This line is also the
area in which border guards control, border surveillance and passport checks
are carried out. The fourth area of control- and surveillance-related activities
finally, makes up for the entire interior of the European Union; the activities
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that should be carried out within this zone consist in operational cooperation
between member states, joint migration control and joint deportation flights.
In the following we will concentrate on the second and third area within
Frontex’ reconceptualized border concept. We will compare three major entry
routes for migrants to the EU and their situation over the last five years (Ca-
nary Islands, Central Mediterranean Route to Italy and Malta, Eastern Ae-
gean Route to Greece). Those routes have been identified as focal routes,
Frontex is actively involved in all of them.
With regard to these two areas of border control and surveillance, re-
spectively the four selected cases, we have to state that the real cornerstone
for successful migration management does not consist in the local presence of
Frontex and the agency’s activities but rather in the bilateral agreements be-
tween the respective EU member states and their neighboring partner states.
These agreements are the foundations for localized border regimes that only
cover a geographically limited area: While Spain successfully negotiated bi-
lateral agreements with neighboring non-EU states23, Greece and Turkey
failed in signing such agreements. While Italy implemented a new way based
on high sea interceptions in cooperation with Libya24 (and taking into
account human rights violations), Malta has moved out of the cooperation
with Frontex over disputes concerning its activities and guidelines.25 Malta,
nevertheless, repeatedly tried to reach an own bilateral readmission- and mi-
gration-control-related agreement with Libya.
Spain: The EU’s Model Student in the Area of Border Management
Until 2006, Frontex has carried out coordinated joint aerial and naval sur-
veillance and interception operations off the Canary Islands and the Western
African shores; these operations called Hera, are perceived as representing
»the birth of sea operations.«26 The first two operations Hera I and II are
moreover seen as a blueprint for future operations to become implemented
by Frontex27: Hera I took place right in the midst of a so-called migration cri-
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24 See Human Rights Watch, Pushed Back, Pushed Around. Italy’s Forced Return of
Boat Migrants and Asylum Seekers, Libya’s Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum
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25 See Sebastian Schaurer/Fabian Wagner, Access Denied: The Failure(s) of Frontex in
the Central Mediterranean [forthcoming].
26 Frontex, First Five Years, p. 30.
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sis in 2010, when more than 31,000 migrants arrived at the Canary Islands.28
Hera I consisting in a long duration surveillance and interception mission led
to a sudden drop in migration, more than 196 migrants were intercepted
during the operation.29 It was, however, neither the first attempt of a joint
transnational surveillance operation in this area, nor is Frontex the backbone
of the localized border regime that came into being over the last years. Al-
ready in December 2003 a largely unknown joint operation named Ulysses
was implemented with involvement of Italy, the UK, Portugal and France.
With the help of the operation, Spain tried to tackle increased illegal migra-
tion to the Canaries and via the Strait of Gibraltar. Ulysses became the first
operation that pooled transnationalized operational structures. Spain, at the
same time, also signed an agreement on joint sea patrols, which is said to
have led to a decrease of 40% of the arrivals in 2005.30
Another predecessor of Hera was the Seahorse project, initiated on be-
half of the Spanish Government (Ministry of the Interior and Guardia Civil)
in March 2006, in collaboration with various EU member states and the in-
volvement of EUROPOL, Frontex and the European Commission. Seahorse
also aimed for a closer cooperation with the African sending and transit
states of Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal and Cape Verde in order to curb off
migration. To this end the mission brought together joint naval patrols and
started to promote a local migration management regime on the basis of in-
tensified information exchange, common border guard trainings, and an an-
nual Euro-African conference on migration measures. Seahorse, furthermore,
led to the establishment of three regional maritime border surveillance cen-
ters to cover the identified ›focal routes‹. In 2007, a satellite-based communi-
cation system to alleviate the information exchange between the Iberian EU
member states and the West-African states became established. Seahorse offi-
cially ended in 2008. A presentation provided at the European Day for Border
Guards in Warsaw in 2010 by Spanish Guardia Civil Major Julio Serrano il-
lustrates that Seahorse has initiated long-term effects and was successful in
centralizing the coordination, advice and facilitation of the maritime surveil-
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29 Frontex, Risk Analysis 2010, p. 15.
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pp. 253–271, here p. 262; see also Thomas Spijkerboer, The Human Costs of Border
Control, in: European Journal of Migration and Law, 9. 2007, no. 1, pp. 127–139, here
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lance of coasts and border operations management and in developing a hub
for easier exchange on the local, national and supranational level.31
Seahorse and Frontex’ coordinated operations give an insight in the local
scope of the EU border regime and its real cornerstones – bilateral agree-
ments between EU member states and their neighboring third states. Already
during Hera II Frontex-coordinated maritime joint patrols off the Senegalese
and Mauritanian coast took place, after Spain signed bilateral agreements
with both states.32 While these two agreements were concluded as non-
binding memoranda of understanding between the Ministries of the Interior
and thus escaped the parliamentary scrutiny33, Spain later, in 2009, was suc-
cessful to conclude a more substantial bilateral agreement with another Afri-
can state – Cape Verde. Beside these three agreements, Spain had already
concluded readmission agreements with Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Mali, Niger and Cape Verde in 2006. These agreements added to the existing
ones with Mauritania, Morocco and Senegal34, but represent a new genera-
tion of readmission agreements that combine readmission with concessions
on temporary labor migration, integration of settled migrants and develop-
ment.
Border Management in the Central Mediterranean
Between 2006 and 2009 Frontex, under the label Nautilus, coordinated joint
naval and aerial surveillance and interception operations in the central Medi-
terranean. Within the context of Nautilus operations, the agency in 2006
started to carry out a first ›Migration Flow Malta‹ operation that aimed at in-
terrogating intercepted migrants in order to gather information about their
place of origin (to facilitate their deportation later), the starting points of their
journeys, their migratory routes, migration motives and overall strategies. In
the same year, the Nautilus operations became extended to curb off migration
not only to Malta, but also to the Italian islands of Lampedusa and Sicily.35
A specific feature of the Nautilus operations is the ›blame game‹ that ac-
tually forms a substantial part of these operations and their underpinning
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›justification‹: Nearly all actors involved (the EU, the governments of Italy,
Malta, and other EU member states, Libya, but also human rights NGOs) put
»the blame for the crisis on others, while exculpating themselves from any
responsibility.«36 Due to this each Nautilus has been accompanied by a reiter-
ated spectacle of political tensions concerning the different interpretations of
maritime law, search and rescue measures, the responsibility (unlawfulness)
of intercepted migrants; the necessity or lack of burden sharing, the missing
solidarity among EU member states; Libya’s failing will to cooperate, and last
but not least the critique of human rights NGOs as regards the refugee and
human rights violations during the operations37; no doubt: Nautilus opera-
tions marked a highly contested field.
The governments of Italy and Malta both pursue a repressive and re-
strictive approach in their national migration policies; an illuminating exam-
ple is Italy’s agreement with Libya. Italy had sought an agreement paving the
way for joint Italian-Libyan patrols in Libyan coastal waters for a long time.
In 2002 Italy had already started to negotiate migration control treaties with
Libya, these either never came into force or were annulled after a short time.
In December 2007, Italy concluded a further agreement with Libya designed
to allow joint patrols. Libya, in exchange, only later started to request the
conclusion of a ›friendship treaty‹ between Libya and Italy and made it a re-
quirement before starting to implement the previous migration-related
agreement with Italy. Libya was awarded with this ›friendship treaty‹ (sum-
mer 2008), Italy in this agreement explicitly recognized its responsibility for
the crimes committed during Italy’s colonization of Libya and agreed to pay
the sum of five billion US-dollars to Libya in compensation. Some months
later, in December 2008, Libya and Italy finally signed an implementation
protocol for the migration-related agreement. The government of Italy (as
well as the Maltese governments) were hoping that the joint patrols of Italy
and Libya could finally start by the end of January 2009. There were, how-
ever, further delays and the patrols, together with the pushing back of refu-
gees to Libya resulting from the joint patrols, did not begin until mid May
2009.
In the weeks before the patrols began, a furious, at times public dispute
flared between Malta and Italy over the continuation of joint border man-
agement activities in the Mediterranean. Italy, in particular, accused Malta of
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having diverted around 40,000 refugees to Italy in 2008. The background of
the dispute was a supplementary protocol to the 2004 UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea that deals with the definition of the nearest safe haven for
those rescued from distress at sea, which includes refugees. Since Malta has
not signed the protocol but has a very large search and rescue area, many of
the refugees seized by the Maltese armed forces were taken to Italy that the
Maltese understood to be the nearest safe haven. In view of this dispute,
Frontex saw no possibility to continue with Nautilus. Although the operation
eventually did continue, it became restricted to the territory (territorial wa-
ters of) Malta. The newly launched operation Hermes, focussing in particular
on Sardinia, in contrast, is based on a renewed cooperation between Frontex
and Italy with no further Maltese involvement.
In terms of migration originating in Libya, Italy still appears to favor its
own national respectively unilateral and bilateral solution. Since mid-May
2009, Italy has been intercepting and diverting migrants on the seas between
Libya and Italy. The Italian Minister of the Interior, Roberto Maroni, called
this new policy »a turning point in the fight against illegal migration« and
confirmed that Italy’s new possibilities for action resulted from its new bilat-
eral treaty with Libya.38 As this practice contravenes the non-refoulement
principle of the Geneva Refugee Convention, the public outcry was huge;
even the UNHCR intervened publicly. The European Commission also
voiced criticism. After all, the non-refoulement principle is ius cogens, a basis
of fundamental European agreements, and cannot be simply ignored. Italy,
nevertheless, continued to adhere firmly to the new practice and marked the
official start of cooperation with Libya with the handover of three patrol
boats to the Libyan authorities. Queried for comments, Frontex simply re-
ferred to the agency’s overall coordinating role which requires respecting the
sovereignty of Italy and issued the announcement that the agency during its
operation Nautilus would not send any refugees on the open seas back to
Libya. However, it could be argued that Frontex is benefiting silently from
increased bilateral Italian-Libyan cooperation. Albeit the Maltese authorities
officially »do not know what the Italians are doing«, an officer of the Maltese
Armed Forces stated that »nothing is happening, because the Italians are ef-
fective with joint patrolling, donations of sea vessels, and hands-on train-
ing.«39 The next reverse followed the next year. In spring 2010, a conflict be-
tween Malta and the European Union enfolded, as after five years of Frontex
operations, finally binding guidelines were to put into force by the European
Union. As the guidelines would designate the country hosting Frontex opera-
tions as the first safe haven for refugees arriving, Malta refused to host fur-
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ther Frontex Missions unless this rule were to be changed.40 The planned
joint operation Chronos – a long duration joint deportation operation – as a
consequence was not able to take place. Since summer 2010 Frontex now
seems to be absent in the area of the central Mediterranean. Border surveil-
lance is currently organized translocally, through several bilateral agree-
ments between Malta and Italy and the previously mentioned treaty between
Italy and Libya.
Detente: Poseidon, RABITs, Failure Reloaded
Frontex has been active in the larger Aegean area since 2006, in the frame-
work of the joint operation Poseidon, which includes activities at land, sea and
air borders. Over the last years, Greece has become the main gate of irregular
migration to Europe. This is partially due to the closure of the routes in the
Western Atlantic and the Central Mediterranean, but the main factor cer-
tainly lies in the fact that the war in Afghanistan and the still unstable politi-
cal situation in Iraq has motivated a large part of the respective population to
attempt a migration project, often towards Europe. As a matter of geographi-
cal location, this makes Greece the country of first entry. In 2009, 150,000
irregular migrants were intercepted in Greece. »Seventy-five percent of the
arrests for illegal entry from the EU’s sea borders this year took place in the
Aegean,« as the Greek Minister for the Protection of Citizens, Michalis
Chrysochoidis, stated.41
Operation Poseidon is an operation with two foci. The first main activity
is to support the Greek border forces (i.e. border guards and coast guard) in
patrolling the borders, mainly towards Turkey. This is achieved by the de-
ployment of officers from participating EU member states as well as through
the deployment of assets such as helicopters, ships and small-scale resources
such as infrared cameras and other surveillance technology. The second ac-
tivity consists in the use of so-called interview experts and translators. They
are deployed not at the actual, geographic border but rather in the detention
centers where intercepted migrants are being detained. There, their task is to
aid in the identification of the migrants, often to the end of increasing their
deportability, to borrow a term by Nicolas de Genova. Such operations
mainly took place in Greek islands close to the Turkish coast (i.e. Lesvos,
Chios and Samos) as well as at the northern land border. Operation Poseidon
is accompanied by operation Attica, a so-called pilot project to establish and
extend the deportation capabilities of the Greek state, as well as the project
that led to a first regional Frontex office in October 2010. The Frontex Opera-
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tional Office is located in the port of Piraeus and supposedly coordinates the
operations in the southeast of the EU as well as maritime operations.
The case of Greece highlights why we insist on an analysis along the
argument of a local border regime. To date, the combined intervention of
Frontex and other elements of the European border and migration regime
have not yielded a continuous, significant decrease in the number of irregular
migrants apprehended in Greece. Greece, the EU and Frontex have pursued a
policy of externalization, as in the other cases discussed above. However,
there has been no major break-through. The wished-for integration of the
Turkish Republic into the European border regime has been pursued for a
long time. On an institutional level, Frontex is trying to connect with the
Turkish coast guard and to involve them in joint maneuvers and also seeks a
working agreement with the Turkish border authority. But also Greece and
the EU are trying to improve their cooperation with Turkey on migration
matters: While Greece and Turkey have a readmission protocol (which
Greece would like to extend, since practically, its functioning is limited), the
EU has been negotiating such an agreement with Turkey since 2003, with lit-
tle success so far. In May 2010, the Turkish newspaper Today’s Zaman re-
ported that Turkey and the EU have reached agreement on 19 articles of a
draft readmission agreement, but have been unable to reach agreement on a
further five articles.42 Turkey wants the readmission agreement to include
strong funding from the EU, mirroring similar funding that is available to EU
member states under the ›resettlement policies‹ within the European Refugee
Fund. This fund was established to support and improve the efforts of mem-
ber states to grant refugee or asylum status to beneficiaries. A further break-
through in the negotiations between Turkey and the EU then was reported in
December 2011. However, the actual ratification of the readmission agree-
ment hinges on Turkey’s demand for visa free access to European Union ter-
ritory for all its citizens. It is especially Germany and Austria that are not apt
to accept this demand. A function readmission agreement would force Tur-
key to readmit not only nationals, but also all irregular migrants who can be
proved to have entered Greece and the EU via Turkey. This would shift the
responsibility for securing borders and inhibiting the movements of migra-
tion to Turkey. Consequently, the Turkish government fears that, without its
own strong and clear readmission agreement in place, vetting thousands of
immigrants and asylum seekers in reception centers while awaiting further
deportation will make Turkey susceptible of being sentenced in the European
Court of Human Rights.
Another EU strategy aims to reinforce the border controls between
Greece and Turkey, both at the land border in the Evros region as well as be-
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tween the Turkish coast and the Greek islands of Lesvos, Chios, Samos and
Rhodos. For 2010, Frontex has announced it would hold its largest operation
ever in Greece43, mobilizing border guards and equipment from all over
Europe. Concerning the land borders, the task is clear: sealing off and patrol-
ling the border, possibly involving high-tech equipment for better monitoring
of movements. At the sea borders, the task is much more unclear, since the
geographical specificity of the islands close to the Turkish coasts does not al-
low for the diversion of boats carrying potential irregular migrants. Still, an
immense focus of Frontex lies on intercepting and detaining migrants on the
sea. One can only speculate about the motivations. For one, it is the interest
of the border guards to establish custody of irregular migrants as early as
possible. Another possible motivation is to present a more decisive effort of
guarding the border so that a crossing of the border seems more risky. Fron-
tex has also been known to put a focus on going after facilitators of undocu-
mented border crossings, as interfering with such crossings as early as possi-
ble might improve their chances to identify so-called smugglers. In the end, it
is also thinkable that Frontex attempts to establish a chain of evidence (foot-
age from helicopters, portraits of those intercepted, protocols of interception)
for all migrants to be able to present to the Turkish authorities an irrefutable
claim that they did actually come from Turkey and are thus eligible for
deportation under the readmission agreement.
Neither the strategy towards Turkey nor the improved border surveil-
lance seems to have made a significant contribution to stopping or minimiz-
ing flows. Both Frontex and the Greek state therefore seem to engage in a
new strategy, which we would refer to as internalization of the border. One
function of the border is to filter between legitimate and illegitimate travel-
ers, granting differing rights according to this categorization. Concerning ir-
regular migrants, this selection process must not necessarily happen right at
the border: the Greek state intends to build so-called screening centers in all
geographic locations where migrants might be encountered: the land and sea
borders, the metropolitan centers as well as at the points of exit, where
migrants attempt to continue their journey northbound. Amongst other pur-
poses, the screening centers will serve as an individualization tool, meaning
that in the centers, the multiplicity of detained migrants will be divided into
single individuals with a distinct identity, history, situation, etc. This allows
for differential treatment. While those found to be in need of protection
might obtain asylum, most migrants will be identified as economic migrants,
thus not legitimate to have entered the country and need to be deported.
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The complete failure, at both externalizing as well as securing the
Greek-Turkish border, became obvious in October 2010. On 25 October 2010,
Frontex announced that they had received
»a request from the Greek Minister of Citizen Protection Christos Papoutsis to
deploy Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) as well as operational means to
increase the control and surveillance levels at Greece’s external border with
Turkey.«
The agency’s executive director, Ilkka Laitinen, was further quoted:
»A team of Frontex staff is on its way to the Greek/Turkish land border to assess
the situation in view of Minister Papoutsis’ request. We will decide how many
officers and what kind of technical means will be needed to effectively assist the
Greek authorities in strengthening this external EU border and act swiftly to
provide the assistance that this Member State has requested. We will take
immediate action of reorganizing experts and assets being present in the area
within the framework of Poseidon Joint Operation coordinated by Frontex.«44
The subsequent RABIT deployment was the first in the history of the agency.
Reserved for situations of exception, of crisis, it underscores how permeable
the Greek-Turkish border has been. The RABIT deployment lasted from No-
vember 2010 to March 2011, and Frontex did report a decrease in numbers of
irregular border crossings. However, as this might also be due to the heavy
winter, this particular statistical data does not allow for a rigid interpretation.
To date, operation Poseidon is still ongoing.
Conclusions
Frontex is mandated to coordinate operational activity at the European Un-
ion’s external borders with the aim of forging and synthesizing a homoge-
nous EU approach to border management. As regards this approach, three
dimensions – the role of space, external power relations and internal configu-
rations – need to be considered:
(1) Role of space: Greece, with its many islands, some of them being
very close to the Turkish coast, is a prime example of how the geographical
setup of the external border plays a pivotal role in the question if a border
can be turned police-able, manage-able or not. At first sight, irregular migra-
tion to Greece has over the last years shifted from routes targeting islands to
routes crossing the main land (Northern Greece). According to our informa-
tion this shift is not so much the outcome of increased policing of maritime
borders; the observable geographical shift of irregular migration rather is due
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to the particular political tensions between Turkey and Greece that render
vast border areas in Northern Greece too difficult to patrol and to manage.
(2) Role of external power relations: The European policy of bordering
relies heavily on externalization. To this end, the position of the country of
transit vis-à-vis the European Union has to be taken into consideration. In the
West African case, we identify a post-colonial situation with a particular im-
balanced distribution of power, allowing Spain to negotiate very favorable
conditions for externalized border control. The same does not hold for the
Central Mediterranean case. While there is a potential post-colonial situation,
Libya found itself in a much stronger situation due to its natural reserves in
oil, and indeed Italy had to make a huge payment in order to receive a coop-
eration mechanism with the Libyan government. However, this mechanism
was always very unstable and at the mercy of the Libyan dictator Gaddafi. It
is also notable that the EU itself did not succeed in negotiating a readmission
agreement with Libya due to the steep demands Gaddafi was bringing for-
ward. The Greek-Turkish case, in contrast, exhibits a reversed role of power.
While Turkey is an accession candidate to the European Union, this process
has largely stalled, resulting in some re-orientation of Turkish external poli-
tics towards the Middle East. While the European Union’s economic growth
has been mediocre in the last years, Turkey has passed the global economic
crisis rather well and boasts high figures of economic growth. In direct com-
parison with Greece, Turkey is definitely the stronger country. And this may
explain why the incorporation of Turkey into the border regime of the Ae-
gean has been so unsuccessful.
(3) Internal configuration: With internal configuration, we refer to the
national capacity of the hosting state of a Frontex operation to carry out effec-
tive border management on its own. But Spain and Italy do possess this
capacity. In recent years, Spain has established a cutting-edge technology
version of a border surveillance regime called SIVE in order to deal with ir-
regular migration from North Africa. This corresponds with the strong lead-
ing role of the Guardia Civil in the Frontex operations hosted in Spain. Italy,
likewise, has already built capacities in border management during the
Albanian refugee crisis in the 1990s. Given this historical perspective, it
comes as no surprise that Italy favored a bilateral approach to a European-
ized one. Greece, on the other hand, has long been a country of exit, rather
than entry, and even during the first decade of the 21st century, has not
strengthened its border management capacities as most refugees and
migrants would pass through Greece on their way to the European Union
member states in the North. There was clearly no need to tighten the borders,
and empirical data from field work suggests that Frontex and the member
states’ border guards deployed in the operations play a more leading role
than in the other operational contexts examined.
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To this end, the coordinating function of Frontex serves as a detriment
to homogenizing border practices across the European Union. While the dis-
cussion of a new mandate seems to favor a strengthening of the agency’s role,
we would also like to put forward, as a last argument, that Frontex pursues a
homogeneous border management practice rather less through practical co-
operation in operations but rather through its risk analysis activities, as they
serve to create – for the first time in the history of the European Union’s ex-
ternal border – a unified image of that very border. This argument, however,
awaits further investigation.




11 Towards a Critical Theory of Migration
Control: The Case of the International
Organization for Migration (IOM)
Fabian Georgi and Susanne Schatral
December 2011 marked the 60th anniversary of the International Organiza-
tion for Migration (IOM). For this occasion IOM created a dedicated website
to highlight its achievements.1 On this website the IOM describes itself as
being »the leading international agency working with governments and civil
society« on migration. IOM presents a narrative of its history that is com-
posed of a chain of successes in »assisting migrants« and helping states to
develop »orderly and humane responses« to migration »for the benefit of
all«.2 It does not mention the more contentious aspects: Since the 1990s, many
of IOM’s activities have been sharply criticized by NGOs, academics, migrant
groups and social movements for infringing letters and spirit of human rights
and for prioritizing the interests of its state donors over the hopes and rights
of migrants.3
To be explicit: While we personally sympathize with this criticism and
have contributed to it4, in our view there are severe problems and limits to
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the way IOM (and other institutions of migration controls such as Frontex5)
are criticized today. To overcome these shortcomings, we develop an alterna-
tive framework for critique. In doing so we draw on two sources, one mainly
theoretical, one more political: First we draw on historical-materialist critical
theory as developed, among others, by Karl Marx, the theorists of the older
Frankfurt School Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, but also con-
temporary thinkers like Alex Demirović. Second we draw on the movements
and struggles of migration that confront the restrictive, bitter reality of mi-
gration controls with everyday practices of survival, and with conscious, stra-
tegic struggles against deportation and detention, and for equal rights and
global freedom of movement.
Our contribution has three main parts. The first part starts out with a
brief introduction on IOM, before describing and evaluating two categories
of human rights-based criticism of IOM. The second part lays the ground-
work for our own framework of critique. It does so by sketching crucial epi-
sodes and ideas of the struggles for global freedom of movement, afterwards
describing the »single existential judgement« (Max Horkheimer) that under-
lies our critique. This judgement is developed by making six arguments in
favor of the abolition of migration controls and applying them to IOM.
Building on this groundwork, the third part moves on to describe two meth-
ods of critical theory, immanent critique and radical contextualization, and illus-
trate the latter by explaining the expansion of IOM since the 1980s within a
wider (geo)political and economic context.6 In outlining the political and
normative groundwork and the methods of a critical theory-approach to IOM
we want to contribute to the broader debate about a critical approach to the
study of migration and border regimes that is currently being led, for exam-
ple, in the mostly German-language Network for Critical Migration and Bor-
der Regime Studies (Kritnet).7
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Human Rights-inspired Criticism of IOM
Founded in 1951 as an US-dominated anti-communist logistics agency, IOM
today is the next-to-largest intergovernmental organization in the field of mi-
gration (the organization of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, UNHCR being the biggest). As of July 2011 it had 132 member
states with an additional 17 states and 80 NGOs as observers. It has more
than 400 field locations and about 7,000 staff members that work on more
than 2,800 projects all over the world.8 We analytically distinguish five areas
of activities9: (1) IOM directly supports the movements of emigrants, migrant
workers and refugees. It arranges resettlement, sells discounted airline tickets
and organizes language courses and overseas job placements; (2) IOM builds
up the capacities of states for migration control. It supports states to expand,
and often to build up in the first place, the political, institutional and cultural
conditions and bureaucratic capacities to control migration; (3) IOM itself
takes a role in all phases of operative migration control, from mass information
campaigns10 over the running of detention camps to assisted voluntary returns
(AVR); (4) IOM is a competitor in the humanitarian marketplace and takes
part in humanitarian emergency operations after natural disasters and (civil)
wars. In 2010, these activities comprised 52% of IOM’s operational budget11;
(5) the IOM engages with discursive practices in the struggles over hegem-
ony in international migration policy. IOM issues a wide variety of publica-
tions, it regularly organizes conferences on migration issues or sends staff to
participate in such events. With secretarial functions it supports many gov-
ernment-led conference processes at regional and global levels. With the con-
cept of migration management12, IOM attempts to hold these very different
activities programmatically and strategically together.13
                                                
Bernd Kasparek, Jenseits von Staat und Nation. Warum Frontex abzuschaffen ist, in:
Informationsstelle Militarisierung (ed.), Frontex. Widersprüche im erweiterten Grenz-
raum, Tübingen 2009, pp. 39–42, http://www.imi-online.de/download/frontex2009-
web.pdf.
  8 See the IOM website and IOM’s organizational information provided at: http://
www.iom.int.
  9 Georgi, For the Benefit of Some, pp. 47f.
10 Celine Nieuwenhuys/Antoine Pécoud, Human Trafficking, Information Campaigns,
and Strategies of Migration Control, in: American Behavioural Scientist, 50. 2007, no.
12, pp. 1674–1695.
11 IOM, Summary Update on the Programme and Budget for 2010 (MC/2296). Geneva
2010, http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/about_iom/en
/council/99/MC_2296.pdf (7 Jun 2011).
12 As regards this concept see also the contribution of Bimal Ghosh in this volume.
13 For further analysis of IOM see Düvell, Globalisierung des Migrationsregimes; Mar-
tin Geiger, Internationale Regierungsorganisationen und die Steuerung von Migra-
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Since the late 1980s, the dual processes of neoliberal globalization and
the implosion of the Eastern bloc have provided IOM with a unique oppor-
tunity for growth and expansion. Since the mid-1980s, its membership has
more than quadrupled. While the struggles over migration, borders and (mi-
grant) rights intensified throughout the 1990s and 2000s and the control re-
gimes expanded, IOM expanded, too, into new operational and geographical
areas. In this context several human rights organizations, above all Amnesty
International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), began to accuse IOM for
violating the human rights of the very people it is tasked with assisting.14
As IOM expanded it became dependent even more than before on the
cooperation with local, operative NGOs to implement hundreds of new proj-
ects. But whereas IOM depicts its relationship with civil society organizations
as a mutual give and take15, its actual relations with NGOs are often strained.
An evaluation of IOM anti-trafficking programs in the Western Balkans
documents that IOM considers itself to be »the trafficking solver«.16 On the
contrary, NGOs believe that IOM instrumentalizes them to implement its
own projects and thereby ignores the NGOs’ unique positions and experi-
ences.17 Also, around 2003, several NGOs in Germany began to feel uncom-
fortable about future collaboration with IOM.18 Tellingly, such contentious
relations between IOM and local NGOs do not occur where IOM collaborates
                                                
tion, in: IMIS-Beiträge, 2007, no. 32, pp. 61–87; idem, Mobility, Development, Protec-
tion: The IOM’s National Migration Strategy for Albania, in: idem/Pécoud (eds.),
The Politics of International Migration Management, pp. 141–159; Georgi, For the
Benefit of Some; Jürgen Bast, International Organization for Migration (IOM), in:
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (ed.), Max
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Online Edition, Heidelberg 2011,
http://www.mpepil.com; Schatral, Categorisation and Instruction; Lise Ander-
sen/Sofie Havn Poulsen, The International Organization for Migration in Global
Migration Governance. Unpublished Master thesis, Roskilde University 2011.
14 Amnesty International/Human Rights Watch, Statement by Amnesty International
and Human Rights Watch to the Governing Council; Human Rights Watch, The In-
ternational Organization for Migration (IOM) and Human Rights Protection in the
Field. Current Concerns, London 2003, http://hrw.org/backgrounder/migrants
/iom-submission-1103.pdf (15 Jun 2011).
15 International Organization for Migration, IOM Partnership with Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) in Managing Migration (MC/INF/253), Geneva 2002,
http://www.iom.ch/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/about_iom/en/coun
cil/84/Mcinf253.pdf (22 Sep 2010).
16 Carolina Wennerholm/Eva Zillén, IOM Regional Counter-Trafficking Programme in
the Western Balkans, 2003, p. 76.
17 Ibid., pp. 78, 88; Geiger, Mobility, Development, Protection.
18 Theda Kröger/Nivedita Prasad, Fragen für das Treffen mit IOM, als Ergebnis eines
Erfahrungsaustausches am 27.11.03 bei Ban Ying, 2003; Personal interview with Ma-
rion Böker (KOK e.V.; April 2003).
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with new networks of civil society organizations, established and qualified
by the organization itself.19 It appears as though IOM partly avoids potential
problems with NGOs by subcontracting to organizations that, from the be-
ginning, are not its partners, but rather subordinates.
The variety of criticism of IOM by NGOs, human rights organizations,
liberal academics and others can be sensibly categorized in two categories.
The Legalistic Strategy
The first NGO strategy of criticism is the legalistic one. It denounces the IOM
for concrete violations of national and international laws. A good example is
the criticism IOM has drawn since October 2001 for running so-called
migrant processing centers on the Pacific islands of Nauru and on Manus
(Papua New Guinea) as part of Australia’s ›Pacific Solution‹. In the camps
hundreds of refugees, who were refused to enter Australia, were detained.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reproached20 IOM for be-
ing involved in the breach of a series of international laws such as the Body
of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention
or Imprisonment due to the bad conditions of detention21; the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (article 9: »No one shall be subjected to arbi-
trary arrest, detention or exile«)22 and of the UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child, article 37b (due to the prolonged detention of children).23 Amnesty
International concluded: The IOM
»has effectively become the detaining agent on behalf of the governments involved.
The absence of basic safeguard to prevent arbitrary detention raises questions about
the IOM’s responsibility for ensuring that its activities are not in violation of
international human rights and refugee law.«24
                                                
19 Bonnie Bernström/Anne Jalaka/Christer Jeffmar, Anti-Trafficking Activities in Cen-
tral Asia financed by Sida, Stockholm 2006.
20 Amnesty International, Offending Human Dignity. The Pacific Solution, London
2002, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA12/009/2002/en (6 Jun 2011);
Human Rights Watch, By Invitation Only: Australian Asylum Policy, London 2002,
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2002/12/10/invita-tion-only (6 Jun 2011).
21 Amnesty International, Offending Human Dignity, pp. 12–14; Human Rights Watch,
By Invitation Only, pp. 67–70.
22 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, New York 1948, http://
www.un.org/en/documents/udhr (28 Jun 2011).
23 Amnesty International, Offending Human Dignity, p. 13; Australian Human Rights
Commission, A Last Resort? National Inquiry into Children in Immigration Deten-
tion, Sydney 2004, ch. 6, 7 and 8: What is the impact of the ›Pacific Solution‹ on the
›shortest appropriate period‹?, http://www.hreoc.gov.au/human_rights/children_
detention_report/report/chap06.htm (6 Jun 2011); UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child, New York, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm#art37 (27 Jun 2011).
24 Amnesty International, Offending Human Dignity, p. 14.
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The Rights-Based Approach
With their second strategy of criticism, NGOs in principle affirm that migra-
tion control measures like visa, border controls, detention or deportations are
acceptable and legitimate – as long as these measures meet the requirements
of a rights-based approach, that is a generous interpretation of international
human rights and refugee law and a priority on the full protection of the
rights of refugees and migrants. In a typical formulation Human Rights
Watch et al. acknowledge that return operations like those conducted by
IOM are necessary:
»NGOs acknowledge that the credibility of the asylum regime does depend, to some
extent, on the return of persons who, after a full and fair determination procedure,
are found not to be in need of protection, to their countries of origin. Due attention
should however be paid to the following concerns«.25
In the following Human Rights Watch et al. add a long list of rights-based
qualifications, such as upholding the fundamental principle of non-refoule-
ment, taking into account the security situation in target countries, the physi-
cal integrity of the deportees during deportation and the ›sustainability‹ of
returns.
An argument that goes in a similar direction is the common complaint
of NGOs that IOM has »no protection mandate«26 – »protection«, the
UNHCR writes, »is usually defined as all activities aimed at obtaining full
respect of the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit
of the relevant bodies of law.«27 Unlike UNHCR, the IOM is neither man-
dated nor obligated by an international law treaty like the Geneva Refugee
Convention to protect the rights of the people with whom it works. In effect,
NGOs claim, that because the IOM lacks the authority and independence that
an international law mandate for protection would give it, IOM serves pri-
marily the interests and wishes of its donors and member state governments
– for whom the full protection of the rights of refugees and migrants might
                                                
25 Human Rights Watch (HRW) et al., NGO Background Paper on the Refugee and
Migration Interface. Presented to the UNHCR Global Consultations on International
Protection Geneva, 28–29 June, Geneva 2001, p. 12, http://www.hrw.org/en/repor
ts/2001/06/28/ngo-background-paper-refugee-and-migration-interface (5 May 2011).
26 Azadeh Dastyari/Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, Testimony at the Austra-
lian Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, in: Australian Senate
Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee (ed.), Hearing on the Migration
Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006, Canberra 2006, pp. 37–
49, here p. 46, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/comm
bill/9410/toc_pdf/4743-2.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22committees
/com mbill/9410/0004%22 (7 Jun 2011).
27 UNHCR, Protection of Persons Involved in Migration. Note on IOM’s Role, Geneva
2007, p. 1, para. 2, http://www.unhcr.org/4bf644779.html (15 Jun 2011).
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not be the first priority. Thus, Amnesty International demanded: »IOM
should not provide an alternative agency for states where they prefer to
avoid their human rights obligations.«28 This is also illustrated by the questi-
on the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) asked in its
newsletter from October 2004: »Is IOM an agency that will do anything as
long there’s money with which to do it?«29
IOM is frequently portrayed and criticized as a donor-driven agency for
which the monetary value of a project tends to supersede ethical or political
considerations. One reason for this donor-dependence is that IOM raises
about 96% of its overall budget through mostly temporary projects and
grants, funded by member states or other intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs).30 Thus, IOM is dramatically dependent on the successful acquisition
of new projects to save the jobs of its staff and keep its local offices.31 This fi-
nancial dynamic leads to a strong competition between NGOs and IOM over
donor money. Juliette Engel, head of the Moscow based MiraMed founda-
tion, sums up her experiences with IOM:
»I think that’s a pattern for [IOM]. To go in, take the resources, they really absorb
the resources that would be going to the NGOs. So they sort of intercept the
resources and dismantle NGO networks.«32
As a consequence, Juliette Engel argued, these policies made IOM »ineffec-
tive in terms of human rights«33, and that IOM took away money from local,
community-based NGOs who, in her opinion, worked effectively for the ›sus-
tainable‹ protection of people affected by trafficking.34
Anti-trafficking-work is a central field where NGOs accuse IOM for not
living up to the high-standards of a rights-based approach.35 NGOs make six
                                                
28 Amnesty International/Human Rights Watch, Statement by Amnesty International
and Human Rights Watch to the Governing Council, p. 2.
29 Manisha Thomas/Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop, Editorial. IOM, Darfur, and the
Meaning of Undermining, in: Talk Back. Newsletter of the International Council of
Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), 6. 2004, no. 1, http://www.icva.ch/doc00001253.html
#editorial.
30 For further details see: Georgi, For the Benefit of Some, p. 62f.
31 Personal interview: Staff members of the IOM headquarters, Geneva (September 2009).




35 An internationally binding definition of trafficking is fixed in the United Nations
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime (2002). Based on this definition NGOs, GOs, and IGOs strive to put
into practice the 3p-approach: to prevent trafficking, to protect people who were af-
fected by trafficking and to persecute trafficking as a criminal offence. Arguably,
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central accusations. They say that: (1) IOM’s assistance programs are defined
by a lack of legally fixed standards36; (2) IOM’s assisted voluntary returns of peo-
ple identified as victims of trafficking are often in fact mandatory returns due to
IOM’s restrictive understandings of voluntariness37; (3) returns within IOM-
programs often stigmatize the returnees in their home societies38; (4) IOM’s
assistance programs re-victimize the women affected by trafficking39; (5) IOM
shelter staff members treat affected persons in a paternalistic way40; (6) many
former victims of trafficking returned by IOM face scarce chances in their
home countries and are unable to start a new living.41 In sum, NGOs argue
that their own anti-trafficking-work aims to substantially empower women
affected by trafficking to claim their human rights and to gain back control
over their lives. In contrast, they portray IOM’s anti-trafficking-work as char-
acterized by a narrow, technocratic interpretation of human rights that limits
the support for people affected by trafficking to physical and psychological
elements of temporary wellbeing.42
A third, well-documented field where NGOs see IOM activities in op-
position to a rights-based approach are IOM’s AVR programs for persons
                                                
these rescue-industries contribute less to help trafficked people, than to contain mi-
gration through a stricter handling of visas and border crossings, applying new
technologies to reduce the number of those migrating or intimidating potential mi-
grants through anti-trafficking prevention campaigns. In contrast we would suggest
an anti-trafficking approach that supports people to use their mobility according to
their wishes, e.g. as a resource for gaining a better life (see Mirjana Morokvasic,
Transnational Mobility and Gender: a View from Post-Wall Europe, in: idem/Umut
Erel/Kyoko Shinozaki (eds.), Crossing Borders and Shifting Boundaries, vol. 1: Gen-
der on the Move, Opladen 2003, pp. 101–133).
36 Bärbel Heide Uhl, Zerrreissproben. Internationale und Europäische Menschenhan-
delspolitiken zwischen Kollateralschäden und Menschenrechtsschutz, in: Katrin
Adams (ed.), Frauenhandel in Deutschland, Berlin 2008, pp. 144–151.
37 Personal interview: Marion Böker (KOK e.V.; April 2003).
38 Barbara Limanowska, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in: Global Alliance Against Traf-
ficking in Women (ed.), Collateral Damage. The Impact of Anti-Trafficking Measures
on Human Rights around the World, Bangkok 2007, pp. 61–86, here p. 75; Elaine
Pearson, Half-Hearted Protection. What Does Victim Protection Really Mean for Vic-
tims of Trafficking in Europe?, in: Gender and Development, 10. 2002, no. 1, pp. 56–
59.
39 Limanowska, Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 76; Heide Bärbel Uhl/Claudia Vorheyer,
Täterprofile und Opferbilder. Die Logik der internationalen Menschenhandelspoli-
tik, in: Osteuropa, 56. 2006, no. 6, Special Issue: Mythos Europa. Prostitution, Migra-
tion, Frauenhandel, pp. 21–32, here p. 31.
40 Limanowska, Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 76; Wennerholm/Zillén, IOM Regional
Counter-Trafficking Programme in the Western Balkans, p. 31.
41 Limanowska, Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 75.
42 Personal interview: Marion Böker (KOK e.V.; April 2003).
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that states want to remove from their territory.43 The main point of conten-
tion between NGOs and IOM is whether or not these AVRs are in fact volun-
tary. NGOs criticize that, often, deportation by force, imprisonment or
destitution are the only other options.44 Under these conditions, NGOs say,
so-called voluntary returns are actually often mandatory returns.45 They see
them as a »cheaper variant of deportation.«46
Limits of Human Rights-Based Criticism: An Immanent Critique
The survey on NGO criticism of IOM has shown that, in public, NGOs affirm
the migration control measures IOM is involved in – while at the same time
sharply criticizing legal rights violations and the gap to the standards of a
rights-based approach. There is evidence, however, that many NGO workers,
human rights activists, academics and, in fact, many people within the liberal
mainstream, have an awareness of what we would call the fundamental in-
justice of migration controls. Stephen Castles for example argues that, while
few people may openly call for open borders, »many more of us might agree«
with »the defence of open borders based on ethical principles.«47 Tellingly, a
                                                
43 AVR programs that have been especially criticised include the certainly not-that-
voluntary return of Iraqi refugees from Jordan and Lebanon to Iraq (Human Rights
Watch, Flight from Iraq: Attacks on Refugees and other Foreigners and their Treat-
ment in Jordan, London 2003; Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch’s State-
ment to the IOM Council. Geneva 2007). Other IOM’s return programs have drawn
criticism include IOM’s work with internally displaced persons, namely in Sri Lanka
and Sudan/Darfur.
44 Human Rights Watch, Statement to the IOM Council, 27–30 November 2007 (94th
Session), Geneva 2007, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/11/28/human-rights-
watch-s-statement-iom-council (6 Jun 2011) see especially footnote 4; Human Rights
Watch, IOM and Human Rights Protection in the Field, pp. 4–8; Human Rights
Watch, Rot Here or Die There. Bleak Choices for Iraqi Refugees in Lebanon, London
2007, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/12/03/rot-here-or-die-there (30 Oct
2010).
45 European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), Position on Return by the Euro-
pean Council on Refugees and Exiles, Brussels 2003, p. 3, http://www.unhcr.org/4d
948adf9.pdf (15 Jun 2011); Stephan Dünnwald, Angeordnete Freiwilligkeit: Zur Bera-
tung und Förderung freiwilliger und angeordneter Rückkehr durch Nichtregierungs-
organisationen in Deutschland (Pro Asyl-Studie), Frankfurt-on-Main 2008, p. 83.
46 Thomas Berthold, Die zweite Säule der Abschiebepolitik. Der politische Rahmen der
freiwilligen Rückkehr, in: Flüchtlingsrat 104/105. 2005, pp. 57–60, here p. 57 (our
own translation).
47 Stephen Castles, A Fair Migration Policy – Without Open Borders, London 2003,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/people-migrationeurope/article_165 7.jsp (20 Apr
2011), own emphasis added. On practical grounds, however, Stephen Castles rejects
open borders because he believes that it would disadvantage workers in the indus-
trialized countries and therefore such a position will be marginalized and achieve
nothing.
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representative of the British think tank IPPR (Institute for Public Policy Re-
search), proponent of a managed migration-approach, complained in the
British Newspaper The Guardian: »[M]any migrant support groups make it
their mission to frustrate any return of refused clients, whatever the merits of
their case.« 48 And in an interview one IOM representative explained:
»[A] part of the NGO constituency […] believes a migrant should have the right to
stay where he wishes and wants to stay. I mean, it is a little bit blunt but that is
pretty much what a lot of people think. And [we are] an intergovernmental organ-
ization that lives in the real world of sovereign states, borders, and nationalities,
and residences categories, where what this group would like to see is never gonna
happen.« 49
Thus, beyond pragmatic strategies, the ethical principles mentioned by Ste-
phen Castles lead many people in the NGO community, in academic migra-
tion research and related fields to perceive a lot of IOM operations instinc-
tively as unjust. These ethical principles lead them to perceive it as wrong to
detain people who seek a better life in IOM-run migrant processing centers in
Nauru; they feel it is not just to force people who search for a better life in un-
seaworthy boats out to the sea because IOM-propagated integrated border
management prevents their legal entry; they think it is unfair to blackmail
people into IOM-conducted assisted voluntary return-programs. This kind of
ethical sensitivity often leads to an implicit attitude of solidarity, sympathy
and even practical support for the illegalized practices of refugees, migrants
and workers. Thus, while the individual consciousness of NGO staff and
some of their activities point towards a much more radical critique of IOM,
most of their public statements fall far short of it. The UK ›No One Is Illegal‹
Manifesto argues a similar point, saying that even people who reject all mi-
gration controls, sometimes do not openly say so because they fear to alienate
potential allies:
»The result is that the argument against controls is simply not presented. Many
people, perhaps most fair-minded people, if they are presented with the case, do
agree that in principle immigration controls are wrong, but may also believe that to
argue for their abolition is unrealistic.« 50
But what follows from this? In our view, the IOM is not criticized the way it
needs to be criticized; be it because of theoretical and political ambiguities or
                                                
48 Tim Finch, Immigration must be a Bigger Part of the Reform Agenda, in: The
Guardian, 2 Aug 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/aug/02/
immigration-part-of-reform-agenda (15 Jun 2011), own emphasis added.
49 Personal interview: Staff members of the IOM headquarters in Geneva (September
2009; own emphasis added).
50 Steve Cohen et al., No One Is Illegal Manifesto (UK), London 2003, http://www.
noii.org.uk/no-one-is-illegal-manifesto (15 Jun 2011).
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because of – understandable but still highly problematic – tactical considera-
tions and opportunism on part of the critics. In sum: To limit the criticism of
IOM and similar migration control institutions to legalistic points and a
rights-based approach, runs danger of missing the actual problem: In our
view the actual problem is that migration controls as such can never be fair
and just and adequate to the ideal of humans as free and equal beings. To us,
this demonstrates the need for an alternative approach to the critique of IOM.
As a first step towards such an approach, in the next section we develop its
ethical and political groundwork.
Groundwork for a Critical Theory of Migration Control
The Counter-Hegemonic Project of Global Freedom of Movement
Karl Marx regarded his critique of political economy in a specific relation to
the real struggles of the working class: »[Marx] criticizes the existing social
order from the point of view of real struggles against it, judging that workers’
struggles point towards a fuller realization of human freedom.«51 In a similar
way, we think that any critical theory of migration control must anchor and
build its critique on the ›real movements‹ of migration that struggle for free-
dom of movement on the face of the earth. Without aiming to be comprehen-
sive, we will sketch briefly the context and some episodes in the development
of these movements.
Roughly since the early 1980s, migration became a survival strategy for
many people in the Global South, set against a background of poverty, desti-
tution, Cold War-related (civil) wars and the social devastation inflicted on
large parts of the developing world by neoliberal structural adjustment pro-
grams and free trade. As a result of complex relations of forces, including
strong racist dynamics, (Western) industrialized states (over)reacted and con-
tinue to react with ever more restrictive, ever more repressive migration and
border controls, among them mandatory detention, illegalization, forced des-
titution and mass deportations. These state practices resulted in massive
human suffering, embodied in the thousands of refugees, migrants and
workers who die every year at the rich country’s borders. They drown in the
Mediterranean or off Australia’s northern coast; they die of thirst in the
Sahara or in the Arizona desert.
The control practices and their terrible effects have increasingly been
attacked since the 1980s by migrant groups, NGOs, social movements, trade
unions, churches and leftist organizations. What became clear in the last
three decades, though, was that their struggles against specific elements of
                                                
51 Paul Blackledge, Marxism and Ethics, http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=486 (Website of
International Socialism, article posted 6 Oct 2008) (6 Jul 2011).
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the new migration regimes were not succeeding in changing the course of
these regimes: While they prevented many individual deportations and,
often, the worst elements of new legislation, overall their political opponents,
the social forces pushing for more repression, forced through an ever more
extreme radicalization of control and exclusion. As a counter-reaction to this
radicalization of control, some sections of the movements fighting these de-
velopments radicalized their own political visions or applied older notions of
internationalism to the new, anti-racist struggles around migration: Since the
1990s, the demands for a more generous treatment of asylum-seekers or, if
only, the conformity of state practices with national and international law,
were accompanied by slogans like ›No One is Illegal‹, ›No Borders!‹ or
›Global Freedom of Movement‹.
Slowly, these ostensible utopian ideas are coalescing into a substantial
counter-hegemonic political project.52 In the 1980s, the Sanctuary movement in the
US set up a covert network to smuggle political activists and refugees from
the US-backed civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala to the US and hide
them from authorities. Today, similar groups provide water, food, orienta-
tion and rest to Latin American migrants crossing the Southern US deserts.
Both movements have drawn explicitly on the experiences and the heroic
spirit of the underground railroad that in the 19th century helped people en-
slaved in the South to escape to safety in the North and in Canada.53 In
1969/70 rebellious student groups in Germany campaigned under the slogan
›Tear the Foreigners Law apart!‹ (›Zerreißt das Ausländergesetz!‹), portray-
ing the law as a link in the chain of global imperialism.54 In 1983 the political
refugee Cemal Altun committed suicide by throwing himself out of a court-
room window in Berlin, to prevent his deportation to Turkey, where he was
threatened with torture. His death was a catalyst for the anti-racist migrant-
                                                
52 With the concept of counter-hegemonic political project we draw on Neo-Gramscian
political theory to describe a more or less loose, often only implicit or indirect coali-
tion of different social and political forces that coalesce around a specific political
aim or idea in order to challenge and alter an aspect of the existing hegemonic order
(Adam David Morton, Unravelling Gramsci. Hegemony and Passive Revolution in
the Global Political Economy, London 2007).
53 Renny Golden/Michael McConnell, Sanctuary. The New Underground Railroad,
Maryknol 1986; Welcome to Europe, No Border Lasts Forever Conference. From
Abolitionism to Freedom of Movement? History and Visions of Antiracist Struggles,
Frankfurt-on-Main 2010, http://conference.w2eu.net/files/2010/11/abolitionism.
pdf (1 Jun 2011); Luis Cabrera, Underground Railroads. Citizen Entitlements and
Unauthorized Mobility in the Antebellum Period and Today, in: Journal of Global
Ethics, 6. 2010, no. 3, pp. 223–238.
54 Niels Seibert, Vergessene Proteste, Münster 2008, pp. 133–139.
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solidarity movement in Germany. A broad coalition, among it the Green
Party, demanded the free movement of people on earth for the first time.55
In the mid-1990s the autonomous struggles of the ›sans-papiers‹ in
France strongly influenced and inspired anti-racist movements in Germany,
the UK and many other countries.56 In Germany, the racist violence of the
early 1990s and the inspiring example of the ›sans-papiers‹ contributed to a
radicalization of parts of the anti-racist movements. In 1994 refugees in Ger-
many began to organize as The VOICE Refugee Forum and since then the
group struggles continuously against legal discrimination, detention camps,
deportations, and the German residence restriction law for asylum-seekers
(Residenzpflicht).57 In 1997 the broad ›No One Is Illegal‹-network was
founded. From 1998 onwards a series of Antiracist (No)Border Camps began
at Germany’s eastern border. The concept of NoBorder Camps spread, and
camps were held in Poland (2001, 2003), Romania (2003) and the Ukraine
(2008), as well as in Spain (2001), France (2002), the UK (2007), the US (2007)
and Australia (2002).58 These camps became crystallization points for the
freedom of movement-project, as several generations of anti-racist activists
(and academics) were socialized there.
One key actor of these movements was the European NoBorder Net-
work, initiated in 1999 and comprising groups from Germany, France, Aus-
tria, Poland, Finland, Romania and the Ukraine.59 In 2002 the network initi-
ated a campaign against the IOM carrying the title ›Combat Global Migration
Management‹. The NoBorder activists singled out the IOM because it seemed
to have its finger in nearly every pie of migration control activities, all over
the world, making it a key factor in the »globalization of migration con-
trol«.60 They interpreted IOM’s concept of migration management as com-
bining two formerly distinct elements of migration policy: first, control-
measures like borders, illegalization, detention camps and deportation; sec-
ond, the selective recruitment of labor and the regulation of labor mobility.61
The NoBorder Network targeted IOM in a series of direct actions: In Novem-
                                                
55 Ibid., pp. 181–189; Kanak Attak/Vassilis Tsianos, Border Clash. Festung Europa.
Polysemie des Grenzregimes, Autonomie der Migration, 2002, http://www.rechtauf
legalisierung.de/text/border.html (7 Jun 2011).
56 Madjiguène Cissé, Papiere für alle. Die Bewegung der Sans Papiers in Frankreich,
Berlin 2002.
57 See The VOICE Refugee Forum website: http://thevoiceforum.org/taxonomy/
term/6.
58 NoBorder Network, About No Border, http://www.noborder.org/about.php
(22 Sept 2010).
59 Ibid.
60 Düvell, Globalisierung des Migrationsregimes.
61 Antirassismusbüro, Stop IOM, p. 22.
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ber 2002, protests were held at IOM offices in Berlin, Vienna and Helsinki. In
June 2003, during the G8-Summit in Evian, a major demonstration with 2,000
people marched to the IOM headquarters in Geneva. In August 2003, several
hundred people gathered for a rally in front of the IOM office in Bonn.62 Dis-
cursively, the NoBorder Network challenged the IOM in a number of articles,
leaflets and brochures. One pamphlet put the criticism into a nutshell: ›The
IOM, Spies and Migrant Hunters‹.63 In May 2003, the network released a 33-
minute anti-IOM documentary and in October 2004 it published a brochure
that documented activities and results of the campaign.64
Overall, the movements calling for global freedom of movement pro-
duced a series of key political documents that lay down their principles.65
The 1997 German manifesto of ›Kein Mensch ist illegal‹ (No One Is Illegal)
was calling, explicitly despite and against state laws,
»for the support of migrants on entry and the continuation of their journey […] for
the provision of work and identity papers […] for the supply of medical care,
education and training, accommodation and material survival, because no one is
illegal.«66
Thousands of individuals and organizations signed the call, including many
Members of Parliament. Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, in their book
                                                
62 Personal interview: NoBorder Activist (May 2009).
63 NoBorder Network, The IOM, Spies and Migrant Hunters. Campaign to Combat
Global Migration Management, http://www.noborder.org/iom/index.php (22 Sept
2010).
64 Antirassismusbüro, Stop IOM; Gina Bremen, The IOM, Spies and Migrant Hunters,
2003, 33 Min., VHS.
65 These political movements have also found expression in academic and philosophi-
cal debates, with a focus on political philosophy: Veit Bader, The Ethics of Immigra-
tion, in: Constellations, 12. 2005, no. 3, pp. 331–361; economics: Nigel Harris, Think-
ing the Unthinkable. The Immigration Myth Exposed, London/New York 2002; ge-
ography: Harald Bauder, Justice and the Problem of International Borders: The Case
of Canadian Immigration Regulation, in: ACME. An International E-Journal for
Critical Geographies, 2. 2003, no. 2, pp. 167–182. Among the most important works
are: Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, in: The Re-
view of Politics, 49. 1987, no. 2, pp. 251–273; Brian Barry/Robert E. Goodin (eds.),
Free Movement. Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and Money,
University Park 1992; Teresa Hayter, Open Borders. The Case Against Immigration
Controls, London 2004; Antoine Pécoud/Paul de Guchteneire (eds.), Migration
without Borders. Essays on the Free Movement of People, Oxford/New York 2007.
This literature, however, is very fragmented and authors do not take excessively ac-
count of each other. A detailed debate between them would be high time.
66 No One Is Illegal, Appeal: No One Is Illegal. Documenta X. Kassel, Germany, 1997,
http://archiv.antira.info/kmii/appell/proclaim.html (4 Jun 2011). For lists of signa-
tories see http://www.medialounge.net/lounge/workspace/cross_the_border/
DOCS/2/rightbar%281%29.html (28 Jun 2011).
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›Empire‹, proclaimed in 2000: »The multitude must be able to decide if, when
and where it moves. […] The general right to control its own movement is
the multitude’s ultimate demand for global citizenship.«67 The 2003 ›No One
is Illegal Manifesto‹ (UK) called in the clearest possible words for a world
without borders and the end to all immigration controls.68 With the 2006
›Call of Bamako‹ European and African movements joined together for »a
year long international mobilization in defence of the right of all people to
circulate freely around the world and to determine their own destiny.«69 And
on 5 February 2011, during the 11th World Social Forum in Dakar, Senegal,
the ›World Charter of Migrants‹ was proclaimed on the Isle of Goreé near
Dakar, a symbolic place for the transatlantic slave trade. The Charter declares:
»Since we all belong to the Earth, all people have the full right to freedom of
movement and settlement on our planet anywhere on this earth. […] All laws in
regard to visas, laissez-passer and authorizations as well as all those limiting the
freedom of movement and settlement must be abolished.«70
In our view, these struggles and movements create social relations, experi-
ences, practices, affects, feelings, norms, ideas and thoughts that point
towards an internationalist, post-national or cosmopolitan solidarity. They
point towards a world that is beyond the one that IOM helps to shape
through migration management, migrant processing centers and assisted voluntary
returns. They reveal an immoral reality, provide a basis for its critique and
produce the relations, experiences, affects that are necessary to overcome it.
Friedrich Engels once described Marx’ critique of political economy as
»nothing but the reflex, in thought of the social conflicts endemic to capital-
ism.«71 Similarly we understand our critical theory of IOM and migration
controls to be one reflex in thought to these struggles of migration.
Critical Theory as an Unfolded Existential Judgement
In the classic text, ›Traditional and Critical Theory‹ Max Horkheimer de-
scribed critical theory as »unfolding a single existential judgement«.72 An
existential judgement is a statement on how practices and circumstances
could be and ought to be. Other than a categorical judgment (»It is like that.
                                                
67 Michael Hardt/Antonio Negri, Empire, Cambridge, MA 2001, p. 400.
68 Cohen et al., No One Is Illegal.
69 Polycentric World Social Forum, For The Dignity and The Respect of Migrants, Ba-
mako 2006, http://www.manifeste-euroafricain.org/spip.php?article37 (6 Jun 2011).
70 World Assembly of Migrants, World Charter of Migrants, Declaration of the World
Assembly of Migrants in Gorée 2011, http://www.blaetter.de/archiv/dokumente
/world-charter-of-migrants (6 Jun 2011).
71 Blackledge, Marxism and Ethics.
72 Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory. Selected Essays, New York 1972, p. 227.
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Nothing can change it«) and a hypothetical judgement (»This may be so. Or it
may be different«), critical theory as an existential judgement declares: »It
must not be like this, men can alter being, the conditions to do so already
exist.«73 Alex Demirović explains that theoretical analysis as unfolded exis-
tential judgement »includes the proposition about whether specific social
conditions should or should not exist«, it includes a »negative judgement
with regard to the continued existence of the concrete ontological order«74
that is target of the critique. Marx himself demonstrated in emphatic prose
one of the existential judgements underlying his theory when he attacked the
reactionary state of affairs in Germany in 1844:
»War on the German state of affairs! By all means! They are below the level of
history, they are beneath any criticism, but they are still an object of criticism
like the criminal who is below the level of humanity but still an object for the
executioner. In the struggle against that state of affairs, criticism is no passion of
the head, it is the head of passion. It is not a lancet, it is a weapon. Its object is its
enemy, which it wants not to refute but to exterminate. For the spirit of that state
of affairs is refuted. In itself, it is no object worthy of thought; it is an existence
that is as despicable as it is despised. Criticism does not need to make things clear
to itself as regards this object, for it has already settled accounts with it. It no
longer assumes the quality of an end-in-itself, but only of a means. Its essential
pathos is indignation, its essential work is denunciation.«75
Similarly, John Holloway, an Irish-Mexican Marxist argues that the starting
point of theoretical reflection is opposition, negativity, struggle. »It is from
rage that thought is born, not from the pose of reason, not from the reasoned-
sitting-back-and-reflecting-on-the-mysteries-of-existence.«76 Yet, before we
can unfold the specific critique of IOM, we think it necessary to at least
sketch briefly the philosophical, ethical and political reasoning that lets us
arrive at a position so starkly removed from positions publicly voiced in the
mainstream today. In the following we sketch six arguments in favor of
global freedom of movement that we hold to be especially relevant:77
                                                
73 Ibid.
74 Alex Demirović, Kritik und Materialität, Münster 2008, p. 32f. (our own translation).
75 Karl Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduc-
tion, Paris 1844, www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.
htm (28 Jun 2008).
76 John Holloway, Change the World without Taking Power. The Meaning of Revolu-
tion Today, London 2005, p. 1.
77 As the philosophical, academic and political debate on these questions is still in its
very early stages, these arguments may appear partly additive or contradictory.
They are preliminary and by presenting them we hope to foster further debate.
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(1) Global freedom of movement as end in itself: Today, at least in theory,
freedom of movement within a national territory is enshrined as a basic hu-
man right. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 states in arti-
cle 13(2): »Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each state.«78 We hold that in the same way global free-
dom of movement must be understood an end in itself, as a good in its own
right and as a condition to realize meaningful human freedom in a globalized
world. In a world so deeply inter-connected as ours, to discriminate and
hierarchically order people according to citizenship, and to privilege fellow
national citizens or compatriots over people with a different citizenship or peo-
ple living in different countries, starkly undermines the conditions for human
freedom. Authors using the concept of cosmopolitan justice have argued that
today the nation-state can no longer be the ethico-political frame of reference.
It must be the global scale, a cosmopolitan realm.79
(2) Global justice: Second, we hold that at the very least as long as there
is dire poverty and massive inequality in life chances, any restriction to
global freedom of movement cannot be justified because the normative good of
a life without destitution for all overrules almost all other considerations that
might justify restrictions. Moreover, today’s inequality is the result of a
»history of conquest, colonialism, and imperialism. […] The starting positions
of the better- and the worse-off are a result of massive crime, force, and
fraud.«80 Since the 1970s migrant activists are shouting: »We are here
because you were there.« In the 1990s they reformulated it to: »We are here
because you destroy our countries.«81
(3) »Citizenship is like feudal privilege«: In an often-quoted passage, Jo-
seph H. Carens argues:
»Citizenship in Western liberal democracies is the modern equivalent of feudal
privilege – an inherited status that greatly enhances one’s life chances. Like feudal
birthright privileges, restrictive citizenship is hard to justify when one thinks about
it closely.«82
                                                
78 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, New York 1948, http:
//www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/Language.aspx?LangID=eng (30 May 2011).
79 Omid A. Payrow Shabani, Cosmopolitan Justice and Immigration. A Critical Theory
Perspective, in: European Journal of Social Theory, 10. 2007, pp. 87–98; Seyla Ben-
habib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens, Cambridge 2004.
80 Bader, Ethics of Immigration, p. 344.
81 Arun Kundnani, The End of Tolerance. Racism in 21st Century Britain, London/Ann
Arbor 2007, p. 22; The Voice Refugee Forum, We are here because you destroy our
countries! Solidarity against deportations! Caravan Tour from May 19th to June 4th
2007, pamphlet, http://thecaravan.org/files/caravan/Call_Tour_07_en.pdf (28 Jun
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82 Carens, Aliens and Citizens, p. 252.
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This argument confronts migration controls with the promises of the human
rights discourse: If all humans are free and equal, have the same worth and
dignity, then all privileges that come from arbitrary criteria of a person or a
group are indefensible and must be abolished.83 Since the Enlightenment a
series of grand struggles have been led about the abolition of such arbitrary
institutions, among them the distinctions between nobels/serfs and free-
men/slaves, the caste-system, the superiority of men over woman, the dis-
crimination of non-Whites and of LGBTI84-people. While almost none of
these power relations have disappeared, what has changed is that they once
appeared to be completely self-evident and natural (appeared so at least to
the superior side). In the past, especially white people thought that of course a
black person cannot have the same rights as them; men thought that of course
women were inferior to them. And today most citizens of rich, industrialized
countries think that of course a non-citizen cannot have the same rights as
them, that naturally foreigners living somewhere else must be excluded from
the citizenship privileges they enjoy. What we argue is that whereas in the
19th and 20th centuries the great emancipatory struggles to end discrimina-
tion based on race, caste, gender or sexuality were led primarily within the
nation-state, in the globalized world of the 21st century the political,
economic, social and ethical frame for struggles of emancipation has been
irreducibly expanded to the transnational sphere. Thus, the historic struggle
for the abolition of migration continues in the 21st century as the successor of
the older abolitionist struggles against feudal privileges, slavery or patriar-
chy.
(4) Migration controls and capitalism: Stable and profitable capital accu-
mulation was and is always based upon other, intersecting relations of domi-
nation and social hierarchization85: Capitalism was and is build on racism
that legitimized colonialism, slavery, and racially segregated labor markets;
capitalism was and is based on patriarchy that provided free or cheap repro-
ductive labor of women; and capitalism relies on discrimination based on
                                                
83 In its core this is of course a liberal bourgeois argument because it implies that in
capitalist societies inequality is morally acceptable if it is based on differences in
merit, hard work, private enterprise or event inherited ›talent‹ and if there are equal
opportunities. Leftists and especially Marxists reject privileges derived from capitalist
competition and confront them with their principle of: »From each according to his
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citizenship because it leads to the juridical disenfranchisement of »migran-
tised«86 workers, even their illegalization. As a consequence, their position
vis-à-vis capital and the state is weakened, which allows for more intensive
exploitation. The profitability of whole economic sectors is built on this, with
famous examples being agribusinesses in Spain and the US.87 The struggle
for the abolition of migration controls, then, is another reiteration of the long-
ongoing struggle to emancipate those sections of the global working class88
that are most disenfranchized and that, because of it, allow capital to con-
tinue accumulation despite all of its crisis tendencies.
(5) Migration controls as global apartheid: Migration controls and borders
stabilize the capitalist world system because they regulate its massive ine-
qualities by containing them, violently, in distinct spatial territories. Migra-
tion controls make it possible for the citizens of rich countries to largely
ignore the dire conditions in the developing world because the people living
under these conditions are spatially confined to their home countries. They
are imprisoned within a system of »global apartheid«.89 This global apart-
heid is materialized in the institutions of migration and border controls,
among them IOM.
(6) Exit is voice: The consequence is that most people in the periphery
have no effective exit-option to escape from inhuman living conditions. And
because they have no exit-option, their voice is weakened:
                                                
86 In our view, the process in which people are socially constructed as different kinds
of migrants has to be problematised. The effect of constructing people as migrants is
to position them at the periphery of today’s nationalised political communities. As
used today, migrants and migration are methodologically nationalist concepts: Nina
Glick-Schiller, A Global Perspective on Transnational Migration: Theorizing Migra-
tion without Methodological Nationalism, Working Paper No. 67 (Centre on Migra-
tion, Policy and Society, University of Oxford), Oxford 2009. In order to overcome
methodological nationalism and its exclusionary and hierarchising effects, we sug-
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crucial part of a critical engagement with migration and border regimes. Instead of
using the migrant concept it would be analytically and politically more productive
to either speak and write in a humanist way about people, or in a more historical-
materialist sense about workers who belong to a global working class; Marcel van
der Linden, Workers of the World. Essays toward a Global Labor History, Leiden 2008.
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teurs Locaux et l’Inclusion Sociale des Ouvriers Agricoles Marocains dans la Pro-
vince Espagnole d’Almería, in: Migrations Société, 102. 2005, no. 17, pp. 215–233.
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Linden, Workers of the World.
89 Étienne Balibar, We, the People of Europe?, Princeton 2004, p. 113.
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»›Exit‹ – to claim one’s freedom of movement and to migrate in order to find a
different, better life, and ›Voice‹ – to raise one’s voice and struggle locally, are not
contradictory, they are rather mutually intertwined.«90
›Exit‹ functioned as ›voice‹ in 1989 as the migration of thousands of people
from the state-regimes of the Eastern bloc were a key factor in their downfall.
In patriarchal marriages husbands only stop to treat woman in oppressive
ways, if and when women have the effective exit-option to divorce and to
live independent lives. ›Exit‹ as the right to leave any country is enshrined in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 13(1): »Everyone has the
right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.«91
Thus, because exit is voice, for billions of people in the ›developing world‹
visa regimes, border controls and immigration restrictions massively weaken
their position in the national as well as in the international relations of forces –
and thereby perpetuating their inferior status. Global freedom of movement,
then, would have the effect to massively improve the power position of the
subaltern classes of the developing world. It may be that only then the aim of
ending poverty and achieving global justice can finally be achieved.
An Existential Judgement on the IOM
Now the ethical and political existential judgement that is unfolded in our
critical theory can be formulated, at least roughly: In the previous three dec-
ades the struggles of migration have mercilessly exposed the hypocrisy of
migration controls. It is intolerable to live in a world where a minority
defends its privileges with an ever more extreme radicalization of border
controls, detention and deportations. It is unbearable to live in a system of
global apartheid, materialized in IOM’s migrant processing centers, assisted
voluntary returns and the ideology of migration management that aims to
confine, to steer and to disenfranchise the movements, hopes and aspirations
of human beings seeking a better life. Most fair-minded people know the
situation is intolerable. They know because the practices of migration have
made it clear to them: desperate but determined border crossings in deadly
peril, everyday appropriation of rights to stay, to education and to medical
services, uprisings in deportation prisons and the continuous, conscious
struggles of the ›sans-papiers‹, the NoBorder movements, of NGOs resisting
every single deportation or the activists of the new underground railroad. To
                                                
90 Afrique-Europe-Interact/Welcome2Europe/kritnet, Freedom, Not Frontex. There
cannot be Democracy without Global Freedom of Movement, 2011, http://w2eu.
net/files/2011/03/fsf.en-freedom.not_.frontex.pdf (24 Jun 2011).
91 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Towards a Critical Theory of Migration Control: The Case of the IOM
213
actualize today the radical emancipatory promises of the Enlightenment92
means to assert: Migration controls need to be abolished. The abolition of
migration controls is an indispensable, irreducible condition of human free-
dom.
But the concrete utopia of global freedom of movement is not about the
formal equality of bourgeois monads who, in their capacity as laboring wage
workers and entrepreneurs, can then finally circulate and compete without
limits on the capitalist world market. The negation of migration controls is
also strategically necessary because it is part of a much broader negation. It is
part of a historic effort that is motivated by Marx’ »categoric imperative to
overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, abandoned,
despicable essence.«93 In this effort, critical scholarship has a role to play. For
Max Horkheimer, critical theory
»is not just a research hypothesis which shows its value in the ongoing business of
men. It is an essential element in the historical effort to create a world which
satisfies the needs and the powers of men […]. Its goal is man’s emancipation from
slavery.«94
Based on our current knowledge, the IOM appears to be a serious hindrance
to this effort. The organization not only passively affirms migration controls,
as today still the vast majority of people in the privileged countries do. In-
stead, the analysis shows that the IOM actively propagates and contributes to
the modernization and perfection of the system of global apartheid by per-
forming control functions, expanding state capacities and rationalizing con-
trols with its utilitarian migration-management ideology. Thus, in a way, our
critique of IOM »does not need to make things clear to itself as regards this
object, for it has already settled accounts with it.«95 To a certain degree, then,
the urgently necessary extensive and sober empirical analysis of IOM serves
to provide detail, sophistication, adequacy and faculty of judgement (Ur-
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teilskraft) to an existential verdict on IOM whose »essential pathos is indig-
nation, its essential work is denunciation.«96
This judgement has no ultimate, indubitably philosophical or even
meta-physical justification. But by grounding it in a reflection of real strug-
gles it is anchored in actual, historical reality and its dynamics.97 What we
have formulated is only the groundwork of a critical theory. The proper work
of critique as critical theory only starts from here.
Methods for a Critical Theory of Migration Control
Two Methods: Immanent Critique and Radical Contextualization
Marx and Marxism have been interpreted as rejecting ethics and morality
and instead performing cold-hearted analysis of economic categories. In fact,
Marx criticized bourgeois morality and ethics as a tool to gloss over and
partly civilize the immoralities of capitalist society. But as is evident in many
of his emphatic formulations, he was very much motivated by moral notions
of justice or human dignity.98 With his method of immanent critique he and
other critical theorists turned bourgeois morality against itself. Marx propa-
gated this method in memorable words as he attacked the reactionary state of
affairs in Germany in 1844:
»The point is not to let the Germans have a minute for self-deception and
resignation. The actual pressure must be made more pressing by adding to it
consciousness of pressure, the shame must be made more shameful by publicizing
it. Every sphere of German society must be shown as the partie honteuse
[eyesore] of German society: these petrified relations must be forced to dance by
singing their own tune to them!«99
In following Marx’ method, we argue that IOM and other migration control
institutions must be criticized immanently from their own alleged stand-
point, that is the liberal promises of the international human rights discourse.
We have already employed this method in our evaluation of the human
rights criticism directed against IOM and within some of the arguments
making the case for the abolition of migration controls. To put it simply, part
of the critique should be to see how these organizations’ practices match up
with their own rhetoric.
But historical-materialist critical theory cannot stop here: »Immanent
critique attacks social reality from its own standpoint, but at the same time
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criticizes the standpoint from the perspective of its historical context.«100
Therefore, a second crucial method of critical theory is a radical historical and
structural contextualization of the object of critique and its manifold ele-
ments, categories and concepts. It’s a critique of ideology in the sense that it
fundamentally analyses the historical processes that have brought about, for
example, the migration management-ideology. To criticize the IOM, then,
means to deeply analyze how the organization and its concepts and catego-
ries are bound up with specific historic structures of power and domination,
how it is embedded in social, economic and political dynamics, how it is as-
sociated with concrete spatio-temporal materializations and tied up with the
associated strategically organized interests. It also means to ask the cui-bono
question: Who benefits?101
Critique in the form of such a fundamental analysis is necessary be-
cause its sole reason to exist is to fundamentally change society. And because
it is a means to that end, in its analysis of society it cannot allow itself to be
anything but as level-headed and objective as it possibly can. Critical theory is
not ideological or dogmatic. It does not mix up aim and diagnosis, nor hope
and understanding. Again: Marx saw critique not as an emotional passion of
the head. Critical theory is the sober head that grows out of passionate ethical
and political negativity. It is a determined head that analyses patiently and
thoroughly to unmake the conditions that breed the negated object.102
In the following sections we outline preliminary elements of such a cri-
tique by analyzing and contextualizing the development of IOM since the
1970s.
The Crisis of the 1970s
Capitalist societies are centrally driven and structured by the constant need
to maintain stable and profitable capital accumulation. Private corporations
and the capitalist state, by way of taxes, are dependent on it. This ubiquitous,
overarching need to create constant growth, as it is normally referred to, is
difficult to fulfill because there are various factors that tend to decrease the
profit rate and bring about crisis. This is what happened in the 1970s. In
terms of regulation theory103, the global recession of 1973 was the final crisis
of the Fordist mode of regulation of Western post-war capitalism, character-
ized by class compromises and relatively strong workers movements. Cen-
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trally it was a profit crisis.104 As the crisis intensified there were bitter politi-
cal and ideological battles over strategies to overcome it and re-increase
profits. As is known, it was neoliberalism that prevailed in becoming the new
hegemonic project, dominating politics, economy and even culture for at
least the three decades of 1979–2008 (and, as it appears now, much longer
than that). Neoliberal reforms (deregulation, privatization, finanzialization
and free trade: 1989 summarized in the ›Washington Consensus‹) were
pushed through in intense societal struggles in country after country and in
the international sphere. European states established the common market,
the G7 countries and transnational corporations promoted the globalization
of production and trade, and capital markets were largely deregulated.105
These so-called reforms defined the conditions for the changing migration
policies since the early 1980s – and for the expansion and transformation of
IOM. Two neoliberal strategies have become especially relevant for migration
policy: First, it was what David Harvey describes as »accumulation by dis-
possession«, second it was the regulation of transnational labor mobility un-
der the imperative to optimize its utility for growth.
Neoliberalism in the Periphery:
Accumulation by Dispossession as a Historical Chance for IOM
Several neoliberal strategies to overcome the low profit rates of the 1970s and
1980s targeted directly or had deep effects on the periphery. In large parts of
the so-called developing world, millions of people reacted with community-
supported migration projects to the shock strategy106 of IMF structural ad-
justment programs that followed the debt crisis of the early 1980s. Economic
reforms and the political manipulation of crises resulted in an »accumulation
by dispossession«.107 People could no longer survive as small-hold farmers in
competition with international agribusinesses. Millions were driven from
their lands, or lost jobs after public companies became privatized, public sec-
tor spending was reduced, or when uncompetitive firms could no longer
survive after their local markets were opened to transnational corporations.
As postcolonial societies were trapped between the double gears of forced
world market integration and hegemonic power interventions in the context
first of the Cold War, then the ›War on Terror‹, local elites took to ethnic
identity politics and state terrorism to assert their power, thereby fuelling
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wars, civil wars and mass oppression.108 Thus, millions of people began to
move from villages to towns and cities and from peripheral countries to capi-
talist core regions. The post-war migration control apparatuses of Western
industrialized countries, among them the IOM (or ICEM/ICM109 as it was
known until 1989) were no match for these new migration movements that
flexibly adapted to new political regulations by subverting or circumventing
them.
The reactions of industrialized countries to these new migration
movements varied. In general, however, sooner or later they institutionalized
new migration and border policies that were more restrictive than before, less
generous for asylum-seekers and deeply hostile towards all but the most
›useful‹, mostly highly qualified migrant workers. Terms like ›The Wall
around the West‹110 and ›Fortress Europe‹ were applied widely to describe
these processes. A major reason for these developments were the independ-
ent and at the same time intersecting dynamics of racism, directed especially
against non-White immigrants, workers and asylum-seekers in many West-
ern countries. There was, however, no real consensus on more restrictive
policies or even ›zero-immigration‹. Since the 1970s, different capital factions
and political forces within the industrial countries disagreed sharply over
tightened migration controls. This often resulted in lax enforcement and the
tacit, if controversial, acceptance of immigration as long as the ›migrantized‹
workers and working refugees were actively illegalized by state policies.111
It was in this situation, in the 1980s, that Western countries began to
establish dozens of new institutions for migration control and migration
research and exhibited a serious interest in international cooperation in the
field for the first time. This was a historical chance for IOM. From the early
1960s onwards ICEM/IOM had experienced a severe crisis: Steady economic
growth in Western Europe and the Iron Curtain between East and West re-
duced the demand for ICEM’s services. Its institutional existence was openly
questioned. From 1961 to 1981, ten member states left the organization,
among them Canada and Australia.112 Only slowly ICEM diversified its
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activities, taking pains to prove its continued utility to its member states.113
In the mid-1970s, ICEM-Director General John F. Thomas failed to convince
skeptical member states to make it a permanent organization by reforming its
constitution. It was only in 1987 that IOM succeeded in mobilizing the sup-
port of its member states for a reform of the Constitution, thereby widening
its mandate, becoming a permanent agency and increasing its member-
ship.114
This enhancement from ICEM (a commission) to IOM (a permanent
organization) must be understood before the historical background: As mil-
lions of people in the periphery were dispossessed of old forms of subsistence
or wage labor through accumulation by dispossession and as some of them
reacted with migration projects to the industrialized countries, migration be-
came to be seen by Western governments as a new problem. In the mid-1980s,
an International Organization for Migration became to be seen by them as a use-
ful thing to have. The utility of IOM for Western governments was further
fuelled by the disappearance of the Iron Curtain after 1989 and the shock
therapies of privatization and market-reforms in Eastern Europe and the CIS-
countries.115 Thus, the reform and expansion of IOM since the early 1990s
was an element of a complex process in which hegemonic forces in Western
industrialized countries tried to shift the balance of forces between their mi-
gration control capacities on the one side and the mobility strategies that
people employed as a reaction to neoliberal reforms on the other.
IOM Migration Management as a Neoliberal Strategy to Solve
the Labor Problem
A second neoliberal strategy that had severe effects on migration policy and
on the IOM was the regulation of labor mobility. The control of labor, its re-
production, its mobility, its skills and the condition of its exploitation belong
to the key problems firms and states have to solve in order to maintain stable
and profitable accumulation. For capital, in order to stay competitive, the
structural problem is to maximize its flexibility in the utilization of labor in
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terms of wages, conditions and quantity.116 Transnational labor regimes that
target the world labor market aim to solve some of these problems. There
have been at least three neoliberal strategies that focus on labor to increase
profits and growth117: (1) Changing local conditions for the exploitation of labor:
limiting trade union influence, reducing wages, flexibilization and deregula-
tion of labor laws, education, illegalizing workers; (2) Moving production to
where labor is: foreign direct investments, relocation of production sites,
outsourcing; (3) Moving labor to where production is: migration policy, man-
aged migration, contract labor.
The implementation of managed migration policies in many industri-
alized countries since the 1990s was, then, a version of the third strategy. It
was an attempt to overcome crisis tendencies and to increase economic
growth and stabilize accumulation by optimizing labor supply and condi-
tions of the exploitation of migrant labor. Migration became to be seen as
positive because and insofar it helped to meet skill and price-specific labor
demand. IOM’s migration management discourse has been interpreted by
many critical scholars as a strategy to make migrants’ labor available and
retrievable in order to utilize it in the process of capital accumulation and to
anchor this strategy in the emerging global elite consensus on migration pol-
icy.118 But IOM’s migration management project is more complex. It is the
attempt to forge a compromise. Against the background of stiff opposition
from nationalist and racist social forces in the industrialized countries, the
migration management compromise propagates restrictive border controls
and effective deportation regimes as necessary preconditions to make a »re-
gulated openness«119 for the economically desirable politically feasible.120
IOM tries to advance this compromise by depolitizing the deeply political
concepts of its migration management-discourse as apolitical and technical
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necessities, as just reasonable, and thereby constructing the particularist in-
terests behind it as the general interest. Rutvica Andrijasevic and William
Walters have pointed out that IOM’s
»reformulation of the border in terms of technical norms, standards, and regu-
lations and their implementation through networks and partnerships allows the
control of borders to be represented as ›beyond politics‹.«121
To sum up: One key reason why state migration controls expanded and have
become more restrictive since the 1980s and, thus, why IOM has expanded
into the role to support states and building up their control capacities, was
that governments needed to react to the counter-reactions of peripheral
populations to accumulation by dispossession and other neoliberal reforms.
These counter-reactions were migration projects, unintended and unwanted
by the industrialized states. The societal relations of forces within the indus-
trialized countries and increasingly also newly industrializing countries were
strongly shaped by racism and nationalist anti-immigration mobilizations.
Moreover, there was a deep hegemony in these states, that effective migra-
tion controls should be upheld and that state control capacities had to adapt
to the new situation. State institutions reacted to the challenges that the
mobility projects of peripheral refugees, workers and other migrants posed to
them. But there was another, more offensive element of migration control
within the neoliberal hegemonic project: It was the attempt to regulate the
mobility of labor and the conditions of exploitation for migrant labor
according to rationality of maximizing economic growth. The IOM became
instrumental for its rich state donor governments in both dimensions of the
new migration controls – and it grew and expanded accordingly.
Conclusions
We started out in this article by describing the two ways in which IOM and
other migration control institutions are mostly criticized: the legal strategy
and the confrontation with standards of a rights-based approach. We then
moved on to establish the groundwork of our alternative approach of critique
by sketching some episodes of the struggles that coalesce in the counter-
hegemonic project for global freedom of movement. We pointed out six ar-
guments that make the case for an abolition of migration controls. We also
roughly outlined the existential judgement that is unfolded in our own criti-
cal analysis. In the previous section, we demonstrated the method of radical
contextualization by locating the massive expansion of IOM within the geo-
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political and economic transformation and struggles in the capitalist world
system since the 1970s.
By way of conclusion, we highlight three points, which in our view,
should be debated among (critical) scholars, NGO staff, activists, people
subjected to migration controls and others. First, we think it is crucial to have
a broader exchange between researchers, NGOs and others working with or
about IOM in order to correct misinterpretations, achieve faculty of judge-
ment and, overall, advance a critical engagement with the organization. Sec-
ond, our aim was to contribute to the on-going discussion on the ground-
work, justification, self-conceptions and methods of critical migration and
border regime studies. In our view, further development of the series of argu-
ments and analyses we made the case for global freedom of movement
would be productive. It would also be interesting to make explicit and then
debate the mostly implicit existential judgements that underlie different critical
approaches. Third, we think that the critique of different migration control
institutions can function along similar patterns. While each critique must be
informed and ultimately structured by an intensive knowledge and deep
analysis of its object, we think that the framework and the methods sketched
here can be productively applied to other institutions.
Some of the ideas we have developed in this text may appear rather
radical – and they are. But they are a reaction to a historical situation charac-
terized by massive human suffering and deep hypocrisy. In a way, to us,
global freedom of movement is the only realistic solution. We think the
authors of the ›No One is Illegal Manifesto‹ are right when they concede:
»The struggle against the totality of controls is certainly uphill.« But, they ar-
gue, »the achievement of fair immigration restrictions […] would require a
miracle.«122
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Workshop ›Disciplining Global Movements. Migration Management and
its Discontents‹
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The aim of the two-day event was to bring together renowned experts, practi-
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IMIS-Day 2010: The New Politics of International Mobility
and Workshop: Disciplining Global Movements. Migration
Management and its Discontents (12 and 13 November 2010)
Duncan Cooper
On the 12th and the 13th November, 2010, academics from around the world
met at the IMIS Institute (Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural
Studies) of the University of Osnabrück in Germany to critically evaluate the
concept of migration management and to appraise some of the ideas which
have been developed in the recently published book ›The Politics of Interna-
tional Migration Management.‹1 On the first day, the 12th November, the in-
stitute played host to an international conference in which strategies adopted
towards dealing with international mobility were critically appraised in five
keynote speeches and a panel discussion. On the second day, a series of short
presentations were given by early-stage researchers and scholars from a
range of different academic disciplines working on issues connected to the
management of migration in different parts of the world, although the large
majority of the presentations focused on Europe. Both the conference and
workshop were made possible by the funding from the Robert Bosch
Stiftung. The first section of this report briefly summarizes the speeches given
on the 12th November. The second section subsequently sums up some of the
more important issues discussed in the workshop which took place the fol-
lowing day.
The conference started with a few introductory remarks by the director
of the IMIS Institute, Andreas Pott. These were then followed by a more de-
tailed introduction into the subject of migration management by the two or-
ganizers of the event, Martin Geiger (IMIS Osnabrück) and Antoine Pécoud
(UNESCO Paris). Both stressed that while the term ›migration management‹
was now frequently used when discussing migration, very few attempts had
been undertaken to precisely define the concept. In this context, the organis-
ers added that one of the aims of the conference was to critically assess
whether migration management represented merely a new way of talking
                                                




about migration or a genuinely new approach towards dealing with migra-
tion flows.
Virginie Guiraudon (University of Lille) discussed this issue in the
day’s first presentation. The professor of political science questioned whether
international organizations (IOs) employed catch-all phrases such as the
much cited ›triple-win situation‹, whereby well managed migration can be a
benefit for all parties involved (i.e. the countries of origin, the countries of
destination and the migrants themselves), and ›global governance‹ as smoke-
screens in order to push through their own agendas. She further emphasized
that a fragmentation in the field of migration management was taking place
due to the presence of increasing numbers of non-state actors engaged in mi-
gration management. Thus while the term migration management lacked on
the one hand a degree of substance, the proliferation of actors was on the
other allowing states and the EU as a whole to choose which issues they
wished to address. The result had been an increasing diversification in the
policies employed towards managing migration.
The lack of a coordinated strategy for dealing with the effects of migra-
tion at a Global or European level was bemoaned by the Chief of Staff of the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) headquarters in Geneva, Pe-
ter Schatzer, in the day’s second presentation. Mr Schatzer commented that
the absence of a single migration strategy severally hampered the work of
both the IOM and other organizations involved in managing migration. This
was because the IOM, in the same way as many other organizations involved
in migration management, is financed to a great extent through projects car-
ried out on the behalf of individual states and supranational organizations
(chiefly the European Union). In this context Mr. Schatzer added that the
IOM was required to apply separately for funding for each individual project
and was hence unable to make coherent, long-term plans.
The next presentation was given by John Bingham, the Head of Policy
of the International Catholic Mission Commission (ICMC) in Geneva. In a
similar way to Mr. Schatzer, Mr. Bingham stressed the urgent need for a
global response to the phenomenon of migration. He highlighted the reac-
tionary, remedial nature of the migration strategies employed by European
states and stressed that differing interests meant that European states did not
always adopt identical policies on issues related to migration (e.g. the differ-
ences between the percentage of refugees whose asylum petitions were offi-
cially recognized in differing countries). The short-sighted, state-orientated
nature of European migration policies prevented the development of more
coherent strategies capable of doing justice to the complex nature of modern-
day migration flows.
In the day’s fourth presentation, William Walters (Carleton University,
Ottawa) examined how an increasing fear of migration had led states to be-
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come more and more security conscious in their approach towards migration
in the last few years. He critically appraised three different aspects of this in-
creasing securitization of migration during his presentation. Mr. Walters
showed initially that the ›policing‹ of transport routes (i.e. at ports of entry,
state boundaries etc.) had a significant influence on the public’s perceptions
of migrants. Mr. Walters labeled the conflicts which were taking place at the
level of road (used as a metaphor to refer to all forms of transport) ›viapoli-
tics‹. The political scientist also suggested that the threat of uncontrolled in-
ternational migration was resulting in perceptions of belonging to a country
or nation increasing in importance – something which he labeled ›domopoli-
tics‹ in allusion to the Latin term ›domos‹ meaning ›home‹ or ›domestic‹. In
the final part of the presentation, Mr. Walters explained how recent attempts
to securitize and tighten national borders had gone hand in hand with a cer-
tain ›humanitarization‹ of migration management. By way of an example,
Mr. Walters contrasted the attempts to securitize the US-Mexican border of
the last few years with the humanitarian action of placing of water barrels
along different sections of the border.
The day’s final keynote speech was given by Bimal Ghosh. The re-
nowned former UN migration expert and IOM Chief Consultant noted that,
while attempts to manage migration were in themselves not new, the expres-
sion ›migration management‹ had been avoided up until the late 1980s. This
was only to gradually change from the early 1990s onwards in wake of the
new political and economic situation which had emerged following the col-
lapse of communism. The editor of the seminal work ›Managing Migration.
Time for a New International Regime?‹2 added that neither an open-door
policy favored by sections of the business community nor a restrictive, state-
centred approach were capable of adequately responding to the challenges
posed by migration in today’s world. Instead, Mr. Ghosh argued that migra-
tion flows could best be managed by developing a set of comprehensive rules
aimed at turning migration into a more predictable process. He labeled an
approach of this nature ›regulated openness.‹ The conference finished with a
discussion about the new politics of international mobility, during which fu-
ture scenarios, critical perspectives and research gaps were discussed. The
five keynote speakers together with Catherine de Wenden (Sciences Po,
Paris), Andreas Pott (Osnabrück) and Antoine Pécoud (UNESCO, Paris) par-
ticipated in a lively discussion on the issue of migration management in
which both elements of the speeches and issues which had not been men-
tioned were discussed.
                                                




The international workshop ›Disciplining Global Movements. Migra-
tion Management and its Discontents‹ that took place the following day (13
November) was able to examine different aspects of the concept of migration
management in a little more depth. Around 30 academics participated in the
workshop, organized by Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud. The workshop
was divided into three parallel sessions, each of which concentrated on a dif-
ferent aspect of the migration management paradigm.
The first session examined the discourse of migration management
which has developed in the past few years. Migration management has, in
the words of one of the participants, Christina Oelgemöller (University of
Sussex/UK), »come to stand for the recognition that migration is a normal
feature of today’s globalized world and should be more than the control of
immigration by northern governments.« However, many participants criti-
cized the concept as being too Eurocentric, and as merely serving the inter-
ests of European states. An example given here was the instrumental use of
development aid to reduce migration pressures from developing countries
(Janine Kisba Silga, European University Institute, Florence). In addition, dis-
cussions on migration management tend to produce a discourse which fits
the needs of what Antonina Levatino (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona)
labeled the »central knots« of an increasingly interlinked, globalized system.
In this respect the supposed ›win-win-win‹ situation can be exposed as being
indeed to a certain extent an ›empty shell‹ which conceals the true hegemonic
nature of the new migration discourse.
The second session critically evaluated international organizations and
the management of migration. The number of international organizations in-
volved in this field has increased exponentially in the last few years, espe-
cially following the adoption of the Global Approach to Migration by the
European Commission in 2005. While increasing numbers of international
bodies are now involved in migration management, the extent to which their
involvement represents merely a continuation of a restrictive approach to
migration was critically examined in many of the papers (e.g. Bernd Kas-
parek, University of Munich and Fabian Wagner, University of Frankfurt-on-
Main). In this context many presentations actively discussed the connection
between the policies carried out by IOs and conceptualization of migration
management by European states, who together with the European Union
largely finance programs in developing countries (Clotilde Caillault, Univer-
sity of Amsterdam, and Nadia Khrouz, NGO ›GADEM‹, Rabat). The
involvement of IOs in migration management has increasingly allowed states
and the EU to transfer responsibility of difficult projects to these non-
governmental organizations and to thereby depoliticize issues related to
migration. In this context some participants criticized the work of IOs as rep-
resenting a mere continuation of the restrictive policies towards migration
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which states had previously employed (e.g. Fabian Georgi, University of
Frankfurt-on-Main and Susanne Schatral, University of Bremen).
The third session examined practices of migration management. Vari-
ous different aspects of migration management were highlighted by scholars
presenting papers during this session. One of these presentations examined
the possible advantages and disadvantages of partnership programs for de-
veloping countries by making reference to the mobility partnership recently
signed between Cape Verde and the European Union (José Pina-Delgado,
University of Praia). The challenges faced by states when dealing with the
presence of illegal migrants in their territory were also highlighted in some of
the presentations given in this session. In this context Anne Koch (Berlin
Graduate School for Transnational Studies) highlighted on the one hand the
problems states experience in balancing humanitarian concerns with the de-
sire to assert their sovereign right to control access into their territory. On the
other hand, Adèle Garnier (University of Leipzig) showed that European
states are increasingly interested in following the Australian example of se-
lecting which refugees they want to accept and thus integrating asylum into
a strategy of migration management.
Both the conference and the workshop succeeded in highlighting some
of the reasons why states are becoming increasingly interested in managing
migration flows. However, the various presentations given during the two
days also showed many of the problems of this new discourse. In addition, it
remains to be seen whether the unpredictable nature of migratory move-
ments, and especially of refugees and other displaced persons, can ever be
truly ›managed‹.
Duncan Cooper wrote his PhD at the University of Osnabrück in Germany. His
PhD thesis is entitled ›Immigration and German Identity in the Federal Republic of
Germany from 1945 to 2006.‹ His research interests include nationalism, migration
and recent German history.
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